[tor-dev] Control-port filtering: can it have a reasonable threat model?

[intrigeri]

Nick Mathewson:
[...]
> 5. tbb.json

> Allows "SETEVENTS STREAM" and "GETINFO circuit-status", for which see
> "onioncircuits" above.

> =====
> Filters from https://git-tails.immerda.ch/tails/tree/config/chroot_local-includes/etc/tor-controlport-filter.d

[...]

> 3. tor-browser.yml

> As "tbb.json" above.

FWIW, I think that Tails' control port filter exposes to Tor Browser
only the streams and circuits it has initiated itself. I'll let anonym
comment further on this.

Cheers,
-- 
intrigeri