[tor-dev] bittorrent based pluggable transport

l.m ter.one.leeboi at hush.com
Mon Mar 2 23:19:54 UTC 2015


Hi,

I'm wondering about a particular case--let me explain. From your
threat model you assume that the adversary has suspicions about
encrypted traffic and may block them without strong justification. You
also take as given that the adversary may be state-level. From the
adversary objective this is because the adversary wants to know who
and what this communication is about. In the limitations you state
that the adversary (counter-intuitively) has strong socio-economic
reasons to not block bittorent. It does not follow... In China it's
not uncommon to hijack torrent sites or ban them entirely. They
perform mitm even for encrypted sites like github. They have a
one-strike policy that they don't normally enforce regarding file
sharing. The golden shield is sophisticated enough to correlate the
use of a bridge across multiple users. Which means you need strength
in numbers. Then again, outside China, bittorrent is commonly
subjected to traffic shaping. I'm unclear about how this helps the
censored user. Under such circumstance wouldn't it be possible to have
a common peer show up in multiple unique torrent swarms?
--leeroy
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