[tor-project] Anti-censorship team meeting notes, 2023-12-07
Shelikhoo
shelikhoo at torproject.org
Thu Dec 7 17:09:59 UTC 2023
Hey everyone!
Here are our meeting logs:
http://meetbot.debian.net/tor-meeting/2023/tor-meeting.2023-12-07-15.57.html
And our meeting pad:
Anti-censorship work meeting pad
--------------------------------
Anti-censorship
--------------------------------
Next meeting: Thursday, Dec 14 16:00 UTC
Facilitator: cohosh
Weekly meetings, every Thursday at 16:00 UTC, in #tor-meeting at OFTC
(channel is logged while meetings are in progress)
This week's Facilitator: shelikhoo
== Goal of this meeting ==
Weekly check-in about the status of anti-censorship work at Tor.
Coordinate collaboration between people/teams on anti-censorship at the
Tor Project and Tor community.
== Links to Useful documents ==
* Our anti-censorship roadmap:
*
Roadmap:https://gitlab.torproject.org/groups/tpo/anti-censorship/-/boards
* The anti-censorship team's wiki page:
*
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/team/-/wikis/home
* Past meeting notes can be found at:
* https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-project/
* Tickets that need reviews: from sponsors, we are working on:
* All needs review tickets:
*
https://gitlab.torproject.org/groups/tpo/anti-censorship/-/merge_requests?scope=all&utf8=%E2%9C%93&state=opened&assignee_id=None
* Sponsor 96 <-- meskio, shell, onyinyang, cohosh
* https://gitlab.torproject.org/groups/tpo/-/milestones/24
* Sponsor 150 <-- meskio working on it
*
https://gitlab.torproject.org/groups/tpo/anti-censorship/-/issues/?label_name%5B%5D=Sponsor%20150
== Announcements ==
== Discussion ==
will wait for cohosh to be around:
* manifest v3 deprecation in browsers and snowflake webextension
*
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake-webext/-/issues/29
* https://developer.chrome.com/blog/resuming-the-transition-to-mv3/
* google chrome will stop supporting mv2 June 2024
* will the snowflake webextension stop working? do we want to
do something? or just recommend firefox?
== Actions ==
== Interesting links ==
*
== Reading group ==
* We will discuss "NetShuffle: Circumventing Censorship with
Shuffle Proxies at the Edge" on December 14
* https://www.cs-pk.com/papers/3/
* Questions to ask and goals to have:
* What aspects of the paper are questionable?
* Are there immediate actions we can take based on this work?
* Are there long-term actions we can take based on this work?
* Is there future work that we want to call out in hopes
that others will pick it up?
== Updates ==
Name:
This week:
- What you worked on this week.
Next week:
- What you are planning to work on next week.
Help with:
- Something you need help with.
cecylia (cohosh): 2023-11-09
Last week:
- conjure bridge maintenance
- caught a bug in safelog library
-
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/issues/40306
- caught problem with domain front in conjure
-
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/conjure/-/issues/38
This week:
- lox tor browser UX integration
- lox distributor testing
- look into alternative domain fronting providers
Needs help with:
dcf: 2023-11-30
Last week:
- did some review of SQS rendezvous merge request
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/merge_requests/214
- answered a question about AMP cache rendezvous in China
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/issues/40308
Next week:
- open issue to have snowflake-client log whenever KCPInErrors
is nonzero
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/issues/40262#note_2886018
- parent:
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/anti-censorship/pluggable-transports/snowflake/-/issues/40267
- open issue to disable /debug endpoint on snowflake broker
Before EOY 2023:
- move snowflake-02 to new VM
Help with:
meskio: 2023-12-07
Last week:
- prepare and give a talk in the Open Source Security Summit
- grant writing
- investigate gettor telegram not distributing android apks,
was a bug on the TB release
- break down rdsys staging server and fill up the disk with logs
Next week:
- prepare settings anti-listing logic to be reused by HTTP
distributor (rdsys#181)
- setup rdsys staging server (rdsys#170)
Shelikhoo: 2023-12-07
Last Week:
- Work on snowflake performance improvement (WIP):
https://gitlab.torproject.org/shelikhoo/snowflake/-/tree/dev-speedwithudp?ref_type=heads
Now udp-like transport is slightly faster than tcp-like
ready for a review of its draft
- Merge request reviews
Next Week/TODO:
- Write Tor Spec for Armored URL (continue)
- Work on snowflake performance improvement (WIP):
https://gitlab.torproject.org/shelikhoo/snowflake/-/tree/dev-speedwithudp?ref_type=heads
- Merge request reviews
onyinyang: 2023-11-30
Last week(s):
- Finished up remaining docs tasks for crates.io publishing
-published all relevant Lox crates to crates.io
- SOTO anti-censorship team presentation preparation
- looked into Telegram bot
- attempted hyper upgrade, many breaking changes so this will
take some work
This week:
- continue Telegram bot dev
- attempt hyper upgrade again
- Splintercon
(long term things were discussed at the meeting!):
https://pad.riseup.net/p/tor-ac-community-azaleas-room-keep
- brainstorming grouping strategies for Lox
buckets (of bridges) and gathering context on how types of bridges are
distributed/use in practice
Question: What makes a bridge usable for a
given user, and how can we encode that to best ensure we're getting the
most appropriate resources to people?
1. Are there some obvious grouping
strategies that we can already consider?
e.g., by PT, by bandwidth (lower
bandwidth bridges sacrificed to open-invitation buckets?), by locale (to
be matched with a requesting user's geoip or something?)
2. Does it make sense to group 3
bridges/bucket, so trusted users have access to 3 bridges (and untrusted
users have access to 1)? More? Less?
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