[tor-relays] Help the Tor Project by running a fast unpublished bridge

[Lorenz Kirchner]

I guess, that would require a modification of the path selection on the
> clients
> side. Usually, Tor clients randomly pick relays weighted by bandwidth.
> Unless
> the Chinese relays would provide an enormous amount of bandwidth, they
> would
> barely get selected by clients which leads to a poor user experience.
>

well compared to now the experience would be better, eventually the
reachable Chinese relays would connect it just might take a while on first
startup



>
> Perhaps it's better to focus on improved bridge distribution strategies
> [0] and
> hard-to-block transport protocols [1]. Also, that would be a universal
> solution
> which would also help in other countries and not a specific - and probably
> hard
> to maintain - Chinese-only solution.
>

I think the solution is not a Chinese only solution as it would work
anywhere where censorship actually exists



>
> I guess, the firewall operators would notice that quite soon when Chinese
> relays
> would start popping up in the consensus or am I missing something here?
> And as
> soon as something is in the consensus, it's particularly easy to block.
>

I am not sure how it works but I have a feeling that the firewall operators
have difficulties in blocking hosts inside their networks

>
> Aren't these 20 mbit only achievable with domestic traffic? I thought that
> international traffic gets throttled a lot in China?
>

my experience is that I can actually get *up to* 20 mbit of international
traffic, but realistically it is more like 10 mbit of reliable traffic,
still ok I feel... the gfw mostly causes latency, inside gfw i can get ping
times of around 4ms whereas ping through the VPN is about 250ms to the
westcoast of the US.. that ping time has an effect on throughput I guess
and also the bandwidth will can vary in what I guess are peak times..

Well if tor could provide a working system of bridges or whatever it would
be great, but at the moment the censors are ahead..

Loz
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