[tor-commits] [tor/main] Service intro circuits are now 4-hop to avoid linkability by intro
asn at torproject.org
asn at torproject.org
Wed Jul 28 09:04:17 UTC 2021
commit 7ec9a68477d3c5b6937fa39445dc6b95415abb39
Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked at riseup.net>
Date: Mon Jul 12 11:23:00 2021 +0300
Service intro circuits are now 4-hop to avoid linkability by intro
Now the circuits look like this:
client rend: C -> G -> L2 -> Rend
client intro: C -> G -> L2 -> M -> Intro
client hsdir: C -> G -> L2 -> M -> HSDir
service rend: C -> G -> L2 -> M -> Rend
service intro: C -> G -> L2 -> M -> Intro
service hsdir: C -> G -> L2 -> M -> HSDir
---
src/core/or/circuitbuild.c | 11 ++++++-----
src/test/test_circuitbuild.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c
index 5cb647bd02..84a8bec421 100644
--- a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c
+++ b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c
@@ -1394,16 +1394,14 @@ route_len_for_purpose(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit_ei)
return routelen;
switch (purpose) {
- /* These two purposes connect to a router that we chose, so
- * DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN is safe. */
- case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO:
- /* hidden service connecting to introduction point */
+ /* These purposes connect to a router that we chose, so DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN
+ * is safe: */
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING:
/* router reachability testing */
known_purpose = 1;
break;
- /* These three purposes connect to a router that someone else
+ /* These purposes connect to a router that someone else
* might have chosen, so add an extra hop to protect anonymity. */
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL:
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HSDIR_GET:
@@ -1413,6 +1411,9 @@ route_len_for_purpose(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit_ei)
/* client connecting to introduction point */
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND:
/* hidden service connecting to rendezvous point */
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO:
+ /* hidden service connecting to intro point. In this case we want an extra
+ hop to avoid linkability attacks by the introduction point. */
known_purpose = 1;
routelen++;
break;
diff --git a/src/test/test_circuitbuild.c b/src/test/test_circuitbuild.c
index 873391a84f..0a5c3530bd 100644
--- a/src/test/test_circuitbuild.c
+++ b/src/test/test_circuitbuild.c
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ test_new_route_len_safe_exit(void *arg)
/* hidden service connecting to introduction point */
r = new_route_len(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO, &dummy_ei,
&dummy_nodes);
- tt_int_op(DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN, OP_EQ, r);
+ tt_int_op(DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN+1, OP_EQ, r);
/* router testing its own reachability */
r = new_route_len(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING, &dummy_ei, &dummy_nodes);
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