[tor-dev] prop224: Deprecating SHA1 circuit digests

[David Goulet]

On 22 Jul (00:02:33), teor wrote:
> Hi all,
> 
> At the moment, Tor uses SHA1 for the running digests of circuit cell
> payloads.
> 
> Some of the prop224 code seems to use SHA256 for the digests for
> client to service rendezvous circuits. But that's not in the spec yet
> (see #22995 at [0]).

That is not accurate. It uses SHA3, notice DIGEST_SHA3_256 in
circuit_init_cpath_crypto():

  if (is_hs_v3) {
    digest_len = DIGEST256_LEN;
    cipher_key_len = CIPHER256_KEY_LEN;
    cpath->f_digest = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA3_256);
    cpath->b_digest = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA3_256);
  }  ...

David

-- 
ra+gAnU3Bd7UeQsMz6zHOjb1xegY80RNpptbYbrMq4Q=
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