[tor-dev] [network-team] [doodle poll] Meeting to discuss guard proposal draft status

isis agora lovecruft isis at torproject.org
Mon Jul 11 16:41:34 UTC 2016


Nick Mathewson transcribed 1.1K bytes:
>

Various questions and responses to the meeting logs [0]:

1. I'm not sure I understand the difference between USABLE_FILTERED_GUARD and
   CONFIRMED_GUARDS.

2. It seems like USED_GUARDS and CONFIRMED_GUARDS are being used
   interchangeably.  I realise that Nick at some point in IRC mentions the
   former was renamed to the latter, but it isn't consistent and with so many
   variables I'm finding myself a bit confused.

3. From:

> 14:14:41 <nickm> (There is also a secret novelty in how it handles bridges
>                  and entrynodes)

  I don't actually see EntryNodes mentioned in the proposal?

4. How were all the parameters in §A.1 [1] chosen?  Did we simulate the
   algorithm yet and fuzz the parameters under different network conditions
   like we did before?

5. For

> 14:22:11 <nickm> #action try to think of ways that the "don't add to
>                  USED_GUARDS till we use it" rule can be manipulated by an
>                  attacker

   I assume the function governing membership in the set of FILTERED_GUARDS
   pushes old/stale/less-usable/less-good guards out of the set when new ones
   are found?  That is, the size of FILTERED_GUARDS can't just grow
   indefinitely, right?

6. For "treating primariness as a continuum", do you mean that we
   should assign some float values to a bunch of guards we're trying
   all in parallel, then pick the guard that succeeded that had the
   highest value?  I worry a bit that this would complicate the code
   and potentially result in many attempted connected to substantially
   less-suitable nodes.


[0]: http://meetbot.debian.net/tor-dev/2016/tor-dev.2016-07-07-13.59.log.html
[1]: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/attachment/ticket/19468/prop259-redux-v3.txt#L414

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