[tor-commits] [tor/release-0.3.5] Replace an assertion with a check-and-log
nickm at torproject.org
nickm at torproject.org
Wed Oct 7 12:16:35 UTC 2020
commit 165a92e33f3dc6123c1cd3326c6b183ac1c1d778
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm at torproject.org>
Date: Tue Jan 14 13:16:39 2020 -0500
Replace an assertion with a check-and-log
We hit this assertion with bug 32868, but I'm stymied figuring out
how we wound up with a routerstatus like this. This patch is a
diagnostic to attempt to figure out what is going on, and to avoid a
crash in the meantime.
---
changes/log_32868 | 4 +++
src/feature/nodelist/node_select.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
2 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/changes/log_32868 b/changes/log_32868
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..34476078b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changes/log_32868
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+ o Minor features (debugging, directory system):
+ - Don't crash when we find a non-guard with a guard-fraction value set.
+ Instead, log a bug warning, in an attempt to figure out how this
+ happened. Diagnostic for ticket 32868.
diff --git a/src/feature/nodelist/node_select.c b/src/feature/nodelist/node_select.c
index e31abb247f..7b9e241e5b 100644
--- a/src/feature/nodelist/node_select.c
+++ b/src/feature/nodelist/node_select.c
@@ -540,6 +540,51 @@ bridge_get_advertised_bandwidth_bounded(routerinfo_t *router)
return result;
}
+/**
+ * We have found an instance of bug 32868: log our best guess about where the
+ * routerstatus was found.
+ **/
+static void
+log_buggy_rs_source(const routerstatus_t *rs)
+{
+ static ratelim_t buggy_rs_ratelim = RATELIM_INIT(1200);
+ char *m;
+ if ((m = rate_limit_log(&buggy_rs_ratelim, approx_time()))) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,
+ "Found a routerstatus %p with has_guardfraction=%u "
+ " and guardfraction_percentage=%u, but is_possible_guard=%u.%s",
+ rs,
+ rs->has_guardfraction,
+ rs->guardfraction_percentage,
+ rs->is_possible_guard,
+ m);
+ tor_free(m);
+ networkstatus_t *ns;
+ int in_ns_count = 0;
+ if ((ns = networkstatus_get_latest_consensus_by_flavor(FLAV_NS))) {
+ int pos = smartlist_pos(ns->routerstatus_list, rs);
+ if (pos >= 0) {
+ ++in_ns_count;
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Found the routerstatus at position %d of the "
+ "NS consensus.", pos);
+ }
+ }
+ if ((ns = networkstatus_get_latest_consensus_by_flavor(FLAV_MICRODESC))) {
+ int pos = smartlist_pos(ns->routerstatus_list, rs);
+ if (pos >= 0) {
+ ++in_ns_count;
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Found the routerstatus at position %d of the "
+ "MD consensus.", pos);
+ }
+ }
+ if (in_ns_count == 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not find the routerstatus in any "
+ "latest consensus.");
+ }
+ tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached();
+ }
+}
+
/** Given a list of routers and a weighting rule as in
* smartlist_choose_node_by_bandwidth_weights, compute weighted bandwidth
* values for each node and store them in a freshly allocated
@@ -715,10 +760,11 @@ compute_weighted_bandwidths(const smartlist_t *sl,
* choose N proportionally to F*Wpf*B + (1-F)*Wpn*B.
*/
if (node->rs && node->rs->has_guardfraction && rule != WEIGHT_FOR_GUARD) {
- /* XXX The assert should actually check for is_guard. However,
- * that crashes dirauths because of #13297. This should be
- * equivalent: */
- tor_assert(node->rs->is_possible_guard);
+ /* We should only have guardfraction set if the node has the Guard
+ flag. */
+ if (! node->rs->is_possible_guard) {
+ log_buggy_rs_source(node->rs);
+ }
guard_get_guardfraction_bandwidth(&guardfraction_bw,
this_bw,
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