[tor-dev] non-anonymous ephemeral onion services with stem

[teor]

> On 10 Jan 2017, at 09:17, teor <teor2345 at gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> Single Onion Services leak the service IP address to at least:
> * 6 HSDirs,
> ...
> 
> They also link the IP and onion address at:
> * 6 HSDirs.
> 
> (For next-generation hidden services, the situation is slightly better:
> 
> The IP leaks are the same, but the IP and onion address can only be
> linked if the HSDirs already know the onion address.)

I'm sorry, I got the HSDir part of this wrong.
Single Onion Services build a 3-hop path to HSDirs, to avoid selective
denial of service by HSDirs.

The connections to Intro and Rend points are one-hop, and the single
onion service IP is available to them.

T

--
Tim Wilson-Brown (teor)

teor2345 at gmail dot com
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xmpp: teor at torproject dot org
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