[tor-dev] The future of GetTor

[Adam Pritchard]

>
> Oh, nice! Although for some reason ./testssl.sh --mx torproject.org does
> not work for me, it says torproject.org has no mx records.
>

Weird. I just ran it and put the output into a gist -- pretty[1], plain[2].
And the CheckTLS sender test[3], for good measure.


> Yeah, our current approach is to get to many people as possible (that's
> why, for example, we don't do DKIM verification).


We don't do DKIM/SPF verification either. I don't think the decision was
with the rationale "to get to as many people as possible", though. More
like, "kind of a hassle and doesn't gain us much". We limit the number of
responses to a single address to 3 per day, so if an attacker is faking a
>From address there's only so much damage they can do... to a single target.
I guess a bigger threat is an attacker causing us to spam all over the
place, hurting our mail server's reputation. (Well. I guess now I have to
reconsider checking DKIM/SPF.)


> Maybe we can share
> experiences about it. Do you have a list of those services?
>

Not a comprehensive list, but here's a start...

Email services that play nice with strong TLS client/server reqs:

* Gmail
* Yahoo (but maybe not some of the regional ones? Like yahoo.de?)
* Hotmail/Outlook.com
* qq.com (Chinese email service)

Email services that do *not*:

* sina.cn, sina.net, sina.com.cn, sina.com (Chinese)
* 163.com (Chinese)
* tom.com (Chinese)
* 126.com (Chinese)

[1]:
https://rawgit.com/adam-p/349d6753aa23fd359e67/raw/63c91716ffb3bc764b1b686b04fd239e1a69f11b/out.html
[2]:
https://gist.githubusercontent.com/adam-p/349d6753aa23fd359e67/raw/cc95105ed0a647baf038ef30de0fe50b94589b44/out.txt
[3]:
https://gist.githubusercontent.com/adam-p/349d6753aa23fd359e67/raw/f8ff6cbcd0f2b39f8b4960912161c6fb5b820f4e/checktls.com.txt
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