[tor-dev] Raising AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr to 4?

[teor]

Hi,

> On 2 Jun 2019, at 13:30, teor <teor at riseup.net> wrote:
> 
> On 2 Jun 2019, at 05:22, Roger Dingledine <arma at torproject.org> wrote:
>> 
>> I've been talking to a longtime exit relay operator, who is in the
>> odd position of having a good 1gbit network connection, but only one
>> IP address.
>> 
>> He used to push an average of 500mbit on his exit relay, but then the
>> HSDir DoS flatlined his relay for a while (!), and now, perhaps due to
>> the bwauth variability, his exit relay only recovered to maybe 200mbit.
>> He is running a second exit relay on that IP address, but also perhaps
>> due to the bwauth variability, it hasn't attracted much attention either.
> 
> I'd like to confirm the problem before we make major network changes.
> (And I'd like to know how widespread it is.)
> 
> Which bandwidth authorities are limiting the consensus weight of these
> relays? Where are they located?
> 
> Are the relays' observed bandwidths limiting their consensus weight?
> 
> Here's how the operator can find out:
> https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/MyRelayIsSlow#TorNetworkLimits
> 
> If the relays are being measured by longclaw's sbws instance, we should
> also look at their detailed measurement diagnostics.
> 
> longclaw's bandwidth file is available at:
> http://199.58.81.140/tor/status-vote/next/bandwidth

For example, this relay is limited by Comcast's poor peering to MIT and
Europe. We've spoken to a few Comcast relay operators with similar issues.

https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-relays/2019-June/017376.html

Adding more tor instances on networks like Comcast would only slow down
Tor.

>> The real answer is to fix the bandwidth measurement infrastructure.
> 
> Do we have funding to continue to improve the bandwidth measurement
> infrastructure? Or to maintain it?
> 
> If we don't have any grants in the pipeline, now would be a good time to
> start some.

I wrote to the grants team about bandwidth authority funding.

T
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