[tor-dev] Tor Relays on Whonix Gateway

[isis agora lovecruft]

bancfc at openmailbox.org transcribed 1.7K bytes:
> On 2016-10-17 03:04, teor wrote:
> >>On 7 Oct 2016, at 08:11, bancfc at openmailbox.org wrote:
> >>
> >>Should Whonix document/encourage end users to turn clients into relays
> >>on their machines?
> >
> >Probably not:
> >* it increases the attack surface,
> >* it makes their IP address public,
> >* the relays would be of variable quality.
> >
> >Why not encourage them to run bridge relays instead, if their connection
> >is
> >fast enough?
> 
> Good idea. We are waiting for snowflake bridge transport to be ready and we
> plan to enable it by default on Whonix Gateway. Its optimal because no port
> forwarding is needed or changes to firewall settings (because VMs connect
> from behind virtual NATs).

You're planning to enable "ServerTransportPlugin snowflake" on Whonix Gateways
by default?  And then "ClientTransportPluging snowflake" on workstations
behind the gateway?

-- 
 ♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
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