[tor-dev] How bad is not having 'enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128' really? (OpenBSD)

[nusenu]

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Hi,

since enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 is
disabled by default on OpenBSD due to compiler bugs [1]
I wanted to ask how bad is it (in relay context) to ignore the usual
tor log entry:

> We were built to run on a 64-bit CPU, with OpenSSL 1.0.1 or later, 
> but with a version of OpenSSL that apparently lacks accelerated 
> support for the NIST P-224 and P-256 groups. Building openssl with 
> such support (using the enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 option when 
> configuring it) would make ECDH much faster.

Tor's changelog "highly recommends" it [2].


Can this be "translated" to something like

"the relay's bandwidth usage and usefulness will be reduced"

"latency will be higher"

"security will be degraded due to fallback to DH-1024"
?

thanks,
nusenu



[1] http://article.gmane.org/gmane.os.openbsd.misc/218944
[2]
https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/plain/ReleaseNotes?id=tor-0.2.5.10
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