[tor-dev] Tor Geolocating exit nodes.

[Tom Ritter]

If your goal is to choose an exit specially to minimize risk of it being
run by a malicious actor, it seems choosing exits run by orgs you trust
would be better than choosing based on where someone is hosting a server.

But yes, you can choose exits by country.  I'm not saying it's a good idea
or that hard choosing exits in any fashion is good for the network. (It's
not.)

http://www.2byts.com/2012/03/09/how-to-configure-the-exit-country-on-tor-network/
http://tor.stackexchange.com/questions/733/can-i-exit-from-a-specific-country-or-node

-tom
On Jun 18, 2014 1:41 AM, "JP Wulf" <wulf.jp at gmail.com> wrote:

>
> So Griffin Boyce is canvasing for some input to improve Tor, specifially
> for Journalists.
> https://twitter.com/abditum/status/479052228138119168
>
> 1. It is known that various actors are trying to compromise Tor comms by
> establishing
> own exit nodes. With enough nodes, they can break Tor (see slides).
>
> 2. Idea: Is it possible to allow the end user to determine the
> geo-location (with various degrees of fine tuning from hemisphere, through
> continental, to top country domain to regional?
> (I have NFI about the inner workings of TOR protocol and new work on it)
>
> For example. Say a journalist in Russia is using Tor, s/he declares in
> their tor client, that they only want to use exit nodes in South America
> and Australia. Thus minimising the chance the nodes are owned.
>
> This geolocation could perhaps be used to validate the integrity of the
> nodes (how I dont know, maybe by establishing TOR honeypots that can only
> be compromised through traffic through a compromised (owned) exit node).
>
> Risk:
> This is a rats nest, because if implemented incorrectly it may allow
> hostile actors to direct exit nodes to those that are owned.
>
> Thanks for reading my fiction. Maybe its useful in the light of what
> Griffin is asking about.
>
>
> --
> JP Wulf
> Problem Solution Engineering
> http://nomeonastiq.com/
>
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>
>
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