[tor-project] Anti-censorship team meeting notes, 2023-09-28
onyinyang
onyinyang at torproject.org
Thu Sep 28 16:25:31 UTC 2023
Hey everyone!
Here are our meeting logs:
http://meetbot.debian.net/tor-meeting/2023/tor-meeting.2023-09-28-15.57.html
And our meeting pad:
Anti-censorship work meeting pad
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THIS IS A
PUBLIC PAD
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Anti-censorship
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Next meeting: Thursday, Oct 05 16:00 UTC
Facilitator: meskio
Weekly meetings, every Thursday at 16:00 UTC, in #tor-meeting at OFTC
(channel is logged while meetings are in progress)
This week's Facilitator: onyinyang
== Goal of this meeting ==
Weekly check-in about the status of anti-censorship work at Tor.
Coordinate collaboration between people/teams on anti-censorship at the
Tor Project and Tor community.
== Links to Useful documents ==
* Our anti-censorship roadmap:
* Roadmap:
https://gitlab.torproject.org/groups/tpo/anti-censorship/-/boards
* The anti-censorship team's wiki page:
*
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/team/-/wikis/home
* Past meeting notes can be found at:
* https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-project/
* Tickets that need reviews: from sponsors, we are working on:
* All needs review tickets:
*
https://gitlab.torproject.org/groups/tpo/anti-censorship/-/merge_requests?scope=all&utf8=%E2%9C%93&state=opened&assignee_id=None
* Sponsor 96 <-- meskio, shell, onyinyang, cohosh
* https://gitlab.torproject.org/groups/tpo/-/milestones/24
* Sponsor 150 <-- meskio working on it
*
https://gitlab.torproject.org/groups/tpo/anti-censorship/-/issues/?label_name%5B%5D=Sponsor%20150
== Announcements ==
== Discussion ==
- Update on snowflake domain fronting issues:
- problem with cdn.sstatic.net affected more than just snowflake,
also moat, conjure (no deployment change required)
- fixed in new tor browser update but some users relying on
snowflake/moat bridges will be unable to update
- relying on a the same new front may be detrimental to improve
connection issues for some users, perhaps a pool of randomly selected
domains would improve the situation:
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/merge_requests/182
== Actions ==
== Interesting links ==
== Reading group ==
* We will discuss "" on
*
* Questions to ask and goals to have:
* What aspects of the paper are questionable?
* Are there immediate actions we can take based on this work?
* Are there long-term actions we can take based on this work?
* Is there future work that we want to call out in hopes
that others will pick it up?
== Updates ==
Name:
This week:
- What you worked on this week.
Next week:
- What you are planning to work on next week.
Help with:
- Something you need help with.
cecylia (cohosh): 2023-09-28
Last week:
- rdsys merge request !157
- wrote a feature for snowflake that allows multiple domain fronts
-
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/merge_requests/182
- wrote a forum post for the domain fronting issue with moat
-
https://forum.torproject.org/t/temporary-fix-for-moat-and-connection-assist/9385
- looked into orbot use of circumvention settings api
- https://github.com/guardianproject/orbot/issues/983
This week:
- finish deploying lox distributor
- follow up on conjure reliability issues
- visualize and write up some snowflake shadow simulation results
Needs help with:
dcf: 2023-09-21
Last week:
- snowflake CDN bookkeeping
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/team/-/wikis/Snowflake-costs/diff?version_id=4a6fa36c5bfc350fa01a5fe774b297f6fcddb51c
- noticed a problem with the fastly domain front and
coordinated with cohosh to analyze it
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/anti-censorship-team/2023-September/000314.html
Next week:
- revise encapsulation.ReadData redesign to return an error in
the case of a short buffer
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/merge_requests/154
- open issue to have snowflake-client log whenever KCPInErrors
is nonzero
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/issues/40262#note_2886018
- parent:
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/issues/40267
- open issue to disable /debug endpoint on snowflake broker
Before EOY 2023:
- move snowflake-02 to new VM
Help with:
meskio: 2023-09-21
Last week:
- make fake descriptors for rdsys (rdsys#171)
- document rdsys development process (rdsys#131)
- use the right content-type in moat (rdsys#175)
- add token authentication to onbasca requests (rdsys#174)
Next week:
- add a DB for bridges to rdsys (rdsys#56)
Shelikhoo: 2023-09-28
Last Week:
- [Merge Request Awaiting] Add SOCKS5 forward proxy support to
snowflake (snowflake!64) (stalled)
- Write Tor Spec for Armored URL
- Remove Go 1.20 CI for Snowflake:
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/merge_requests/184
- Consolidated Snowflake Update
dependencies:https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/merge_requests/185
- Merge request reviews
Next Week/TODO:
- Write Tor Spec for Armored URL(continue)
- Merge request reviews
onyinyang: 2023-09-28
Last week(s):
- Still need to merge the updated dependencies and make MR to
upstream ZK lib:
- found bug in the zkp crate and will push a change to this
to the upstream branch
- reach out to dalek-cryptography maintainers to give them
a heads up and get a sense of the plan for zkp lib
- we may end up maintaining the zkp lib
- Finished changes to rdsys API at the /resources endpoint
to meet the needs of Lox
- Working on required changes to lox-distributor
This week:
- Hopefully,finish up with the dependencies issue
- Finish up changes to Lox distributor
- continue with metrics
(long term things were discussed at the meeting!):
https://pad.riseup.net/p/tor-ac-community-azaleas-room-keep
- brainstorming grouping strategies for Lox buckets (of
bridges) and gathering context on how types of bridges are
distributed/use in practice
Question: What makes a bridge usable for a given user, and
how can we encode that to best ensure we're getting the most appropriate
resources to people?
1. Are there some obvious grouping strategies that we
can already consider?
e.g., by PT, by bandwidth (lower bandwidth bridges
sacrificed to open-invitation buckets?), by locale (to be matched with a
requesting user's geoip or something?)
2. Does it make sense to group 3 bridges/bucket, so
trusted users have access to 3 bridges (and untrusted users have access
to 1)? More? Less?
--
---
onyinyang
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