[tor-dev] Onion DoS: Killing rendezvous circuits over the application layer

[meejah]

George Kadianakis <desnacked at riseup.net> writes:

> However, IMO the right way to do this feature, would be to improve the control
> port code and design so that it doesn't get so overwhelmed by multiple
> events. That said, I'm not sure exactly what kind of changes we would have to
> do to the control port to actually make it a viable option, and it seems to me
> like a pretty big project that serves as a medium-term to long-term solution
> (which we have no resources to pursue right now), whereas the hack of this
> thread is more of a short-term solution.

Is it definitely the Tor-side control-port code that's "overwhelmed", or
is the controller-side not reading fast enough or something..? (It seems
odd to me that it's somehow faster/better to inband-signal via HTTP..)
What controller is being used?

-- 
meejah