[tor-dev] Using fingerprint of cached relay bypasses bridge?

[teor]

> On 2 Nov. 2016, at 14:50, Roger Dingledine <arma at mit.edu> wrote:
> 
> There are still some missing pieces to my theory though. The biggest one
> is: how would your Tor client proceed past the fingerprint complaint?
> That is, Tor will never get to actually fetching a bridge descriptor,
> because the fingerprint of the bridge will be wrong so it will stop.
> Maybe there is some edge case you can arrange where you had the right
> fingerprint on the last run, so you have the descriptor already at boot?
> Or maybe you do a setconf of the bridge line while your Tor is running?

You could also run Tor 0.2.7 or earlier, where the fingerprint is never
checked, as long as you use the DirPort.

T

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Tim Wilson-Brown (teor)

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