[tor-dev] Proposal: RTT-based Congestion Control for Tor
Mike Perry
mikeperry at torproject.org
Thu Jul 2 21:31:49 UTC 2020
https://github.com/mikeperry-tor/torspec/blob/rtt-congestion-control/proposals/324-rtt-congestion-control.txt
https://github.com/torproject/torspec/pull/125
================================
Filename: 324-rtt-congestion-control.txt
Title: RTT-based Congestion Control for Tor
Author: Mike Perry
Created: 02 July 2020
Status: Open
0. Motivation [MOTIVATION]
This proposal specifies how to incrementally deploy RTT-based congestion
control and improved queue management in Tor. It is written to allow us
to first deploy the system only at Exit relays, and then incrementally
improve the system by upgrading intermediate relays.
Lack of congestion control is the reason why Tor has an inherent speed
limit of about 500KB/sec for downloads and uploads via Exits, and even
slower for onion services. Because our stream SENDME windows are fixed
at 500 cells per stream, and only ~500 bytes can be sent in one cell,
the max speed of a single Tor stream is 500*500/circuit_latency. This
works out to about 500KB/sec max sustained throughput for a single
download, even if circuit latency is as low as 500ms.
Because onion services paths are more than twice the length of Exit
paths (and thus more than twice the circuit latency), onion service
throughput will always have less than half the throughput of Exit
throughput, until we deploy proper congestion control with dynamic
windows.
Proper congestion control will remove this speed limit for both Exits
and onion services, as well as reduce memory requirements for fast Tor
relays, by reducing queue lengths.
The high-level plan is to use Round Trip Time (RTT) as a primary
congestion signal, and compare the performance of two different
congestion window update algorithms that both use RTT as a congestion
signal.
The combination of RTT-based congestion signaling, a congestion window
update algorithm, and Circuit-EWMA will get us the most if not all of
the benefits we seek, and only requires clients and Exits to upgrade to
use it. Once this is deployed, circuit bandwidth caps will no longer be
capped at ~500kb/sec by the fixed window sizes of SENDME; queue latency
will fall significantly; memory requirements at relays should plummet;
and transient bottlenecks in the network should dissipate.
Extended background information on the choices made in this proposal can
be found at:
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2020-June/014343.html
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2020-January/014140.html
An exhaustive list of citations for further reading is in Section
[CITATIONS].
1. Overview [OVERVIEW]
This proposal has five main sections, after this overview. These
sections are referenced [IN_ALL_CAPS] rather than by number, for easy
searching.
Section [CONGESTION_SIGNALS] specifies how to use Tor's SENDME flow
control cells to measure circuit RTT, for use as an implicit congestion
signal. It also specifies an explicit congestion signal, which can be
used as a future optimization once all relays upgrade.
Section [CONTROL_ALGORITHMS] specifies two candidate congestion window
upgrade mechanisms, which will be compared for performance in simulation
in Shadow, as well as evaluated on the live network, and tuned via
consensus parameters listed in [CONSENSUS_PARAMETERS].
Section [FLOW_CONTROL] specifies how to handle back-pressure when one of
the endpoints stops reading data, but data is still arriving. In
particular, it specifies what to do with streams that are not being read
by an application, but still have data arriving on them.
Section [SYSTEM_INTERACTIONS] describes how congestion control will
interact with onion services, circuit padding, and conflux-style traffic
splitting.
Section [EVALUATION] describes how we will evaluate and tune our
options for control algorithms and their parameters.
Section [PROTOCOL_SPEC] describes the specific cell formats and
descriptor changes needed by this proposal.
Section [SECURITY_ANALYSIS] provides information about the DoS and
traffic analysis properties of congestion control.
2. Congestion Signals [CONGESTION_SIGNALS]
In order to detect congestion at relays on a circuit, Tor will use
circuit Round Trip Time (RTT) measurement. This signal will be used in
slightly different ways in our various [CONTROL_ALGORITHMS], which will
be compared against each other for optimum performance in Shadow and on
the live network.
To facilitate this, we will also change SENDME accounting logic
slightly. These changes only require clients, exits, and dirauths to
update.
As a future optimization, we also specify an explicit congestion signal.
This signal *will* require all relays on a circuit to upgrade to support
it, but it will reduce congestion by making the first congestion event
on a circuit much faster to detect.
2.1 RTT measurement
Recall that Tor clients, exits, and onion services send
RELAY_COMMAND_SENDME relay cells every CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT (100) cells
of received RELAY_COMMAND_DATA.
This allows those endpoints to measure the current circuit RTT, by
measuring the amount of time between sending of every 100th data cell
and the arrival of the SENDME command that the other endpoint
immediately sends to ack that 100th cell.
Circuits will record the current RTT measurement as a field in their
circuit_t data structure. They will also record the minimum and maximum
RTT seen so far.
Algorithms that make use of this RTT measurement for congestion
window update are specified in [CONTROL_ALGORITHMS].
2.2. SENDME behavior changes
We will make four major changes to SENDME behavior to aid in computing
and using RTT as a congestion signal.
First, we will need to establish a ProtoVer of "CCtrl=1" to signal
support by Exits for the new SENDME format and congestion control
algorithm mechanisms. We will need a similar announcement in the onion
service descriptors of services that support congestion control.
Second, we will turn CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT into a consensus parameter
'circwindow_inc', instead of using a hardcoded value of 100 cells. It is
likely that more frequent SENDME cells will provide quicker reaction to
congestion, since the RTT will be measured more often. If
experimentation in Shadow shows that more frequent SENDMEs reduce
congestion and improve performance but add significant overhead, we can
reduce SENDME overhead by allowing SENDME cells to carry stream data, as
well.
TODO: If two endpoints view different consensus parameters for
'circwindow_inc', we will have complications measuring RTT,
as well as complications for authenticated SENDME hash
accounting. We need a way for endpoints to negotiate SENDME
pacing with eachother, perhaps during circuit setup. This will
require changes to the Onionskin/CREATE cell format (and
RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND), as mentioned in Section [PROTOCOL_SPEC].
Second, all end-to-end relay cells except RELAY_COMMAND_DROP and
RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE1 will count towards SENDME cell counts. The
details behind how these cells are handled is addressed in section
[SYSTEM_INTERACTIONS].
TODO: List any other exceptions. There probably are some more.
Third, authenticated SENDMEs can remain as-is in terms of protocol
behavior, but will require some implementation updates to account for
variable window sizes and variable SENDME pacing. In particular, the
sendme_last_digests list for auth sendmes needs updated checks for
larger windows and CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT changes. Other functions to
examine include:
- circuit_sendme_cell_is_next()
- sendme_record_cell_digest_on_circ()
- sendme_record_received_cell_digest()
- sendme_record_sending_cell_digest()
- send_randomness_after_n_cells
Fourth, stream level SENDMEs will be eliminated. Details on handling
streams and backpressure is covered in [FLOW_CONTROL].
2.3. Backward ECN signaling [BACKWARD_ECN]
As an optimization after the RTT deployment, we will deploy an explicit
congestion control signal by allowing relays to modify the
cell_t.command field when they detect congestion, on circuits for which
all relays have support for this signal (as mediated by Tor protocol
version handshake via the client). This is taken from the Options
mail[1], section BACKWARD_ECN_TOR.
To detect congestion in order to deliver this signal, we will deploy a
simplified version of the already-simple CoDel algorithm on each
outbound TLS connection at relays.
https://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=2209336
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8289
Each cell will get a timestamp upon arrival at a relay that will allow
us to measure how long it spends in queues, all the way to hitting a TLS
outbuf.
The duration of total circuitmux queue time for each cell will be
compared a consensus parameter 'min_queue_target', which is set to 5% of
min network RTT. (This mirrors the CoDel parameter of the same name).
As soon as a cell of a circuit spends more than this time in queues, a
per-circuit flag 'ecn_exit_slow_start' will be set to 1. As soon as a
cell is available in the opposite direction on that circuit, the relay
will flip the cell_t.command of from CELL_COMMAND_RELAY to
CELL_COMMAND_RELAY_CONGESTION. (We must wait for a cell in the opposite
direction because that is the sender that caused the congestion).
This enhancement will allow endpoints to very quickly exit from
[CONTROL_ALGORITHM] "slow start" phase (during which, the congestion
window increases exponentially). The ability to more quickly exit the
exponential slow start phase during congestion will help reduce queue
sizes at relays.
To avoid side channels, this cell must only be flipped on
CELL_COMMAND_RELAY, and not CELL_COMMAND_RELAY_EARLY. Additionally, all
relays MUST enforce that only *one* such cell command is flipped, per
direction, per circuit. Any additional CELL_COMMAND_RELAY_CONGESTION
cells seen by any relay or client MUST cause those circuit participants
to immediately close the circuit.
As a further optimization, if no relay cells are pending in the opposite
direction as congestion is happening, we can send a zero-filled cell
instead. In the forward direction of the circuit, we can send this cell
without any crypto layers, so long as further relays enforce that the
contents are zero-filled, to avoid side channels.
3. Congestion Window Update Algorithms [CONTROL_ALGORITHMS]
We specify two candidate window update algorithms. The specification
describes the update algorithms for the slow start phase and the
steady state phase separately, with some explanation. Then the
combined algorithm is given.
Note that these algorithms differ slightly from the background tor-dev
mails[1,2], due to corrections and improvements. Hence they have been
given different names than in those two mails.
These algorithms will be evaluated by running Shadow simulations, to
help determine parameter ranges, but experimentation on the live network
will be required to determine which of these algorithms performs best
when in competition with our current SENDME behavior, as used by real
network traffic. This experimentation and tuning is detailed in section
[EVALUATION].
All of these algorithms have rules to update 'cwnd' - the current
congestion window. In the C Tor reference implementation, 'cwnd' is
called the circuit 'package_window'. C Tor also maintains a
'deliver_window', which it uses to track how many cells it has received,
in order to send the appropriate number of SENDME acks.
TODO: This 'deliver_window' count can be updated by the other
endpoint using the congestion control rules to watch for
cheating. Alternatively, it can be simplified just to count
the number of cells we get until we send a SENDME.
Implementation of different algorithms should be very simple - each
algorithm should have a different set of package_window update functions
depending on the selected algorithm, as specified by consensus parameter
'cc_alg'.
For C Tor's current flow control, these functions are defined in sendme.c,
and are called by relay.c:
- sendme_note_circuit_data_packaged()
- sendme_circuit_data_received()
- sendme_circuit_consider_sending()
- sendme_process_circuit_level()
Despite the complexity of the following algorithms in their TCP
implementations, their Tor equivalents are extremely simple, each being
just a handful of lines of C. This simplicity is possible because Tor
does not have to deal with out-of-order delivery, packet drops,
duplicate packets, and other network issues at the circuit layer, due to
the fact that Tor circuits already have reliability and in-order
delivery at that layer.
We are also removing the aspects of TCP that cause the congestion
algorithm to reset into slow start after being idle for too long, or
after too many congestion signals. These are deliberate choices that
simplify the algorithms and also should provide better performance for
Tor workloads.
TODO: We may want to experiment with adding revert-to-slow-start back
in, but slow start is very expensive in a lot of ways, so let's
see if we can avoid falling back into it, if at all possible.
3.1. Tor Westwood: TCP Westwood using RTT signaling [TOR_WESTWOOD]
http://intronetworks.cs.luc.edu/1/html/newtcps.html#tcp-westwood
http://nrlweb.cs.ucla.edu/nrlweb/publication/download/99/2001-mobicom-0.pdf
http://cpham.perso.univ-pau.fr/TCP/ccr_v31.pdf
https://c3lab.poliba.it/images/d/d7/Westwood_linux.pdf
Recall that TCP Westwood is basically TCP Reno, but it uses RTT to help
estimate the bandwidth-delay-product (BDP) of the link, and use that for
"Fast recovery" after a congestion signal arrives.
We will also be using the RTT congestion signal as per BOOTLEG_RTT_TOR
here, from the Options mail[1] and Defenestrator paper[3]. Recall that
BOOTLEG_RTT_TOR emits a congestion signal when the current RTT falls
below some fractional threshold ('rtt_thresh') fraction between RTT_min
and RTT_max:
RTT_current < (1−rtt_thresh)*RTT_min + rtt_thresh*RTT_max
We can also optionally use the ECN signal described in [BACKWARD_ECN]
above, to exit Slow Start.
Tor Westwood will require each circuit endpoint to maintain a
Bandwidth-Delay-Product (BDP) and Bandwidth Estimate (BWE) variable.
The bandwidth estimate is the current congestion window size divided by
the RTT estimate:
BWE = cwnd / RTT_current
The BDP estimate is computed by multiplying the Bandwidth estimate by
the circuit latency:
BDP = BWE * RTT_min
TODO: Different papers on TCP Westwood and TCP Vegas recommend
different methods for calculating BWE. See citations for
details, but common options are 'packets_in_flight/RTT_current'
or 'circwindow_inc*sendme_arrival_rate'. They also recommend
averaging and filtering of the BWE, due to ack compression in
inbound queues. We will need to experiment to determine how to
best compute the BWE for Tor circuits.
3.1.1. Tor Westwood: Slow Start
Prior to the first congestion signal, Tor Westwood will update its
congestion window exponentially, as per Slow Start.
Recall that this first congestion signal can be either BOOTLEG_RTT_TOR's
RTT threshold signal, or BACKWARD_ECN's cell command signal.
For simplicity, we will just write the BOOTLEG_RTT_TOR check, which
compares the current RTT measurement to the observed min and max RTT,
using the consensus parameter 'rtt_thresh'.
This section of the update algorithm is:
cwnd = cwnd + circwindow_inc # For acked cells
# BOOTLEG_RTT_TOR threshold check:
if RTT_current < (1−rtt_thresh)*RTT_min + rtt_thresh*RTT_max:
cwnd = cwnd + circwindow_inc # Exponential window growth
else:
BDP = BWE*RTT_min
cwnd = max(cwnd * cwnd_recovery_m, BDP)
in_slow_start = 0
Increasing the congestion window by 100 *more* cells every SENDME allows
the sender to send 100 *more* cells every 100 cells. Thus, this is an
exponential function that causes cwnd to double every cwnd cells.
Once a congestion signal is experienced, Slow Start is exited, and the
Additive-Increase-Multiplicative-Decrease (AIMD) steady-state phase
begins.
3.1.2. Tor Westwood: Steady State AIMD
After slow start exits, in steady-state, after every SENDME response
without a congestion signal, the window is updated as:
cwnd = cwnd + circwindow_inc # For acked cells
cwnd = cwnd + circwindow_inc/cwnd # Linear window growth
This comes out to increasing cwnd by 1, every time cwnd cells are
successfully sent without a congestion signal occurring. Thus this is
additive linear growth, not exponential growth.
If there is a congestion signal, cwnd is updated as:
cwnd = cwnd + circwindow_inc # For acked cells
cwnd = max(cwnd * cwnd_recovery_m, BDP) # For window shrink
This is called "Fast Recovery". If you dig into the citations, actual
TCP Westwood has some additional details for responding to multiple
packet losses that in some cases can fall back into slow-start, as well
as some smoothing of the BDP to make up for dropped acks. Tor does not
need either of these aspects of complexity.
3.1.3. Tor Westwood: Complete SENDME Update Algorithm
Here is the complete congestion window algorithm for Tor Westwood, using
only RTT signaling.
This will run each time we get a SENDME (aka
sendme_process_circuit_level()):
in_slow_start = 1 # Per-circuit indicator
Every received SENDME ack, do:
cwnd = cwnd + circwindow_inc # Update acked cells
# BOOTLEG_RTT_TOR threshold; can also be BACKWARD_ECN check:
if RTT_current < (1−rtt_thresh)*RTT_min + rtt_thresh*RTT_max:
if in_slow_start:
cwnd = cwnd + circwindow_inc # Exponential growth
else:
cwnd = cwnd + circwindow_inc/cwnd # Linear growth
else:
BDP = BWE*RTT_min
cwnd = max(cwnd * cwnd_recovery_m, BDP) # Window shrink
in_slow_start = 0
3.2. Tor Vegas: TCP Vegas with Aggressive Slow Start [TOR_VEGAS]
http://intronetworks.cs.luc.edu/1/html/newtcps.html#tcp-vegas
http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~akella/CS740/F08/740-Papers/BOP94.pdf
ftp://ftp.cs.princeton.edu/techreports/2000/628.pdf
TCP Vegas control algorithm makes use of two RTT measurements:
RTT_current and RTT_min. Like TCP Westwood, it also maintains a
bandwidth estimate and a BDP estimate, but those can be simplified away
with algebra.
The bandwidth estimate is the current congestion window size divided by
the RTT estimate:
BWE = cwnd/RTT_current
The extra queue use along a path can thus be estimated by first
estimating the path's bandwidth-delay product:
BDP = BWE*RTT_min
TCP Vegas then estimates the queue use caused by congestion as:
queue_use = cwnd - BDP
= cwnd - cwnd*RTT_min/RTT_current
= cwnd * (1 - RTT_min/RTT_current)
So only RTT_min and RTT_current need to be recorded to provide this
queue_use estimate.
TODO: This simplification might not hold for some versions of BWE
and BDP estimation. See also the [TOR_WESTWOOD] section's TODO
and paper citations for both TCP Westwood and TCP Vegas.
3.2.1. Tor Vegas Slow Start
During slow start, we will increase our window exponentially, so long as
this queue_use estimate is below the 'vegas_gamma' consensus parameter.
We also re-use the Tor Westwood backoff, upon exit from Slow Start.
Note though that the exit from Slow Start for here does *not* use the
BOOTLEG_RTT_TOR style RTT threshold, and instead relies on the
queue_use calculation directly.
Tor Vegas slow start can also be exited due to [BACKWARD_ECN] cell
signal, which is omitted for brevity and clarity.
cwnd = cwnd + circwindow_inc # Ack cells
if queue_use < vegas_gamma: # Vegas RTT check
cwnd = cwnd + circwindow_inc # Exponential growth
else:
cwnd = max(cwnd * cwnd_recovery_m, BDP) # Westwood backoff
in_slow_start = 0
3.2.2. Tor Vegas: Steady State Queue Tracking
Recall that TCP Vegas does not use AIMD in the steady state. Because
TCP Vegas is actually trying to directly control the queue use
on the path, its updates are additive and subtractive only.
If queue_use drops below a threshold alpha (typically 2-3 packets for
TCP Vegas, but perhaps double or triple that for our smaller cells),
then the congestion window is increased. If queue_use exceeds a
threshold beta (typically 4-6 packets, but again we should probably
double or triple this), then the congestion window is decreased.
cwnd = cwnd + circwindow_inc # Ack cells
if queue_use < vegas_alpha:
cwnd = cwnd + circwindow_inc/cwnd # linear growth
elif queue_use > vegas_beta:
cwnd = cwnd - circwindow_inc/cwnd # linear backoff
TODO: Why not reduce the window by the number of packets that
queue_use is over or under the target value by, rather than
just 1 cell per cwnd? Need to ask some TCP folks, or experiment.
3.2.3. Tor Vegas: Complete SENDME Update Algorithm
in_slow_start = 1 # Per-circuit indicator
Every received SENDME ack:
cwnd = cwnd + circwindow_inc # Update acked cells
queue_use = cwnd * (1 - RTT_min/RTT_current)
if in_slow_start:
if queue_use < vegas_gamma:
cwnd = cwnd + circwindow_inc # Exponential growth
else:
cwnd = max(cwnd * cwnd_recovery_m, BDP) # Westwood backoff
in_slow_start = 0
else:
if queue_use < vegas_alpha:
cwnd = cwnd + circwindow_inc/cwnd # linear growth
elif queue_use > vegas_beta:
cwnd = cwnd - circwindow_inc/cwnd # linear backoff
4. Flow Control [FLOW_CONTROL]
Flow control provides what is known as "pushback" -- the property that
if one endpoint stops reading data, the other endpoint stops sending
data. This prevents data from accumulating at points in the network, if
it is not being read fast enough by an application.
Because Tor must multiplex many streams onto one circuit, and each
stream is mapped to another TCP socket, Tor's current pushback is rather
complicated and under-specified. In C Tor, it is implemented in the
following functions:
- circuit_consider_stop_edge_reading()
- connection_edge_package_raw_inbuf()
- circuit_resume_edge_reading()
Tor currently maintains separate windows for each stream on a circuit,
to provide individual stream flow control. Circuit windows are SENDME
acked as soon as a relay data cell is decrypted and recognized. Stream
windows are only SENDME acked if the data can be delivered to an active
edge connection. This allows the circuit to continue to operate if an
endpoint refuses to read data off of one of the streams on the circuit.
Because Tor streams can connect to many different applications and
endpoints per circuit, it is important to preserve the property that if
only one endpoint edge connection is inactive, it does not stall the
whole circuit, in case one of those endpoints is malfunctioning or
malicious.
However, window-based stream flow control also imposes a speed limit on
individual streams. If the stream window size is below the circuit
congestion window size, then it becomes the speed limit of a download,
as we saw in the [MOTIVATION] section of this proposal.
So for performance, it is optimal that each stream window is the same
size as the circuit's congestion window. However, large stream windows
are a vector for OOM attacks, because malicious clients can force Exits
to buffer a full stream window for each stream while connecting to a
malicious site and uploading data that the site does not read from its
socket. This attack is significantly easier to perform at the stream
level than on the circuit level, because of the multiplier effects of
only needing to establish a single fast circuit to perform the attack on
a very large number of streams.
This catch22 means that if we use windows for stream flow control, we
either have to commit to allocating a full congestion window worth
memory for each stream, or impose a speed limit on our streams.
Hence, we will discard stream windows entirely, and instead use a
simpler buffer-based design that uses XON/XOFF as a backstop. This will
allow us to make full use of the circuit congestion window for every
stream in combination, while still avoiding buffer buildup inside the
network.
4.1. Stream Flow Control Without Windows [WINDOWLESS_FLOW]
Each endpoint (client, Exit, or onion service) should send circuit-level
SENDME acks for all circuit cells as soon as they are decrypted and
recognized, but *before* delivery to their edge connections. If the edge
connection is blocked because an application is not reading, data will
build up in a queue at that endpoint.
Three consensus parameters will govern the max length of this queue:
xoff_client, xoff_exit, and xoff_mobile. These will be used for Tor
clients, exits, and mobile devices, respectively. These cuttofs will be
a percentage of current 'cwnd' rather than number of cells. Something
like 5% of 'cwnd' should be plenty, since these edge connections should
normally drain *much* faster than Tor itself.
If the length of an application stream queue exceeds the size provided
in the appropriate consensus parameter, a RELAY_COMMAND_STREAM_XOFF will
be sent, which instructs the other endpoint to stop sending from that
edge connection. This XOFF cell can optionally contain any available
stream data, as well.
As soon as the queue begins to drain, a RELAY_COMMAND_STREAM_XON will
sent, which allows the other end to resume reading on that edge
connection. Because application streams should drain quickly once they
are active, we will send the XON command as soon as they start draining.
If the queues fill again, another XOFF will be sent. If this results in
excessive XOFF/XON flapping and chatter, we will also use consensus
parameters xon_client, xon_exit, and xon_mobile to optionally specify
when to send an XON. These parameters will be defined in terms of cells
below the xoff_* levels, rather than percentage. The XON cells can also
contain stream data, if any is available.
Tor's OOM killer will be invoked to close any streams whose application
buffer grows too large, due to memory shortage, or malicious endpoints.
Note that no stream buffer should ever grow larger than the xoff level
plus 'cwnd', unless an endpoint is ignoring XOFF. So,
'xoff_{client,exit,mobile} + cwnd' should be the hard-close stream
cutoff, regardless of OOM killer status.
5. System Interactions [SYSTEM_INTERACTIONS]
Tor's circuit-level SENDME system currently has special cases in the
following situations: Intropoints, HSDirs, onion services, and circuit
padding. Additionally, proper congestion control will allow us to very
easily implement conflux (circuit traffic splitting).
This section details those special cases and interactions of congestion
control with other components of Tor.
5.1. HSDirs
Because HSDirs use the tunneled dirconn mechanism and thus also use
RELAY_COMMAND_DATA, they are already subject to Tor's flow control.
We may want to make sure our initial circuit window for HSDir circuits
is set custom for those circuit types, so a SENDME is not required to
fetch long descriptors. This will ensure HSDir descriptors can be
fetched in one RTT.
5.2. Introduction Points
Introduction Points are not currently subject to any flow control.
Because Intropoints accept INTRODUCE1 cells from many client circuits
and then relay them down a single circuit to the service as INTRODUCE2
cells, we cannot provide end-to-end congestion control all the way from
client to service for these cells.
We can run congestion control from the service to the Intropoint,
however, and if that congestion window reaches zero (because the service
is overwhelmed), then we start sending NACKS back to the clients (or
begin requiring proof-of-work), rather than just let clients wait for
timeout.
5.3. Rendezvous Points
Rendezvous points are already subject to end-to-end SENDME control,
because all relay cells are sent end-to-end via the rendezvous circuit
splice in circuit_receive_relay_cell().
This means that rendezvous circuits will use end-to-end congestion
control, as soon as individual onion clients and onion services upgrade
to support it. There is no need for intermediate relays to upgrade at
all.
5.4. Circuit Padding
Recall that circuit padding is negotiated between a client and a middle
relay, with one or more state machines running on circuits at the middle
relay that decide when to add padding.
https://github.com/torproject/tor/blob/master/doc/HACKING/CircuitPaddingDevelopment.md
This means that the middle relay can send padding traffic towards the
client that contributes to congestion, and the client may also send
padding towards the middle relay, that also creates congestion.
For low-traffic padding machines, such as the currently deployed circuit
setup obfuscation, this padding is inconsequential.
However, higher traffic circuit padding machines that are designed to
defend against website traffic fingerprinting will need additional care
to avoid inducing additional congestion, especially after the client or
the exit experiences a congestion signal.
The current overhead percentage rate limiting features of the circuit
padding system should handle this in some cases, but in other cases, an
XON/XOFF circuit padding flow control command may be required, so that
clients may signal to the machine that congestion is occurring.
5.5. Conflux
Conflux (aka multi-circuit traffic splitting) becomes significantly
easier to implement once we have congestion control. However, much like
congestion control, it will require experimentation to tune properly.
Recall that Conflux uses a 256-bit UUID to bind two circuits together at
the Exit or onion service. The original Conflux paper specified an
equation based on RTT to choose which circuit to send cells on.
https://www.cypherpunks.ca/~iang/pubs/conflux-pets.pdf
However, with congestion control, we will already know which circuit has
the larger congestion window, and thus has the most available cells in
its current congestion window. This will also be the faster circuit.
Thus, the decision of which circuit to send a cell on only requires
comparing congestion windows (and choosing the circuit with more packets
remaining in its window).
Conflux will require sequence numbers on data cells, to ensure that the
two circuits' data is properly re-assembled. The resulting out-of-order
buffer can potentially be as large as an entire congestion window, if
the circuits are very desynced (or one of them closes). It will be very
expensive for Exits to maintain this much memory, and exposes them to
OOM attacks.
This is not as much of a concern in the client download direction, since
clients will typically only have a small number of these out-of-order
buffers to keep around. But for the upload direction, Exits will need
to send some form of early XOFF on the faster circuit if this
out-of-order buffer begins to grow too large, since simply halting the
delivery of SENDMEs will still allow a full congestion window full of
data to arrive. This will also require tuning and experimentation, and
optimum results will vary between simulator and live network.
TODO: Can we use explicit SENDME sequence number acking to make a
connection-resumption conflux, to recover from circuit collapse
or client migration? I am having trouble coming up with a design
that does not require Exits to maintain a full congestion
window full of data as a retransmit buffer in the event of
circuit close. Such reconnect activity might require assistance
from Guard relays so that they can help clients discover which
cells were sent vs lost.
6. Performance Evaluation [EVALUATION]
Congestion control for Tor will be easy to implement, but difficult to
tune to ensure optimal behavior.
6.1. Congestion Signal Experiments
Our first experiments will be to conduct client-side experiments to
determine how stable the RTT measurements of circuits are across the
live Tor network, to determine if we need more frequent SENDMEs, and/or
need to use any RTT smoothing or averaging.
Once we have a reliable way to measure RTT, we will need to test the
reliability and accuracy of the Bandwidth Estimation (BWE) and
Bandwidth-Delay-Product (BDP) measurements that are required for
[TOR_WESTWOOD] and [TOR_VEGAS]. These experiments can be conducted in
Shadow, with precise network topologies for which actual bandwidth and
latency (and thus BWE and BDP) are known parameters. We should use the
most accurate form of these estimators from Shadow experimentation to
run some client tests with custom Exits on the live network, to check
for high variability in these estimates, discrepancy with client
application throughput and application latency, and other surprises.
Care will need to be taken to increase or alter Tor's circwindow during
these experiments in Shadow and on the custom Exits, so that the default
of 1000 does not impose an artificial ceiling on circuit bandwidth.
6.2. Congestion Algorithm Experiments
In order to evaluate performance of congestion control algorithms, we
will need to implement [TOR_WESTWOOD], [TOR_VEGAS], and also variants of
those without the Westwood BDP fast recovery backoff. We will need to
simulate their use in the Shadow Tor network simulator.
Simulation runs will need to evaluate performance on networks that use
only one algorithm, as well as on networks that run a combinations of
algorithms - particularly each type of congestion control in combination
with Tor's current flow control. If Tor's current flow control is too
aggressive, we can experiment with kneecapping these legacy flow control
Tor clients by setting a low 'circwindow' consensus parameter for them.
Because custom congestion control can be deployed by any Exit or onion
service that desires better service, we will need to be particularly
careful about how congestion control algorithms interact with rogue
implementations that more aggressively increase their window sizes.
During these adversarial-style experiments, we must verify that cheaters
do not get better service, and that Tor's circuit OOM killer properly
closes circuits that seriously abuse the congestion control algorithm,
as per [SECURITY_ANALYSIS].
Finally, we should determine if the [BACKWARD_ECN] cell_t.command
congestion signal is enough of an optimization to be worth the
complexity, especially if it is only used once, to exit slow start. This
can be determined in Shadow.
6.3. Flow Control Algorithm Experiments
We will need to tune the xoff_* consensus parameters to minimize the
amount of edge connection buffering as well as XON/XOFF chatter for
Exits. This can be done in simulation, but will require fine-tuning on
the live network.
Relays will need to report these statistics in extra-info descriptor,
to help with monitoring the live network conditions.
6.4. Performance Metrics [EVALUATION_METRICS]
Because congestion control will affect so many aspects of performance,
from throughput to RTT, to load balancing, queue length, overload, and
other failure conditions, the full set of performance metrics will be
required:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/roadmaps/CoreTor/PerformanceMetrics
We will also need to monitor network health for relay queue lengths,
relay overload, and other signs of network stress (and particularly the
alleviation of network stress).
6.5. Consensus Parameter Tuning [CONSENSUS_PARAMETERS]
During Shadow simulation, we will determine reasonable default
parameters for our consensus parameters for each algorithm. We will then
re-run these tuning experiments on the live Tor network, as described
in:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/roadmaps/CoreTor/PerformanceExperiments
The following list is the complete set of network consensus parameters
referenced in this proposal, sorted roughly in order of importance (most
important to tune first):
cc_alg:
- Description:
Specifies which congestion control algorithm clients should
use, as an integer.
- Range: [0,2] (0=fixed, 1=Westwood, 2=Vegas)
- Default: 2
cwnd_recovery_m:
- Description: Specifies how much to reduce the congestion
window after a congestion signal, as a fraction of
100.
- Range: [0, 100]
- Default: 70
circwindow:
- Description: Initial congestion window for legacy Tor clients
- Range: [1, 1000]
- Default: 1000 (reduced if legacy Tor clients compete unfairly)
circwindow_cc:
- Description: Initial congestion window for new congestion
control Tor clients.
- Range: [1, 1000]
- Default: 10-100
rtt_thresh:
- Description:
Specifies the cutoff for BOOTLEG_RTT_TOR to deliver
congestion signal, as fixed point representation
divided by 1000.
- Range: [1, 1000]
- Default: 230
vegas_alpha
vegas_beta
vegas_gamma
- Description: These parameters govern the number of cells
that [TOR_VEGAS] can detect in queue before reacting.
- Range: [1, 1000]
- Defaults: 6,12,12
circwindow_inc:
- Description: Specifies how many cells a SENDME acks
- Range: [1, 5000]
- Default: 100
min_queue_target:
- Description: How long in milliseconds can a cell spend in
a relay's queues before we declare its circuit congested?
- Range: [1, 10000]
- Default: 10
xoff_client
xoff_mobile
xoff_exit
- Description: Specifies the stream queue size as a percentage of
'cwnd' at an endpoint before an XOFF is sent.
- Range: [1, 100]
- Default: 5
xon_client
xon_mobile
xon_exit
- Description: Specifies the how many cells below xoff_* before
an XON is sent from an endpoint.
- Range: [1, 10000000]
- Default: 10000
7. Protocol format specifications [PROTOCOL_SPEC]
TODO: This section needs details once we close out other TODOs above.
7.1. Circuit window handshake format
TODO: We need to specify a way to communicate the currently seen
circwindow_inc consensus parameter to the other endpoint,
due to consensus sync delay. Probably during the CREATE
onionskin (and RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND).
TODO: We probably want stricter rules on the range of values
for the per-circuit negotiation - something like
it has to be between [circwindow_inc/2, 2*circwindow_inc].
That way, we can limit weird per-circuit values, but still
allow us to change the consensus value in increments.
7.2. XON/XOFF relay cell formats
TODO: We need to specify XON/XOFF for flow control. This should be
simple.
TODO: We should also allow it to carry stream data.
7.3. Onion Service formats
TODO: We need to specify how to signal support for congestion control
in an onion service, to both the intropoint and to clients.
7.4. Protocol Version format
TODO: We need to pick a protover to signal Exit and Intropoint
congestion control support.
7.5. SENDME relay cell format
TODO: We need to specify how to add stream data to a SENDME as an
optimization.
7.6. BACKWARD_ECN signal format
TODO: We need to specify exactly which byte to flip in cells
to signal congestion on a circuit.
TODO: Black magic will allow us to send zero-filled BACKWARD_ECN
cells in the *wrong* direction in a circuit, towards the Exit -
ie with no crypto layers at all. If we enforce strict format
and zero-filling of these cells at intermediate relays, we can
avoid side channels there, too. (Such a hack allows us to
send BACKWARD_ECN without any wait, if there are no relay cells
that are available heading in the backward direction, towards
the endpoint that caused congestion).
7.7. Extrainfo descriptor formats
TODO: We will want to gather information on circuitmux and other
relay queues, as well as XON/XOFF rates, and edge connection
queue lengths at exits.
8. Security Analysis [SECURITY_ANALYSIS]
The security risks of congestion control come in three forms: DoS
attacks, fairness abuse, and side channel risk.
8.1. DoS Attacks (aka Adversarial Buffer Bloat)
The most serious risk of eliminating our current window cap is that
endpoints can abuse this situation to create huge queues and thus DoS
Tor relays.
This form of attack was already studied against the Tor network in the
Sniper attack:
https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/sniper14.pdf
We had two fixes for this. First, we implemented a circuit-level OOM
killer that closed circuits whose queues became too big, before the
relay OOMed and crashed.
Second, we implemented authenticated SENDMEs, so clients could not
artificially increase their window sizes with honest exits:
https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/289-authenticated-sendmes.txt
We can continue this kind of enforcement by having Exit relays ensure
that clients are not transmitting SENDMEs too often, and do not appear
to be inflating their send windows beyond what the Exit expects by
calculating a similar receive window.
Unfortunately, authenticated SENDMEs do *not* prevent the same attack
from being done by rogue exits, or rogue onion services. For that, we
rely solely on the circuit OOM killer. During our experimentation, we
must ensure that the circuit OOM killer works properly to close circuits
in these scenarios.
But in any case, it is important to note that we are not any worse off
with congestion control than we were before, with respect to these kinds
of DoS attacks. In fact, the deployment of congestion control by honest
clients should reduce queue use and overall memory use in relays,
allowing them to be more resilient to OOM attacks than before.
8.2. Congestion Control Fairness Abuse (aka Cheating)
On the Internet, significant research and engineering effort has been
devoted to ensuring that congestion control algorithms are "fair" in
that each connection receives equal throughput. This fairness is
provided both via the congestion control algorithm, as well as via queue
management algorithms at Internet routers.
One of the most unfortunate early results was that TCP Vegas, despite
being near-optimal at minimizing queue lengths at routers, was easily
out-performed by more aggressive algorithms that tolerated larger queue
delay (such as TCP Reno).
Note that because the most common direction of traffic for Tor is from
Exit to client, unless Exits are malicious, we do not need to worry
about rogue algorithms as much, but we should still examine them in our
experiments because of the possibility of malicious Exits, as well as
malicious onion services.
Queue management can help further mitigate this risk, too. When RTT is
used as a congestion signal, our current Circuit-EWMA queue management
algorithm is likely sufficient for this. Because Circuit-EWMA will add
additional delay to loud circuits, "cheaters" who use alternate
congestion control algorithms to inflate their congestion windows should
end up with more RTT congestion signals than those who do not, and the
Circuit-EWMA scheduler will also relay fewer of their cells per time
interval.
In this sense, we do not need to worry about fairness and cheating as a
security property, but a lack of fairness in the congestion control
algorithm *will* increase memory use in relays to queue these
unfair/loud circuits, perhaps enough to trigger the OOM killer. So we
should still be mindful of these properties in selecting our congestion
control algorithm, to minimize relay memory use, if nothing else.
These two properties (honest Exits and Circuit-EWMA) may even be enough
to make it possible to use [TOR_VEGAS] even in the presence of other
algorithms, which would be a huge win in terms of memory savings as well
as vastly reduced queue delay. We must verify this experimentally,
though.
8.3. Side Channel Risks
Vastly reduced queue delay and predictable amounts of congestion on the
Tor network may make certain forms of traffic analysis easier.
Additionally, the ability to measure RTT and have it be stable due to
minimal network congestion may make geographical inference attacks
easier:
https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/ccs07-latency-leak.pdf
https://www.robgjansen.com/publications/howlow-pets2013.pdf
It is an open question as to if these risks are serious enough to
warrant eliminating the ability to measure RTT at the protocol level and
abandoning it as a congestion signal, in favor of other approaches
(which have their own side channel risks). It will be difficult to
comprehensively eliminate RTT measurements, too.
On the plus side, Conflux traffic splitting (which is made easy once
congestion control is implemented) does show promise as providing
defense against traffic analysis:
https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2019/2019-delacadena-splitting-defense.pdf
There is also literature on shaping circuit bandwidth to create a side
channel. This can be done regardless of the use of congestion control,
and is not an argument against using congestion control. In fact, the
Backlit defense may be an argument in favor of endpoints monitoring
circuit bandwidth and latency more closely, as a defense:
https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/ndss09-rainbow.pdf
https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/ndss11-swirl.pdf
https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/acsac11-backlit.pdf
Finally, recall that we are considering BACKWARD_ECN to use a
circuit-level cell_t.command to signal congestion. This allows all
relays in the path to signal congestion in under RTT/2 in either
direction, and it can be flipped on existing relay cells already in
transit, without introducing any overhead. However, because
cell_t.command is visible and malleable to all relays, it can also be
used as a side channel. So we must limit its use to a couple of cells
per circuit, at most.
https://blog.torproject.org/tor-security-advisory-relay-early-traffic-confirmation-attack
9. [CITATIONS]
1. Options for Congestion Control in Tor-Like Networks.
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2020-January/014140.html
2. Towards Congestion Control Deployment in Tor-like Networks.
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2020-June/014343.html
3. DefenestraTor: Throwing out Windows in Tor.
https://www.cypherpunks.ca/~iang/pubs/defenestrator.pdf
4. TCP Westwood: Bandwidth Estimation for Enhanced Transport over
Wireless Links
http://nrlweb.cs.ucla.edu/nrlweb/publication/download/99/2001-mobicom-0.pdf
5. Performance Evaluation and Comparison of Westwood+, New Reno, and
Vegas TCP Congestion Control
http://cpham.perso.univ-pau.fr/TCP/ccr_v31.pdf
6. Linux 2.4 Implementation of Westwood+ TCP with rate-halving
https://c3lab.poliba.it/images/d/d7/Westwood_linux.pdf
7. TCP Westwood
http://intronetworks.cs.luc.edu/1/html/newtcps.html#tcp-westwood
8. TCP Vegas: New Techniques for Congestion Detection and Avoidance
http://pages.cs.wisc.edu/~akella/CS740/F08/740-Papers/BOP94.pdf
9. Understanding TCP Vegas: A Duality Model
ftp://ftp.cs.princeton.edu/techreports/2000/628.pdf
10. TCP Vegas
http://intronetworks.cs.luc.edu/1/html/newtcps.html#tcp-vegas
11. Controlling Queue Delay
https://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=2209336
12. Controlled Delay Active Queue Management
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8289
13. How Much Anonymity does Network Latency Leak?
https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/ccs07-latency-leak.pdf
14. How Low Can You Go: Balancing Performance with Anonymity in Tor
https://www.robgjansen.com/publications/howlow-pets2013.pdf
15. POSTER: Traffic Splitting to Counter Website Fingerprinting
https://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/fileadmin/papers/2019/2019-delacadena-splitting-defense.pdf
16. RAINBOW: A Robust And Invisible Non-Blind Watermark for Network Flows
https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/ndss09-rainbow.pdf
17. SWIRL: A Scalable Watermark to Detect Correlated Network Flows
https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/ndss11-swirl.pdf
18. Exposing Invisible Timing-based Traffic Watermarks with BACKLIT
https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/acsac11-backlit.pdf
19. The Sniper Attack: Anonymously Deanonymizing and Disabling the Tor
Network
https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/sniper14.pdf
20. Authenticating sendme cells to mitigate bandwidth attacks
https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/289-authenticated-sendmes.txt
21. Tor security advisory: "relay early" traffic confirmation attack
https://blog.torproject.org/tor-security-advisory-relay-early-traffic-confirmation-attack
22. The Path Less Travelled: Overcoming Tor’s Bottlenecks with Traffic
Splitting
https://www.cypherpunks.ca/~iang/pubs/conflux-pets.pdf
23. Circuit Padding Developer Documentation
https://github.com/torproject/tor/blob/master/doc/HACKING/CircuitPaddingDevelopment.md
24. Plans for Tor Live Network Performance Experiments
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/roadmaps/CoreTor/PerformanceExperiments
25. Tor Performance Metrics for Live Network Tuning
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/roadmaps/CoreTor/PerformanceMetrics
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