[tor-relays] Public Munin Graphs: Security Risk?

[Linus Nordberg]

Moritz Bartl <moritz at torservers.net> wrote
Tue, 29 Jan 2013 16:54:58 +0100:

| I finally deployed Munin across our exit nodes. The graphs are currently
| public, and I don't see an obvious reason for not doing that. Any
| objections?
| 
| https://www.torservers.net/munin/

Thanks, that's interesting data.

FWIW, DFRI publish 5 minute average stats per site, for sites where we
have exit relays [0][1]. There is a one hour delay in publishing the
data. We might switch to per-relay data when our sites with Tor in them
push more than 0.1% non Tor traffic or so.

On a side note, comparing our graphs with Torservers.net's made us
wonder why our relays don't max out at the same time while
Torserver.net's apparently do that. Or are we reading the graphs in the
wrong way? It looks like the 10 graphs in
https://www.torservers.net/munin/torservers.net/aggregates/index.html
follow each other very closely while the DFRI graphs show, f.ex., max
traffic yesterday in sto0 between 19:00 and 21:30 (CET) but 12:30 to
22:30 (CET) in sto2.

It might of course be the case that one or more of our relays have
trouble keeping up with the pace. Some of them do complain about not
keeping up and others about both failing DNS servers and "Address
mismatch on received DNS packet" (eventdns). Log printouts don't seem to
correlate with changes in the graphs though so I doubt that this is the
reason.

[0] https://dfri.se/__trafstats__/em1.100.html
[1] https://dfri.se/__trafstats__/em1.3021.html