[tor-dev] Discussion on the crypto migration plan of the identity keys of Hidden Services

[Gordon Morehouse]

Symmetric cryptography (AES et al) key length - the 128, 256 etc bits
you are talking about - is not directly comparable to public/private
key cryptography, specifically RSA in this case.  1024 bits was
considered a good strong RSA key... in 1995.





On Fri, May 17, 2013, at 08:29 AM, David Vorick wrote:

Why are so many bits necessary? Isn't 128bits technically safe against
brute force? At 256 bits you are pretty much safe from any volume of
computational power that one could fathom within this century. The only
real danger is a new computational model that is nondeterministic or
something crazy like that. I feel like what exists currently (from a
quantity of bits standpoint) is more than sufficient.



On Fri, May 17, 2013 at 11:09 AM, adrelanos <[1]adrelanos at riseup.net>
wrote:

George Kadianakis:

> Thoughts?



Can you make .onion domains really long and therefor really safe
against

brute force?



Or have an option for maximum key length and a weaker default if common

CPU's are still too slow? I mean, if you want to make 2048 bit keys the

default because you feel most hidden services have CPU's which are too

slow for 4096 bit keys, then use 2048 bit as default with an option to

use the max. of 4096 bit.



Bonus point: Can you make the new implementation support less painful

updates (anyone or everyone) when the next update will be required?

(forward compatibility)

_______________________________________________

tor-dev mailing list

[2]tor-dev at lists.torproject.org

[3]https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev




_______________________________________________

tor-dev mailing list

[4]tor-dev at lists.torproject.org

[5]https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev



Sent from my device

References

1. mailto:adrelanos at riseup.net
2. mailto:tor-dev at lists.torproject.org
3. https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
4. mailto:tor-dev at lists.torproject.org
5. https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/attachments/20130517/1a83fd2e/attachment-0001.html>