Guard nodes (was: Re: [or-cvs] r13101)

[Karsten Loesing]

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| Author: arma
| Date: 2008-01-10 21:23:33 -0500 (Thu, 10 Jan 2008)
| New Revision: 13101
|
| Modified:
|    tor/trunk/doc/design-paper/roadmap-future.tex
|
| [...]
|
| +\subsection{Exactly what do guard nodes provide?}
| +
| +Entry guards seem to defend against all sorts of attacks. Can we work
| +through all the benefits they provide? Papers like Nikita's CCS 2007
| +paper make me think their value is not well-understood by the research
| +community.

There is one thing with guards that I am still unsure about. Maybe
somebody can clear that up for me?

When using guards against the locating attack of hidden services, does
it make any difference for this attack _how_many_ requests an attacker
performs to the hidden service? More precise: Would a single request (or
a very low number) suffice when the attacker is picked as guard node,
and would an unlimited number of requests not be enough when the
attacker is not picked as guard node?

Thanks!
- --Karsten
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