[tor-dev] [Discussion] 5 ^H 3 hops rendezvous circuit design

[str4d]

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On 02/13/2014 11:43 AM, Zack Weinberg wrote:
> (Four hops is what I2P uses, with two chosen entirely by the client
> and two entirely by the server; but there appears to be nothing to
> guarantee that a malicious peer can't connect directly to its
> counterparty's two-hop chain, sacrificing some of its own anonymity
> but getting closerfor a while now to the counterparty.  I did just
> argue that that shouldn't matter, though...)

Just FTR, since 0.9.7.1 I2P defaults to 3 hops for "client" tunnels
(so default of 6 hops end-to-end, and 12 hops round-trip). And yes,
there is nothing stopping a malicious peer building zero-hop tunnels
(acting as its own Outbound Endpoint/Inbound Gateway), just as honest
clients or servers can choose to use zero-hop tunnels (e.g. a website
or IRC network that requires no anonymity of its own, but wants its
users to benefit).

str4d

> 
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