Brainstorming about Tor, Germany, and data retention
Smuggler
smuggler at kryptohippie.com
Thu Oct 9 11:57:57 UTC 2008
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Lexi Pimenidis wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 09, 2008 at 06:29:00AM CEST, Smuggler wrote:
>
>> The issue is mostly the part of the law that concerns "replacement of
>> addresses". Basically every node would need to log the original IP and
>> the new IP of a connection as well as the time when the connection
>> started and ended.
>>
>> "Anonymisierungsdienste speichern die ursprüngliche und die neue Angabe
>> sowie des Zeitpunktes der Umschreibung dieser Angaben nach Datum und
>> Uhrzeit unter Angabe der zugrunde liegenden Zeitzone"
>>
>> The problem here is that the "Technische Richtlinie" (technical
>> directive) has not yet been adapted to the law and/or not yet publicized.
>
> Although I've heared recently that "small nodes" (like personal devices for
> NAT as used for sharing single DSL-lines) will not fall under the directive.
>
> Maybe it's possible to exploit this loophole?
>
> -- Lexi
>
The law is for "public telecommunications providers". A personal/company
NAT gateway is not public. A wifi hotspot is not public if it can only
be reached from the premises of the provider.
So... not a loophole for Tor :(
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