[tor-dev] Improving Private Browsing Mode/Tor Browser

[Georg Koppen]

> If you maintain two long sessions within the same Tor Browser Bundle
> instance, you're screwed -- not because the exit nodes might be
> watching you, but because the web sites' logs can be correlated, and
> the *sequence* of exit nodes that your Tor client chose is very likely
> to be unique.

Ah, okay, I did not know that. Thanks for that information. I was just
wondering how the proposed changes to the private browsing mode would
avoid being tracked by exit mixes (as the blog post claimed).

Georg

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