[tor-dev] A new idea for email encryption on tor

[Keifer Bly]

Well, the mechanism is that it overwrites the key ever time, so each
message has its own unique key, also the receiver needs to verify the key
file with the built in tool to be able to use it. So an attacker does not
know this the only way to get this information is from the person that
created the message as the need when the OS originally generated the
message, not when it was uploaded as an attachment somewhere. That's what I
was thinking. I will look into the communities suggested, thanks very much.
--Keifer


On Thu, Nov 12, 2020 at 1:27 PM Santiago Torres-Arias <
santiago at archlinux.org> wrote:

> On Thu, Nov 12, 2020 at 11:19:44AM -0800, Keifer Bly wrote:
> > Hi there,
>
> Hello,
>
> > So I have a new email encryption system which requires that the user has
> > the specific key file generated for a message rather than the password,
> > specifically this software generates a unique key file for a specific
> > message every time a message is created. The user then enters the date
> and
> > time the message was created. Without the original key file the message
> > can't be opened;
> >
> > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R0W7OVdNrOA
> >
> > Here is a video showing the software. I've built it for Windows and Mac
> OS.
> > I was wondering if this could be implemented in tor. I think it would be
> an
> > interesting idea for a tor based email system to make the messages
> > unrecoverable after use.
>
> I'm not a tor-dev, so I can't comment on the interest, but it appears to
> me that the value added of this idea (basically, using time to seed a
> PRF/KDF) is very little. All in all, using time to seed keys is not the
> best idea. It also seems to be on top of PGP, so I'm pretty convinced
> this doesn't provide perfect forward-secrecy unless you're layering any
> sort of session key ratcheting mechanism yourself.
>
> I think the goal is laudable, but I suggest getting a little bit more
> involved in cryptography engineering communities to see learn, develop
> and eventually help change the status quo.
>
> Cheers!
> -S
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