[tor-dev] Proposal: Internal Mapaddress for Tor Configuration Testing

[Mike Perry]

Also at:
https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/mikeperry/torspec.git/blob/mapaddress-check:/proposals/xxx-mapaddress-tor-status.txt

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Title: Internal Mapaddress for Tor Configuration Testing
Author: Mike Perry
Created: 08-10-2012
Status: Open
Target: 0.2.4.x+


Overview

 This proposal describes a method by which we can replace the
 https://check.torproject.org/ testing service with an internal XML
 document provided by the Tor client.

Motivation

 The Tor Check service is a central point of failure in terms of Tor
 usability. If it is ever out of sync with the set of exit nodes on the
 Tor network or down, user experience is degraded considerably. Moreover,
 the check itself is very time-consuming. Users must wait seconds or more
 for the result to come back. Worse still, if the user's software *was*
 in fact misconfigured, the check.torproject.org DNS resolution and
 request leaks out on to the network.

Design Overview

 The system will have three parts: an internal hard-coded IP address
 mapping (127.84.111.114:80), a hard-coded mapaddress to a DNS name
 (selftest.torproject.org:80), and a DirPortFrontPage-style simple
 HTTP server that serves an XML document for both addresses.

 Upon receipt of a request to the IP address mapping, the system will 
 create a new 128 bit randomly generated nonce and provide it
 in the XML document.
 
 Requests to http://selftest.torproject.org/ must include a valid,
 recent nonce as the GET url path. Upon receipt of a valid nonce,
 it is removed from the list of valid nonces. Nonces are only valid
 for 60 seconds or until SIGNAL NEWNYM, which ever comes first.

 The list of pending nonces should not be allowed to grow beyond 10
 entries. 

 The timeout period and nonce limit should be configurable in torrc.

Design: XML document format for http://127.84.111.114

 To avoid the need to localize the message in Tor, Tor will only provide
 a XML object with connectivity information. Here is an example form:

 <tor-test>
  <tor-bootstrap-percent>100</tor-bootstrap-percent>
  <tor-version-current>true</tor-version-current>
  <dns-nonce>4977eb4842c7c59fa5b830ac4da896d9</dns-nonce>
 <tor-test/>

 The tor-bootstrap-percent field represents the results of the Tor client
 bootstrap status as integer percentages from bootstrap_status_t.

 The tor-version-current field represents the results of the Tor client
 consensus version check. If the bootstrap process has not yet
 downloaded a consensus document, this field will have the value
 null.

 The dns-nonce field contains a 128-bit secret, encoded in base16. This
 field is only present for requests that list the Host: header as
 127.84.111.114.

Design: XML document format for http://selftest.torproject.org/nonce

 <tor-test>
  <tor-bootstrap-percent>100</tor-bootstrap-percent>
  <tor-version-current>true</tor-version-current>
  <dns-nonce-valid>true</dns-nonce-valid>
 <tor-test/>

 The first two fields are the same as for the IP address version.

 The dns-nonce-valid field is only true if the Host header matches
 selftest.torproject.org and the nonce is current and valid. Upon
 receipt of a valid nonce, that nonce is removed from the list of
 valid nonces.

Design: Request Servicing

 Care must be taken with the dns-nonce generation and usage, to prevent
 users from being tracked through leakage of nonce value to application
 content. While the usage of XML appears to make this impossible
 due to stricter same-origin policy enforcement than JSON, same-origin
 enforcement is still fraught with exceptions and loopholes.

 In particular: 

 Any requests that contain the Origin: header MUST be ignored,
 as the Origin: header is only included for third party web content
 (CORS).

 dns-nonce fields MUST be omitted if the HTTP Host: header does not
 match the IP address 127.84.111.114.

 Requests to selftest.torproject.org MUST return false for the
 dns-nonce-valid field if the HTTP Host: header does not match
 selftest.torproject.org, regardless of nonce value.

 Further, requests to selftest.torproject.org MUST validate that
 'selftest.torproject.org' was the actual hostname provided to
 SOCKS4A, and not some alternate address mapping (due to DNS rebinding
 attacks, for example).

Design: Application Usage

 Applications will use the system in two steps. First, they will make an
 HTTP request to http://127.84.111.114:80/ over Tor's SOCKS port and
 parse the resulting XML, if any.

 If the request at this stage fails, the application should inform the
 user that either their Tor client is too old, or that it is
 misconfigured, depending upon the nature of the failure.

 If the request succeeds and valid XML is returned, the application
 will record the value of the dns-nonce field, and then perform a second
 request to http://selftest.torproject.org/nonce_value. If the second
 request succeeds, and the dns-nonce-valid field is true, the application
 may inform the user that their Tor settings are valid.

 If the second request fails, or does not provide the correct dns-nonce,
 the application will inform the user that their Tor DNS proxy settings
 are incorrect.
 
 If either tor-bootstrap-percent is not 100, or tor-version-current is
 false, applications may choose to inform the user of these facts using
 properly localized strings and appropriate UI.

Security Considerations

 XML was chosen over JSON due to the risks of the identifier leaking
 in a way that could enable websites to track the user[1].

 Because there are many exceptions and circumvention techniques
 to the same-origin policy, we have also opted for strict controls
 on dns-nonce lifetimes and usage, as well as validation of the Host
 header and SOCKS4A request hostnames.


1. http://www.hpenterprisesecurity.com/vulncat/en/vulncat/dotnet/javascript_hijacking_vulnerable_framework.html


-- 
Mike Perry
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