[tor-project] Plan to double-check Tor Browser initial download numbers

[Yawning Angel]

On Mon, 17 Jul 2017 21:41:40 -0400
Roger Dingledine <arma at mit.edu> wrote:

> On Mon, Jul 17, 2017 at 07:54:14PM -0400, Ian Goldberg wrote:
> > Any chance you (i.e. a script) could replace the IP address with
> > HASH(IP||salt) for a randomly chosen salt that you don't know, and
> > which is deleted when the 30 minutes are up, before you get access
> > to the log file?  
> 
> See https://www.eff.org/policy#cryptolog for how EFF does something
> similar. It looks like they use 24 hour intervals, and they do this
> all the time, but hopefully their cryptolog tool will be helpful if
> we opt to use it for the short term.
> https://github.com/efforg/cryptolog

Would a prefix preserving scheme a la Crypto-PAn[0] be more useful?
http://www.cc.gatech.edu/computing/Telecomm/projects/cryptopan/

Regards,

-- 
Yawning Angel

[0]: nb: the scheme as presented and the reference code needs a slight
tweak.
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