[tor-dev] Crippled intro points

[Andrea Shepard]

A recent thread has advocated crippling relays to selectively refuse to
act as intro points for hidden services.  Unfortunately, with the current
HS design it would be implementable.  I state my opposition to adding any
such censorship feature now, and look forward to an improved HS protocol
that will make it impossible.

Also, note that it would be possible to patch Tor to do this without any
official protocol changes, but this would have the effect of leaving the
targeted HSes no way to discover intro points that will accept them other
than trial and error.  This strikes me as something that would comprise an
attack on the network and be good grounds for a !reject.

-- 
Andrea Shepard
<andrea at torproject.org>
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