[tor-project] Remove mercurius4 obfs4 bridge from Tor Browser?
isis agora lovecruft
isis at torproject.org
Thu Aug 4 22:51:32 UTC 2016
David Fifield transcribed 1.8K bytes:
> On Mon, Jul 18, 2016 at 08:42:30PM -0400, David Goulet wrote:
> > On 18 Jul (17:36:54), David Fifield wrote:
> > > According to my and Lynn Tsai's bridge reachability measurements, the
> > > default obfs4 bridge mercurius4 has not been running for a few months.
> > >
> > > It was refusing connections in March and April, and more recently has
> > > just been timing out. Time to remove it?
> > >
> > > pref("extensions.torlauncher.default_bridge.obfs4.6", "obfs4 104.131.108.182:56880 EF577C30B9F788B0E1801CF7E433B3B77792B77A cert=0SFhfDQrKjUJP8Qq6wrwSICEPf3Vl/nJRsYxWbg3QRoSqhl2EB78MPS2lQxbXY4EW1wwXA iat-mode=0");
> >
> > I'm not sure what's the requirement to get a bridge in Tor Browser but if you
> > are looking for a replacement, I've set up an obfs4 bridge couple weeks ago on
> > a server that is pretty fast an with a nice port (443). If it could be useful,
> > please let me known!
Yes, this would be great! We need a lot more bandwidth for the TB default
obfs4 bridges — the current bridges are pretty saturated.
> Yes, we're interested in having more bridges. Let's coordinate with Lynn
> and the TB maintainers so we can start measuring its reachability in
> advance. You should first block the bridge's ORPort, in order to keep it
> out of BridgeDB--that will help us in our blocking-delay experiment.
Were tickets ever created for removing mercurius4 and adding David Goulet's
bridge?
--
♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
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