[tor-dev] adding smartcard support to Tor

[Ivan Markin]

Ken Keys:
>> > The point is that one can't[*] extract a private key from a smartcard
>> > and because of that even if machine is compromised your private key
>> > stays safe.
> If the machine is going to use the HS key, the actual HS key has to be
> visible to it.

Nope. If the machine is going to use the HS key it can ask a smartcard
to do so. Of course private key is visible to something/someone anyway.
But in case of smartcards it is visible to a smartcard only.

> An encrypted container holding a VM could use RSA-style
> public/private key encryption so that it never has to see the private
> key used to unlock it. You would still need to trust the VM, but the
> encrypted container would allow you to establish a chain of custody.

It's OK to unlock some encrypted block device/VM with some 'unpluggable'
key. But it does nothing to protect your HS' identity.

-- 
Ivan Markin
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