[tor-dev] Update on 259

[Ola Bini]

Hey,

> On second thought, I think using a single USED_GUARDS list here should be OK
> for now. That's also what Tor is doing right now, so this behavior can't be
> worse than the status quo.
>
> On this note, we should add a small "Discussion" section on the proposal and
> briefly mention these issues that we might want to solve in the future, but we
> don't know how now.
Both things sound good to me.

> It might be a good idea to enumerate the guards for each possible filter we
> will add, and then calculate their guard probabilities, to see how likely it is
> to randomly choose a guard of that type. If we have filters were there is only
> 1% probability of picking a bridge of the right type, then these "your current
> network settings make it impossible for us to safely choose an entry guard"
> messages might appear more frequently than we would like.
I'm not sure we can do this - a lot of the filters will be based on
backwards compatibility with the existing Tor configuration options,
things such as ReachableAddresses - I'm not sure how to reasonably
enumerate all possibilities in a useful way.

Cheers
-- 
 Ola Bini (https://olabini.se)

 "Yields falsehood when quined" yields falsehood when quined.
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 931 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/attachments/20160407/bfce3962/attachment.sig>