[tor-dev] Progress on hidserv-stats Metrics integration, request for code review

Karsten Loesing karsten at torproject.org
Fri Mar 13 15:52:39 UTC 2015


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On 12/03/15 21:26, Roger Dingledine wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 12, 2015 at 06:01:13PM +0000, George Kadianakis wrote:
>> Karsten Loesing <karsten at torproject.org> writes:
>>> The question is, what graphs do we want on Metrics?  How
>>> about:
>>> 
>>> - Total hidden-service traffic in Mbit/s (per day, using
>>> weighted interquartile mean, like lower graph on page 1 of the
>>> PDF)
>>> 
>>> - Unique .onion addresses (per day, using weighted
>>> interquartile mean, like upper graph on page 1 of the PDF)
>>> 
>>> - Fraction of relays reporting hidden-service statistics
>>> (containing both dir-onions-seen and rend-relayed-cells, like
>>> page 3 of the PDF)
>> 
>> I think these are indeed the essential graphs here. Let's proceed
>> with these for now!
> 
> Sounds great. I'm really excited to see these graphs up on the
> metrics page.
> 
> That said, for the "total hidden-service traffic" one... we want to
> know that, but we also want to know what fraction that is of total
> traffic, yes? I could imagine a graph with total hidden-service
> traffic and also with total traffic; but then the smaller curve
> will be around y=0 and not easy to see. What would you all think
> about a graph that is estimated fraction of total traffic that is
> hidden-service traffic, instead of graph #1 above?
> 
>>> Note that I left out "fraction of traffic", because we can't
>>> guarantee that our many assumptions we made for the blog post
>>> will hold in the future.  Happy to be convinced otherwise.
> 
> Oh. Yes, this is exactly the same question. Hm. I think the "number
> of hidden-service related bytes" is going to go up over time, and
> make it really easy for people to mis-conclude "hidden-service
> related bytes are getting to be more of Tor's traffic" which is not
> what that means.
> 
> Which assumptions from the blog post do you think are going to
> become less right in the future? Because I'd much rather have the
> graph that tells us the answer to the research question.

The main assumption was that exits only handle exit traffic and that
non-exits (relays without the Exit flag) don't handle exit traffic at all.

Basically, if we want to make this graph available, we'll first have
to come up with a reliable metric for traffic exiting the network.

I left out the absolute-hidden-service-traffic graph for now, but it's
not hard to add it later.

>> I think a new tab on metrics called "Advanced" with such
>> research graphs would be helpful. Maybe.
> 
> We could also imagine a cron job somewhere that generates the
> graphs somewhere (e.g. people.tp.o), and an "advanced" link from
> the hs metrics page to those graphs. To make it clearer that it's
> informal and not something we'll necessarily include forever.

Let's first come up with graphs without necessarily automating them,
and then let's discuss where they fit in best.

All the best,
Karsten

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