[tor-dev] Future Onion Addresses and Human Factors

[Alec Muffett]

Gah, I am evidently having a bad day with e-mail, so I am going to send a typo correction with this and then go do something else instead.

Corrections in caps, below.

—
Alec Muffett
Security Infrastructure
Facebook Engineering
London

> On Aug 8, 2015, at 2:14 PM, Alec Muffett <alecm at fb.com> wrote:
> 
> Please  let a thousand discovery mechanisms bloom - including peer-to-peer directories and tweeted URLs.
> 
> But, what they boil down to, please let *that* be human-readable, too.  The more I THINK about it, the more I like:
> 
> a1uik-0w1gm-fq3i5-ievxd-m9ceu-27e88-g6o7p-e0rff-dw9jm-ntwkd-sdxxx.onion
> 
> …where the final “xxx” is a 15-bit truncated secure hash of the rest of the original raw address bitstring.
> 
> That way people looking to quickly compare addresses can check the first QUINTET, and the last, and sample a few of the inner ones (“…people compare glyphs not words…” / “there’s IEVXD and there’s E0RFF, I like that one, it’s like Eeyore in Winnie-The-Pooh, and 0WLGM reminds me of Owls") and be reasonably satisfied and reasonably secure.
> 
> And the XXX can be checked by the browser and tell the user that they’ve goofed-up cut/paste/typing-it-in. And then they bookmark it once it loads.
> 

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