[tor-dev] bridge:// URI and QR codes

[meskio]

Quoting Michael Rogers (2022-08-02 13:23:30)
> Another thing that would be useful for this scenario would be for 
> BridgeDB to publish some kind of signed record saying "the bridge with 
> such-and-such a fingerprint was known to BridgeDB at such-and-such a 
> time" - similar to what can already be queried via the API, but in a 
> form that could be distributed offline.
> 
> If users were able to distribute these records alongside the 
> corresponding bridge lines then apps might decide to treat BridgeDB 
> bridges differently - for example, showing a warning if the bridge 
> entered by the user was *not* signed by BridgeDB. This would provide a 
> useful second layer of trust when finding bridges from sources like 
> Telegram bots, where the provenance isn't always clear.
> 
> However, including these signatures in a bridge URI might make the URI 
> quite long, which in turn might cause issues with scanning QR codes. So 
> there might be tradeoffs here.

This log already exists in collector, the server descriptors[0] contains the
hashed fingerprint and the software could check if the bridge has existed there.
But I understand is not a simple API.

Will be trivial for an attacker to add a bridge there, just making it public
configured with a distributor like email that might not have tons of users. And
share it to the person they want to attack. I'm not sure how much this mechanism
will prevent this kind of attack.


Also we have to take into account that many users use private bridges, that will
never be known by BridgeDB and we don't want to scare the private bridges users.
Is the only reliable way to connect to Tor for some people.


[0]https://metrics.torproject.org/collector/recent/bridge-descriptors/server-descriptors/

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