[tor-dev] [prop-meeting] [prop#239] "Consensus Chain Hashing"

[Linus Nordberg]

isis agora lovecruft <isis at torproject.org> wrote
Fri, 9 Feb 2018 00:08:19 +0000:

> Hi!
>
> The notes from this meeting are online. [0]  Thanks to everyone who attended!
>
> We've decided to have the prop#267 [1] meeting next, then (potentially, depending on
> the takeaway from the prop#267 meeting) revise prop#239 [2] according to these
> notes.  Finally, we'll (potentially) have a third meeting to compare and
> contrast the two proposals, and choose one to go with.
>
> [0]: http://meetbot.debian.net/tor-meeting/2018/tor-meeting.2018-02-08-20.59.html[1]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/267-tor-consensus-transparency.txt[2]: https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/239-consensus-hash-chaining.txt

Thanks for arranging this meeting and apologies for not showing up as
planned.

For convenience, here are the highlighted items from the meeting. They
didn't make it to the meeting minutes page. (Seems like #info, #action
and #idea are what meetbot cares about.)

--8<---------------cut here---------------start------------->8---
<nickm> #item proposal should clarify how many older consensuses to hold
<teor> #item why not just keep the hash(es) of each consensus
<nickm> #item maybe use sha3-256 instead.
<nickm> #item maybe store only the hash and the signatures.  Have the chaining
<tjr> #item Instead of keeping full documents, can we keep a chain of diffs?
<teor> #item expand "some categories of attacks" to explain what the attacks
<tjr> #item Provide an export of a suspicious consensus that would prove
<tjr> #item It would be good to look at prop267 again in relation to this
--8<---------------cut here---------------end--------------->8---