[tor-project] Anti-censorship team meeting notes, 2023-11-16
meskio
meskio at torproject.org
Thu Nov 16 16:31:03 UTC 2023
Hey everyone!
Here are our meeting logs:
http://meetbot.debian.net/tor-meeting/2023/tor-meeting.2023-11-09-16.00.html
And our meeting pad:
Anti-censorship
--------------------------------
Next meeting: Thursday, Nov 16 16:00 UTC
Facilitator: meskio
Weekly meetings, every Thursday at 16:00 UTC, in #tor-meeting at OFTC
(channel is logged while meetings are in progress)
This week's Facilitator: onyinyang
== Goal of this meeting ==
Weekly check-in about the status of anti-censorship work at Tor.
Coordinate collaboration between people/teams on anti-censorship at the Tor Project and Tor community.
== Links to Useful documents ==
* Our anti-censorship roadmap:
* Roadmap:https://gitlab.torproject.org/groups/tpo/anti-censorship/-/boards
* The anti-censorship team's wiki page:
* https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/team/-/wikis/home
* Past meeting notes can be found at:
* https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-project/
* Tickets that need reviews: from sponsors, we are working on:
* All needs review tickets:
* https://gitlab.torproject.org/groups/tpo/anti-censorship/-/merge_requests?scope=all&utf8=%E2%9C%93&state=opened&assignee_id=None
* Sponsor 96 <-- meskio, shell, onyinyang, cohosh
* https://gitlab.torproject.org/groups/tpo/-/milestones/24
* Sponsor 150 <-- meskio working on it
* https://gitlab.torproject.org/groups/tpo/anti-censorship/-/issues/?label_name%5B%5D=Sponsor%20150
== Announcements ==
* changed to a read-only pad:
* https://pad.riseup.net/p/r.9574e996bb9c0266213d38b91b56c469
== Discussion ==
* Dual stack (IPv4/6) bridges support
* https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/issues/40885
* the changes in cached-extrainfo work fine in rdsys
* we'll need to wait for the patch to be ready in c-tor
== Actions ==
== Interesting links ==
*
== Reading group ==
* We will discuss "" on
*
* Questions to ask and goals to have:
* What aspects of the paper are questionable?
* Are there immediate actions we can take based on this work?
* Are there long-term actions we can take based on this work?
* Is there future work that we want to call out in hopes that others will pick it up?
== Updates ==
Name:
This week:
- What you worked on this week.
Next week:
- What you are planning to work on next week.
Help with:
- Something you need help with.
cecylia (cohosh): 2023-11-09
Last week:
- conjure bridge maintenance
- caught a bug in safelog library
- https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/issues/40306
- caught problem with domain front in conjure
- https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/conjure/-/issues/38
This week:
- lox tor browser UX integration
- lox distributor testing
- look into alternative domain fronting providers
Needs help with:
dcf: 2023-11-09
Last week:
- revised encapsulation.ReadData redesign to return an error in the case of a short buffer https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/merge_requests/154#note_2962562
- security upgrade to tor 0.4.8.8 on snowflake bridges https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/issues/40305
- sent emails to make contacts for uTLS-like fingerprint obfuscation in pion/dtls
Next week:
- open issue to have snowflake-client log whenever KCPInErrors is nonzero https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/issues/40262#note_2886018
- parent: https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/issues/40267
- open issue to disable /debug endpoint on snowflake broker
Before EOY 2023:
- move snowflake-02 to new VM
Help with:
meskio: 2023-11-16
Last week:
- experiment with testing bridges more frequently by bridgestrap (bridgestrap#39)
- investigate why OSX TB installers didn't work in telegram (onionsproutsbot#57)
- investigate why rdsys tests are failing for multiconfig (rdsys!196)
- restart bridgedb to fix the email distributor that was not responding emails
- test the whatsapp user in rdsys-frontend-01 (tpa/team#41370)
- test the patch for dual stack (IPv4/6) bridges and if it works with current rdsys (tor#40885)
- finish the pad archival for the hackweek (hackweek#16)
Next week:
- keep working on a frequent bridgestrap
Shelikhoo: 2023-11-16
Last Week:
- Work on snowflake performance improvement (WIP): https://gitlab.torproject.org/shelikhoo/snowflake/-/tree/dev-speedwithudp?ref_type=heads
- Merge request reviews
Next Week/TODO:
- Write Tor Spec for Armored URL (continue)
- Work on snowflake performance improvement (WIP): https://gitlab.torproject.org/shelikhoo/snowflake/-/tree/dev-speedwithudp?ref_type=heads
- Merge request reviews
onyinyang: 2023-11-09
Last week(s):
- Continued work on Lox telegram bot
- Hackweek: Docs for Lox https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/community/hackweek/-/issues/20
This week:
- Hackweek: Docs for Lox https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/community/hackweek/-/issues/20
- Publish Lox crates to crates.io
(long term things were discussed at the meeting!): https://pad.riseup.net/p/tor-ac-community-azaleas-room-keep
- brainstorming grouping strategies for Lox
buckets (of bridges) and gathering context on how types of bridges are
distributed/use in practice
Question: What makes a bridge usable for a
given user, and how can we encode that to best ensure we're getting the
most appropriate resources to people?
1. Are there some obvious grouping
strategies that we can already consider?
e.g., by PT, by bandwidth (lower
bandwidth bridges sacrificed to open-invitation buckets?), by locale (to
be matched with a requesting user's geoip or something?)
2. Does it make sense to group 3
bridges/bucket, so trusted users have access to 3 bridges (and untrusted
users have access to 1)? More? Less?
--
meskio | https://meskio.net/
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
My contact info: https://meskio.net/crypto.txt
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Nos vamos a Croatan.
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