[tor-dev] Notes from the prop224 proposal reading group

[Tim Wilson-Brown - teor]

> On 29 Mar 2016, at 01:44, David Goulet <dgoulet at ev0ke.net> wrote:
> 
> On 24 Mar (16:55:57), George Kadianakis wrote:
>> George Kadianakis <desnacked at riseup.net> writes:
>> 
>>> [ text/plain ]
>>> Hello,
>>> 
>>> so we had a meeting about the future of "Next Generation Hidden Services" aka prop224.
>>> It was a good meeting.
>>> 
>>> We spent most of the time discussing the topics brought up here:
>>>  https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2016-March/010534.html
>>> Please read the above mail to get up to speed with the topics of discussion.
>>> 
>>> <snip>
>>> 
>>> b) In prop224, why do intro points need to know the "intro point encryption key"
>>>   and also what's the point of UPDATE-KEYS-SUBCMD?
>>> 
>>>   Nick told us that the main point of UPDATE-KEYS-SUBCMD is that so hidden
>>>   services can rotate their intro point encryption key periodically, so that
>>>   they can reset their replay caches.
>>> 
>>>   That's a fair point. The big question here is, is this worth the complexity
>>>   that MAINT_INTRO and UPDATE-KEYS-SUBCMD add to the protocol logic?


I'm not convinced that this feature is necessary.

I think we should remove it, and if it looks like it's needed later, we can write a separate, small proposal for it that gives reasons why it's needed.

Tim

Tim Wilson-Brown (teor)

teor2345 at gmail dot com
PGP 968F094B

teor at blah dot im
OTR CAD08081 9755866D 89E2A06F E3558B7F B5A9D14F

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