[tor-dev] [tor-commits] [tor/master] Remove the HidServDirV2 and VoteOnHidServDirectoriesV2 options

[isis]

Roger Dingledine transcribed 1.0K bytes:
> Isis: I'd like to highlight this change for you, since it means
> that the bridge authority's networkstatus files are now going to
> have HSDir flags on the bridge status lines.
> 
> I don't know if this is going to be a problem for any of your parsing
> code in any way (hopefully not), but I figured now's a great time to
> let you know it's coming.
> 
> --Roger
> 
> On Thu, Jul 16, 2015 at 07:47:05PM +0000, nickm at torproject.org wrote:
> > --- a/src/or/networkstatus.c
> > +++ b/src/or/networkstatus.c
> > @@ -1678,7 +1678,7 @@ networkstatus_getinfo_by_purpose(const char *purpose_string, time_t now)
> >      if (bridge_auth && ri->purpose == ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE)
> >        dirserv_set_router_is_running(ri, now);
> >      /* then generate and write out status lines for each of them */
> > -    set_routerstatus_from_routerinfo(&rs, node, ri, now, 0, 0);
> > +    set_routerstatus_from_routerinfo(&rs, node, ri, now, 0);
> >      smartlist_add(statuses, networkstatus_getinfo_helper_single(&rs));
> >    } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ri);
> 

Hey Roger,

Thanks for the heads up!  I've added unittests to BridgeDB to test how its
parsers handle the HSDir flag (and make-believe flags like "Unicorn" for good
measure). [0]

Does this mean that, if I were a client using Bridges, and I were also running
a Hidden Service, that there is some chance I might use one of my Bridges to
store my HS descriptor?  If so, wouldn't that be harmful to the HS's anonymity?

[0]: https://bugs.torproject.org/16616

-- 
 ♥Ⓐ isis agora lovecruft
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