[tor-dev] Proposal: Expose raw bwauth votes

[teor]

> On 16 Jul 2018, at 18:03, Iain Learmonth <irl at torproject.org> wrote:
> 
> On 16/07/18 04:12, teor wrote:
>> It MUST NOT attempt to send its bandwidth list file in a HTTP POST to
>> other authorities and it SHOULD NOT make bandwidth list files from other
>> authorities available.
> 
> There is no mechanism specified that could be used to send this file via
> an HTTP POST.

But there is a mechanism for sending votes via HTTP POST:

   An authority SHOULD publish its vote immediately at the start of each voting
   period (minus VoteSeconds+DistSeconds).  It does this by making it
   available at
     http://<hostname>/tor/status-vote/next/authority.z
   and sending it in an HTTP POST request to each other authority at the URL
     http://<hostname>/tor/post/vote

https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/dir-spec.txt#n1586

> There is also no mechanism to make available bandwidth
> list files from other authorities specified.

   Once an authority has a vote from another authority, it makes it available
   at
      http://<hostname>/tor/status-vote/next/<fp>.z
   where <fp> is the fingerprint of the other authority's identity key.
   And at
      http://<hostname>/tor/status-vote/next/d/<d>.z
   where <d> is the digest of the vote document.

https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/dir-spec.txt#n1597

> I wonder if this paragraph
> has to be here.

We included this paragraph to avoid implementing unnecessary features.
We wanted a minimal implementation to start with.

> I can also see a future where, to support more robust metrics
> collection, we might want to have authorities also provide mirrors of
> other authorities' documents.

I think this would be a good feature, but it’s outside the scope of a
minimal implementation.

If someone would like to help out:
* I would happily merge a spec or proposal patch
* Please open tickets for the POST and GET features
* See "Authorities should put a hash of the bandwidth file in their votes"
  https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/26698

T



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