[tor-dev] [Fwd: UX Principles]

[Greg Norcie]

Another useful resource might be this academic article on "privacy
pitfalls" in usable interface design:

http://repository.cmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1077&context=hcii

On Tue, Nov 3, 2015 at 3:09 PM, Mike Perry <mikeperry at torproject.org> wrote:

> Nima sent this to me a while ago and I completely forgot to forward it
> on. Note the Google docs and the PDF at the bottom.
>
> Useful food for though for Tor Messenger, Tor Browser, and other
> user-facing stuff.
>
> ----- Forwarded message from Nima Fatemi <nima at torproject.org> -----
>
> Date: Fri, 24 Jul 2015 03:39:31 +0000
> From: Nima Fatemi <nima at torproject.org>
> To: Mike Perry <mikeperry at torproject.org>
> Subject: UX Principles
>
> Hi Mike,
>
> sorry for late email. I was meaning to send you this sooner but I've had
> a big pile of email, I had to take care of.
>
> So the forwarded message below includes an attachment, which is the
> Yee's principles and then there's another paper that linda has
> mentioned, which is worth reading I think.
>
> Here's that talk from Google Chrome's Elisabeth Morant that I mentioned
> to you:
>
>
> https://news.yahoo.com/video/yahoo-trust-unconference-security-ux-161037378.html
>
> Here are the slides:
> (the good stuff start from page 12)
>
>
> https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1i2Pwennj8PcsigACPA1oLpRNLd7BVC0oilsgKzAx2sY/edit?pli=1#slide=id.g999beac96_0_0
>
> And here are my notes from the talk + my thoughts added to them:
>
> - 1st principle: Don't annoy users, even with updates.
>
> - People (even infosec ppl) ignore updates
>
> - users are often worried that updates would change the interface, it
> took them time and energy to get used to current things, they dont want
> it to change (even if it's a good change)
>
> - Enable auto-update by default with an option to opt out
>
> - Give devs and users tools to time permission requests
> - 2nd principle: allow mistakes!!! let them change their settings easily
> if they've changed their minds
>
> - settings windows doing similar thing should look similar and if they
> do the exact things, they should look identical.
>
> - make settings easy to discover
> - 3rd principle: combat jerks [malicious-HS_maybe?]
>         - danger is hard to communicate
>         - how to tell users about the danger they're facing
>         - infrastructure for detecting and reacting to badness
>                 - how to do this in a decentralized way?!
>         - karma! tie user engagement to resource allocation (maybe useful
> for
> HiddenServices?) (okay, right after writing this sentence, I started a
> conversation in #tor-project. see the backlog, you might find it
> interesting)
>         - crowd consent
>
> Let me know if I can be of any help.
>
> Bests,
>
> -- Nima
>
> -------- Forwarded Message --------
> Subject: Yee's principles
> Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2015 05:51:05 -0700
> From: Linda Naeun Lee <lnl at berkeley.edu>
> To: Tor Project <nima at torproject.org>
>
> Nima:
>
> Here are notes. And another paper.
>
> http://zesty.ca/pubs/yee-sid-ieeesp2004.pdf
>
>
> --
> Linda Naeun Lee
>
> Graduate Student Researcher
> Department of Computer Science
> University of California, Berkeley
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> ----- End forwarded message -----
>
> --
> Mike Perry
>
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> tor-dev at lists.torproject.org
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
>
>


-- 
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*Greg Norcie (norcie at cdt.org <norcie at cdt.org>)*

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