[tor-dev] Action items wrt prop224 onion address encoding (was Re: Proposition: Applying an AONT to Prop224 addresses?)

[Michael Rogers]

On 11/04/17 11:45, George Kadianakis wrote:
> We basically add the canonical onion address in the inner encrypted
> layer of the descriptor, and expect the client to verify it. I made this
> feature optional in case we ever decide it was a bad idea.

Is the version number also included in the blinded key derivation? I
haven't been keeping up with prop224 developments, so apologies if
that's already been settled, but in your previous email it sounded like
it was one of the suggestions but not one of the action items.

If the version number is included in the descriptor but not in the
blinded key derivation, can a service publish descriptors for multiple
protocol versions? Would there be a conflict if the HS directories store
the descriptors under the same blinded key?

Cheers,
Michael
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