[tor-onions] Connection to a hidden service with a RFC 6455 web-socket - advice on risks please
Alec Muffett
alec.muffett at gmail.com
Tue Mar 6 18:55:18 UTC 2018
On 6 March 2018 at 17:54, Michael Jonker <michael at openpoint.ie> wrote:
> 2) Bisq 's infrastructural backbone runs as a P2P network over TOR
> network. Clients talk to each other and there are various hidden services
> providing network resources.
>
At the risk of blowing my own trumpet, I tried writing up suggestions for
hardening hidden services to preserve their anonymity:
https://github.com/alecmuffett/the-onion-diaries/blob/master/basic-production-onion-server.md
...although the above was written long before I got seriously into EOTK,
and into the amazing benefits of using Unix-domain sockets to connect my
webservers and tor-daemons.
Aside: the benefits of Unix-domain sockets include:
- massively increased resistance to socket-table-filling
denial-of-onion-service attacks, and faster recovery times
- (probably) lower latency
- reduced (but not eliminated) risk of IP metadata leakage of internet
address, etc, because less reliance on network addresses
But between *that* document, and some of the tech in EOTK, there may be
some useful hardening tips for you.
- alec
--
http://dropsafe.crypticide.com/aboutalecm
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