[tor-dev] Proposal 271: Another algorithm for guard selection

[Spencer]

Hi,

> 
> Nick Mathewson:
> uniformly at random
> 

What does this mean!

> 
> an adversary who had (k/N) of the network would deanonymize
> F=(k/N)^2 of all circuits...
> and after a given user had built C circuits, the attacker
> would see them at least once with probability 1-(1-F)^C.
> With large C, the attacker would get a sample of every
> user's traffic with probability 1.
> 

Probabilistic risk analysis (imaginary math).

> 
> To prevent this from happening, Tor clients choose a small
> number of guard nodes (currently 3)
> 

Except that imaginary math cannot prevent anything XD

> 
> we can't continue to connect to the Tor network
> unconditionally.
> 

The conditions set herein create a hierarchical system of trust amongst 
the guards, potentially reducing the likelihood that the selected guards 
are malicious, correct?

> 
> Tor should make a best attempt at discovering
> 

You mean *deciding*.

> 
> appropriate behavior, with as little user input and
> configuration as possible.
> 

How can Tor know what the users wants?

And, when it comes to what the software does, how do you bridge/close 
the gap of understanding between those using and those working on Tor?

Wordlife,
Spencer