[tor-onions] Connection to a hidden service with a RFC 6455 web-socket - advice on risks please

[Alec Muffett]

On 6 March 2018 at 16:55, Michael Jonker <michael at openpoint.ie> wrote:

> I have connected to my hidden service with RFC 6455 web-socket and feel
> like a kid in a candy store streaming API requests and return data back and
> forth at good, reliable speeds.


Yay! Good to hear news of new successes.  I found websockets a bit messy to
approve (it seemed that one of the TBB security plugins got in the way?)
but once they were approved, it was fine.



> My concern is that I am missing something here.....
>
> My mental model is that, once the connection and http upgrade request is
> established, TOR sees this as a long running http request and will will not
> close the circuit or change the route until the either side breaks the
> connection.
>

That is my understanding, too.



> I would appreciate if someone could comment:
>
> 1) Am I correct in my mental model?
>

I have the same model.


2) Am I perpetrating a security anti-pattern by holding the connection open
> indeterminately?
>

I would say 'no', but then you have not stated a threat-model yet.  What
are you trying to achieve, and what are the capabilities of your threat
actors?

    -a


-- 
http://dropsafe.crypticide.com/aboutalecm
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