[tor-dev] Tor proposals implemented in Tor 0.2.3.x

[Fabian Keil]

Nick Mathewson <nickm at freehaven.net> wrote:

> IMPLEMENTED IN 0.2.3.x

>    174  Optimistic Data for Tor: Server Side
>    181  Optimistic Data for Tor: Client Side
> 
>      This one is a performance hack that hasn't seen its full impact
>      yet.  Starting with Tor 0.2.3.x, clients MAY send data to the
>      exit node before finding out whether the exit has been able to
>      successfully connect to the destination server.  Previously, it
>      took an extra round trip for clients to wait to see whether the
>      exit said "Yes, I'm connected" before they were allowed to send
>      data for the exit.
> 
>      This should make connection startup faster in many protocols
>      where the client speaks first (http, https), as more and more
>      client programs gain support for it.

Is optimistically sending data for non-testing purposes recommended?

The "Security implications" in 181 seem to imply that it isn't,
but the man page doesn't mention any risks. Is that because they
are considered obvious, or simply an oversight?

Fabian
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