[tor-commits] [tor/release-0.4.1] Merge branch 'bug30781_034' into bug30781_035
nickm at torproject.org
nickm at torproject.org
Tue Jun 11 12:42:04 UTC 2019
commit c8c2e2b8fcc4d99adce600da8210a5e9ae653daf
Merge: e5deb2bbc dc8e3cd5c
Author: teor <teor at torproject.org>
Date: Thu Jun 6 09:55:44 2019 +1000
Merge branch 'bug30781_034' into bug30781_035
Moved fix from src/or/routerparse.c to src/feature/dirparse/routerparse.c.
changes/bug30781 | 4 ++++
src/feature/dirparse/routerparse.c | 3 +++
2 files changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --cc src/feature/dirparse/routerparse.c
index a81930263,000000000..e44fbf77f
mode 100644,000000..100644
--- a/src/feature/dirparse/routerparse.c
+++ b/src/feature/dirparse/routerparse.c
@@@ -1,1242 -1,0 +1,1245 @@@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file routerparse.c
+ * \brief Code to parse and validate router descriptors, consenus directories,
+ * and similar objects.
+ *
+ * The objects parsed by this module use a common text-based metaformat,
+ * documented in dir-spec.txt in torspec.git. This module is itself divided
+ * into two major kinds of function: code to handle the metaformat, and code
+ * to convert from particular instances of the metaformat into the
+ * objects that Tor uses.
+ *
+ * The generic parsing code works by calling a table-based tokenizer on the
+ * input string. Each token corresponds to a single line with a token, plus
+ * optional arguments on that line, plus an optional base-64 encoded object
+ * after that line. Each token has a definition in a table of token_rule_t
+ * entries that describes how many arguments it can take, whether it takes an
+ * object, how many times it may appear, whether it must appear first, and so
+ * on.
+ *
+ * The tokenizer function tokenize_string() converts its string input into a
+ * smartlist full of instances of directory_token_t, according to a provided
+ * table of token_rule_t.
+ *
+ * The generic parts of this module additionally include functions for
+ * finding the start and end of signed information inside a signed object, and
+ * computing the digest that will be signed.
+ *
+ * There are also functions for saving objects to disk that have caused
+ * parsing to fail.
+ *
+ * The specific parts of this module describe conversions between
+ * particular lists of directory_token_t and particular objects. The
+ * kinds of objects that can be parsed here are:
+ * <ul>
+ * <li>router descriptors (managed from routerlist.c)
+ * <li>extra-info documents (managed from routerlist.c)
+ * <li>microdescriptors (managed from microdesc.c)
+ * <li>vote and consensus networkstatus documents, and the routerstatus_t
+ * objects that they comprise (managed from networkstatus.c)
+ * <li>detached-signature objects used by authorities for gathering
+ * signatures on the networkstatus consensus (managed from dirvote.c)
+ * <li>authority key certificates (managed from routerlist.c)
+ * <li>hidden service descriptors (managed from rendcommon.c and rendcache.c)
+ * </ul>
+ **/
+
+#define EXPOSE_ROUTERDESC_TOKEN_TABLE
+
+#include "core/or/or.h"
+#include "app/config/config.h"
+#include "core/or/policies.h"
+#include "core/or/versions.h"
+#include "feature/dirparse/parsecommon.h"
+#include "feature/dirparse/policy_parse.h"
+#include "feature/dirparse/routerparse.h"
+#include "feature/dirparse/sigcommon.h"
+#include "feature/dirparse/unparseable.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/describe.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/nickname.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/routerinfo.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/routerlist.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/torcert.h"
+#include "feature/relay/router.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_curve25519.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_ed25519.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_format.h"
+#include "lib/memarea/memarea.h"
+#include "lib/sandbox/sandbox.h"
+
+#include "core/or/addr_policy_st.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/extrainfo_st.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/routerinfo_st.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/routerlist_st.h"
+
+/****************************************************************************/
+
+/** List of tokens recognized in router descriptors */
+const token_rule_t routerdesc_token_table[] = {
+ T0N("reject", K_REJECT, ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T0N("accept", K_ACCEPT, ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T0N("reject6", K_REJECT6, ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T0N("accept6", K_ACCEPT6, ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T1_START( "router", K_ROUTER, GE(5), NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("ipv6-policy", K_IPV6_POLICY, CONCAT_ARGS, NO_OBJ),
+ T1( "signing-key", K_SIGNING_KEY, NO_ARGS, NEED_KEY_1024 ),
+ T1( "onion-key", K_ONION_KEY, NO_ARGS, NEED_KEY_1024 ),
+ T01("ntor-onion-key", K_ONION_KEY_NTOR, GE(1), NO_OBJ ),
+ T1_END( "router-signature", K_ROUTER_SIGNATURE, NO_ARGS, NEED_OBJ ),
+ T1( "published", K_PUBLISHED, CONCAT_ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("uptime", K_UPTIME, GE(1), NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("fingerprint", K_FINGERPRINT, CONCAT_ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("hibernating", K_HIBERNATING, GE(1), NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("platform", K_PLATFORM, CONCAT_ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("proto", K_PROTO, CONCAT_ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("contact", K_CONTACT, CONCAT_ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("read-history", K_READ_HISTORY, ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("write-history", K_WRITE_HISTORY, ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("extra-info-digest", K_EXTRA_INFO_DIGEST, GE(1), NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("hidden-service-dir", K_HIDDEN_SERVICE_DIR, NO_ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("identity-ed25519", K_IDENTITY_ED25519, NO_ARGS, NEED_OBJ ),
+ T01("master-key-ed25519", K_MASTER_KEY_ED25519, GE(1), NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("router-sig-ed25519", K_ROUTER_SIG_ED25519, GE(1), NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("onion-key-crosscert", K_ONION_KEY_CROSSCERT, NO_ARGS, NEED_OBJ ),
+ T01("ntor-onion-key-crosscert", K_NTOR_ONION_KEY_CROSSCERT,
+ EQ(1), NEED_OBJ ),
+
+ T01("allow-single-hop-exits",K_ALLOW_SINGLE_HOP_EXITS, NO_ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+
+ T01("family", K_FAMILY, ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("caches-extra-info", K_CACHES_EXTRA_INFO, NO_ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T0N("or-address", K_OR_ADDRESS, GE(1), NO_OBJ ),
+
+ T0N("opt", K_OPT, CONCAT_ARGS, OBJ_OK ),
+ T1( "bandwidth", K_BANDWIDTH, GE(3), NO_OBJ ),
+ A01("@purpose", A_PURPOSE, GE(1), NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("tunnelled-dir-server",K_DIR_TUNNELLED, NO_ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+
+ END_OF_TABLE
+};
+
+/** List of tokens recognized in extra-info documents. */
+static token_rule_t extrainfo_token_table[] = {
+ T1_END( "router-signature", K_ROUTER_SIGNATURE, NO_ARGS, NEED_OBJ ),
+ T1( "published", K_PUBLISHED, CONCAT_ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("identity-ed25519", K_IDENTITY_ED25519, NO_ARGS, NEED_OBJ ),
+ T01("router-sig-ed25519", K_ROUTER_SIG_ED25519, GE(1), NO_OBJ ),
+ T0N("opt", K_OPT, CONCAT_ARGS, OBJ_OK ),
+ T01("read-history", K_READ_HISTORY, ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("write-history", K_WRITE_HISTORY, ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("dirreq-stats-end", K_DIRREQ_END, ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("dirreq-v2-ips", K_DIRREQ_V2_IPS, ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("dirreq-v3-ips", K_DIRREQ_V3_IPS, ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("dirreq-v2-reqs", K_DIRREQ_V2_REQS, ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("dirreq-v3-reqs", K_DIRREQ_V3_REQS, ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("dirreq-v2-share", K_DIRREQ_V2_SHARE, ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("dirreq-v3-share", K_DIRREQ_V3_SHARE, ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("dirreq-v2-resp", K_DIRREQ_V2_RESP, ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("dirreq-v3-resp", K_DIRREQ_V3_RESP, ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("dirreq-v2-direct-dl", K_DIRREQ_V2_DIR, ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("dirreq-v3-direct-dl", K_DIRREQ_V3_DIR, ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("dirreq-v2-tunneled-dl", K_DIRREQ_V2_TUN, ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("dirreq-v3-tunneled-dl", K_DIRREQ_V3_TUN, ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("entry-stats-end", K_ENTRY_END, ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("entry-ips", K_ENTRY_IPS, ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("cell-stats-end", K_CELL_END, ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("cell-processed-cells", K_CELL_PROCESSED, ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("cell-queued-cells", K_CELL_QUEUED, ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("cell-time-in-queue", K_CELL_TIME, ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("cell-circuits-per-decile", K_CELL_CIRCS, ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("exit-stats-end", K_EXIT_END, ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("exit-kibibytes-written", K_EXIT_WRITTEN, ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("exit-kibibytes-read", K_EXIT_READ, ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("exit-streams-opened", K_EXIT_OPENED, ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+
+ T1_START( "extra-info", K_EXTRA_INFO, GE(2), NO_OBJ ),
+
+ END_OF_TABLE
+};
+
+#undef T
+
+/* static function prototypes */
+static int router_add_exit_policy(routerinfo_t *router,directory_token_t *tok);
+static smartlist_t *find_all_exitpolicy(smartlist_t *s);
+
+/** Set <b>digest</b> to the SHA-1 digest of the hash of the first router in
+ * <b>s</b>. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+router_get_router_hash(const char *s, size_t s_len, char *digest)
+{
+ return router_get_hash_impl(s, s_len, digest,
+ "router ","\nrouter-signature", '\n',
+ DIGEST_SHA1);
+}
+
+/** Set <b>digest</b> to the SHA-1 digest of the hash of the <b>s_len</b>-byte
+ * extrainfo string at <b>s</b>. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. */
+int
+router_get_extrainfo_hash(const char *s, size_t s_len, char *digest)
+{
+ return router_get_hash_impl(s, s_len, digest, "extra-info",
+ "\nrouter-signature",'\n', DIGEST_SHA1);
+}
+
+/** Helper: move *<b>s_ptr</b> ahead to the next router, the next extra-info,
+ * or to the first of the annotations proceeding the next router or
+ * extra-info---whichever comes first. Set <b>is_extrainfo_out</b> to true if
+ * we found an extrainfo, or false if found a router. Do not scan beyond
+ * <b>eos</b>. Return -1 if we found nothing; 0 if we found something. */
+static int
+find_start_of_next_router_or_extrainfo(const char **s_ptr,
+ const char *eos,
+ int *is_extrainfo_out)
+{
+ const char *annotations = NULL;
+ const char *s = *s_ptr;
+
+ s = eat_whitespace_eos(s, eos);
+
+ while (s < eos-32) { /* 32 gives enough room for a the first keyword. */
+ /* We're at the start of a line. */
+ tor_assert(*s != '\n');
+
+ if (*s == '@' && !annotations) {
+ annotations = s;
+ } else if (*s == 'r' && !strcmpstart(s, "router ")) {
+ *s_ptr = annotations ? annotations : s;
+ *is_extrainfo_out = 0;
+ return 0;
+ } else if (*s == 'e' && !strcmpstart(s, "extra-info ")) {
+ *s_ptr = annotations ? annotations : s;
+ *is_extrainfo_out = 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!(s = memchr(s+1, '\n', eos-(s+1))))
+ break;
+ s = eat_whitespace_eos(s, eos);
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/** Given a string *<b>s</b> containing a concatenated sequence of router
+ * descriptors (or extra-info documents if <b>want_extrainfo</b> is set),
+ * parses them and stores the result in <b>dest</b>. All routers are marked
+ * running and valid. Advances *s to a point immediately following the last
+ * router entry. Ignore any trailing router entries that are not complete.
+ *
+ * If <b>saved_location</b> isn't SAVED_IN_CACHE, make a local copy of each
+ * descriptor in the signed_descriptor_body field of each routerinfo_t. If it
+ * isn't SAVED_NOWHERE, remember the offset of each descriptor.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure. Adds a digest to
+ * <b>invalid_digests_out</b> for every entry that was unparseable or
+ * invalid. (This may cause duplicate entries.)
+ */
+int
+router_parse_list_from_string(const char **s, const char *eos,
+ smartlist_t *dest,
+ saved_location_t saved_location,
+ int want_extrainfo,
+ int allow_annotations,
+ const char *prepend_annotations,
+ smartlist_t *invalid_digests_out)
+{
+ routerinfo_t *router;
+ extrainfo_t *extrainfo;
+ signed_descriptor_t *signed_desc = NULL;
+ void *elt;
+ const char *end, *start;
+ int have_extrainfo;
+
+ tor_assert(s);
+ tor_assert(*s);
+ tor_assert(dest);
+
+ start = *s;
+ if (!eos)
+ eos = *s + strlen(*s);
+
+ tor_assert(eos >= *s);
+
+ while (1) {
+ char raw_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
+ int have_raw_digest = 0;
+ int dl_again = 0;
+ if (find_start_of_next_router_or_extrainfo(s, eos, &have_extrainfo) < 0)
+ break;
+
+ end = tor_memstr(*s, eos-*s, "\nrouter-signature");
+ if (end)
+ end = tor_memstr(end, eos-end, "\n-----END SIGNATURE-----\n");
+ if (end)
+ end += strlen("\n-----END SIGNATURE-----\n");
+
+ if (!end)
+ break;
+
+ elt = NULL;
+
+ if (have_extrainfo && want_extrainfo) {
+ routerlist_t *rl = router_get_routerlist();
+ have_raw_digest = router_get_extrainfo_hash(*s, end-*s, raw_digest) == 0;
+ extrainfo = extrainfo_parse_entry_from_string(*s, end,
+ saved_location != SAVED_IN_CACHE,
+ rl->identity_map, &dl_again);
+ if (extrainfo) {
+ signed_desc = &extrainfo->cache_info;
+ elt = extrainfo;
+ }
+ } else if (!have_extrainfo && !want_extrainfo) {
+ have_raw_digest = router_get_router_hash(*s, end-*s, raw_digest) == 0;
+ router = router_parse_entry_from_string(*s, end,
+ saved_location != SAVED_IN_CACHE,
+ allow_annotations,
+ prepend_annotations, &dl_again);
+ if (router) {
+ log_debug(LD_DIR, "Read router '%s', purpose '%s'",
+ router_describe(router),
+ router_purpose_to_string(router->purpose));
+ signed_desc = &router->cache_info;
+ elt = router;
+ }
+ }
+ if (! elt && ! dl_again && have_raw_digest && invalid_digests_out) {
+ smartlist_add(invalid_digests_out, tor_memdup(raw_digest, DIGEST_LEN));
+ }
+ if (!elt) {
+ *s = end;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (saved_location != SAVED_NOWHERE) {
+ tor_assert(signed_desc);
+ signed_desc->saved_location = saved_location;
+ signed_desc->saved_offset = *s - start;
+ }
+ *s = end;
+ smartlist_add(dest, elt);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Try to find an IPv6 OR port in <b>list</b> of directory_token_t's
+ * with at least one argument (use GE(1) in setup). If found, store
+ * address and port number to <b>addr_out</b> and
+ * <b>port_out</b>. Return number of OR ports found. */
+int
+find_single_ipv6_orport(const smartlist_t *list,
+ tor_addr_t *addr_out,
+ uint16_t *port_out)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ tor_assert(list != NULL);
+ tor_assert(addr_out != NULL);
+ tor_assert(port_out != NULL);
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(list, directory_token_t *, t) {
+ tor_addr_t a;
+ maskbits_t bits;
+ uint16_t port_min, port_max;
+ tor_assert(t->n_args >= 1);
+ /* XXXX Prop186 the full spec allows much more than this. */
+ if (tor_addr_parse_mask_ports(t->args[0], 0,
+ &a, &bits, &port_min,
+ &port_max) == AF_INET6 &&
+ bits == 128 &&
+ port_min == port_max) {
+ /* Okay, this is one we can understand. Use it and ignore
+ any potential more addresses in list. */
+ tor_addr_copy(addr_out, &a);
+ *port_out = port_min;
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(t);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/** Helper function: reads a single router entry from *<b>s</b> ...
+ * *<b>end</b>. Mallocs a new router and returns it if all goes well, else
+ * returns NULL. If <b>cache_copy</b> is true, duplicate the contents of
+ * s through end into the signed_descriptor_body of the resulting
+ * routerinfo_t.
+ *
+ * If <b>end</b> is NULL, <b>s</b> must be properly NUL-terminated.
+ *
+ * If <b>allow_annotations</b>, it's okay to encounter annotations in <b>s</b>
+ * before the router; if it's false, reject the router if it's annotated. If
+ * <b>prepend_annotations</b> is set, it should contain some annotations:
+ * append them to the front of the router before parsing it, and keep them
+ * around when caching the router.
+ *
+ * Only one of allow_annotations and prepend_annotations may be set.
+ *
+ * If <b>can_dl_again_out</b> is provided, set *<b>can_dl_again_out</b> to 1
+ * if it's okay to try to download a descriptor with this same digest again,
+ * and 0 if it isn't. (It might not be okay to download it again if part of
+ * the part covered by the digest is invalid.)
+ */
+routerinfo_t *
+router_parse_entry_from_string(const char *s, const char *end,
+ int cache_copy, int allow_annotations,
+ const char *prepend_annotations,
+ int *can_dl_again_out)
+{
+ routerinfo_t *router = NULL;
+ char digest[128];
+ smartlist_t *tokens = NULL, *exit_policy_tokens = NULL;
+ directory_token_t *tok;
+ struct in_addr in;
+ const char *start_of_annotations, *cp, *s_dup = s;
+ size_t prepend_len = prepend_annotations ? strlen(prepend_annotations) : 0;
+ int ok = 1;
+ memarea_t *area = NULL;
+ tor_cert_t *ntor_cc_cert = NULL;
+ /* Do not set this to '1' until we have parsed everything that we intend to
+ * parse that's covered by the hash. */
+ int can_dl_again = 0;
+ crypto_pk_t *rsa_pubkey = NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(!allow_annotations || !prepend_annotations);
+
+ if (!end) {
+ end = s + strlen(s);
+ }
+
+ /* point 'end' to a point immediately after the final newline. */
+ while (end > s+2 && *(end-1) == '\n' && *(end-2) == '\n')
+ --end;
+
+ area = memarea_new();
+ tokens = smartlist_new();
+ if (prepend_annotations) {
+ if (tokenize_string(area,prepend_annotations,NULL,tokens,
+ routerdesc_token_table,TS_NOCHECK)) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Error tokenizing router descriptor (annotations).");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ start_of_annotations = s;
+ cp = tor_memstr(s, end-s, "\nrouter ");
+ if (!cp) {
+ if (end-s < 7 || strcmpstart(s, "router ")) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "No router keyword found.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ s = cp+1;
+ }
+
+ if (start_of_annotations != s) { /* We have annotations */
+ if (allow_annotations) {
+ if (tokenize_string(area,start_of_annotations,s,tokens,
+ routerdesc_token_table,TS_NOCHECK)) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Error tokenizing router descriptor (annotations).");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Found unexpected annotations on router descriptor not "
+ "loaded from disk. Dropping it.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (router_get_router_hash(s, end - s, digest) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Couldn't compute router hash.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ {
+ int flags = 0;
+ if (allow_annotations)
+ flags |= TS_ANNOTATIONS_OK;
+ if (prepend_annotations)
+ flags |= TS_ANNOTATIONS_OK|TS_NO_NEW_ANNOTATIONS;
+
+ if (tokenize_string(area,s,end,tokens,routerdesc_token_table, flags)) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Error tokenizing router descriptor.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (smartlist_len(tokens) < 2) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Impossibly short router descriptor.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, K_ROUTER);
+ const int router_token_pos = smartlist_pos(tokens, tok);
+ tor_assert(tok->n_args >= 5);
+
+ router = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(routerinfo_t));
+ router->cert_expiration_time = TIME_MAX;
+ router->cache_info.routerlist_index = -1;
+ router->cache_info.annotations_len = s-start_of_annotations + prepend_len;
+ router->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len = end-s;
+ if (cache_copy) {
+ size_t len = router->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len +
+ router->cache_info.annotations_len;
+ char *signed_body =
+ router->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body = tor_malloc(len+1);
+ if (prepend_annotations) {
+ memcpy(signed_body, prepend_annotations, prepend_len);
+ signed_body += prepend_len;
+ }
+ /* This assertion will always succeed.
+ * len == signed_desc_len + annotations_len
+ * == end-s + s-start_of_annotations + prepend_len
+ * == end-start_of_annotations + prepend_len
+ * We already wrote prepend_len bytes into the buffer; now we're
+ * writing end-start_of_annotations -NM. */
+ tor_assert(signed_body+(end-start_of_annotations) ==
+ router->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body+len);
+ memcpy(signed_body, start_of_annotations, end-start_of_annotations);
+ router->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body[len] = '\0';
+ tor_assert(strlen(router->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body) == len);
+ }
+ memcpy(router->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+
+ router->nickname = tor_strdup(tok->args[0]);
+ if (!is_legal_nickname(router->nickname)) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR,"Router nickname is invalid");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!tor_inet_aton(tok->args[1], &in)) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR,"Router address is not an IP address.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ router->addr = ntohl(in.s_addr);
+
+ router->or_port =
+ (uint16_t) tor_parse_long(tok->args[2],10,0,65535,&ok,NULL);
+ if (!ok) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR,"Invalid OR port %s", escaped(tok->args[2]));
+ goto err;
+ }
+ router->dir_port =
+ (uint16_t) tor_parse_long(tok->args[4],10,0,65535,&ok,NULL);
+ if (!ok) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR,"Invalid dir port %s", escaped(tok->args[4]));
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, K_BANDWIDTH);
+ tor_assert(tok->n_args >= 3);
+ router->bandwidthrate = (int)
+ tor_parse_long(tok->args[0],10,1,INT_MAX,&ok,NULL);
+
+ if (!ok) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "bandwidthrate %s unreadable or 0. Failing.",
+ escaped(tok->args[0]));
+ goto err;
+ }
+ router->bandwidthburst =
+ (int) tor_parse_long(tok->args[1],10,0,INT_MAX,&ok,NULL);
+ if (!ok) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Invalid bandwidthburst %s", escaped(tok->args[1]));
+ goto err;
+ }
+ router->bandwidthcapacity = (int)
+ tor_parse_long(tok->args[2],10,0,INT_MAX,&ok,NULL);
+ if (!ok) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Invalid bandwidthcapacity %s", escaped(tok->args[1]));
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, A_PURPOSE))) {
+ tor_assert(tok->n_args);
+ router->purpose = router_purpose_from_string(tok->args[0]);
++ if (router->purpose == ROUTER_PURPOSE_UNKNOWN) {
++ goto err;
++ }
+ } else {
+ router->purpose = ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL;
+ }
+ router->cache_info.send_unencrypted =
+ (router->purpose == ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL) ? 1 : 0;
+
+ if ((tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_UPTIME))) {
+ tor_assert(tok->n_args >= 1);
+ router->uptime = tor_parse_long(tok->args[0],10,0,LONG_MAX,&ok,NULL);
+ if (!ok) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Invalid uptime %s", escaped(tok->args[0]));
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_HIBERNATING))) {
+ tor_assert(tok->n_args >= 1);
+ router->is_hibernating
+ = (tor_parse_long(tok->args[0],10,0,LONG_MAX,NULL,NULL) != 0);
+ }
+
+ tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, K_PUBLISHED);
+ tor_assert(tok->n_args == 1);
+ if (parse_iso_time(tok->args[0], &router->cache_info.published_on) < 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, K_ONION_KEY);
+ if (!crypto_pk_public_exponent_ok(tok->key)) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR,
+ "Relay's onion key had invalid exponent.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ router_set_rsa_onion_pkey(tok->key, &router->onion_pkey,
+ &router->onion_pkey_len);
+ crypto_pk_free(tok->key);
+
+ if ((tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_ONION_KEY_NTOR))) {
+ curve25519_public_key_t k;
+ tor_assert(tok->n_args >= 1);
+ if (curve25519_public_from_base64(&k, tok->args[0]) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Bogus ntor-onion-key in routerinfo");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ router->onion_curve25519_pkey =
+ tor_memdup(&k, sizeof(curve25519_public_key_t));
+ }
+
+ tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, K_SIGNING_KEY);
+ router->identity_pkey = tok->key;
+ tok->key = NULL; /* Prevent free */
+ if (crypto_pk_get_digest(router->identity_pkey,
+ router->cache_info.identity_digest)) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Couldn't calculate key digest"); goto err;
+ }
+
+ {
+ directory_token_t *ed_sig_tok, *ed_cert_tok, *cc_tap_tok, *cc_ntor_tok,
+ *master_key_tok;
+ ed_sig_tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_ROUTER_SIG_ED25519);
+ ed_cert_tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_IDENTITY_ED25519);
+ master_key_tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_MASTER_KEY_ED25519);
+ cc_tap_tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_ONION_KEY_CROSSCERT);
+ cc_ntor_tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_NTOR_ONION_KEY_CROSSCERT);
+ int n_ed_toks = !!ed_sig_tok + !!ed_cert_tok +
+ !!cc_tap_tok + !!cc_ntor_tok;
+ if ((n_ed_toks != 0 && n_ed_toks != 4) ||
+ (n_ed_toks == 4 && !router->onion_curve25519_pkey)) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Router descriptor with only partial ed25519/"
+ "cross-certification support");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (master_key_tok && !ed_sig_tok) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Router descriptor has ed25519 master key but no "
+ "certificate");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (ed_sig_tok) {
+ tor_assert(ed_cert_tok && cc_tap_tok && cc_ntor_tok);
+ const int ed_cert_token_pos = smartlist_pos(tokens, ed_cert_tok);
+ if (ed_cert_token_pos == -1 || router_token_pos == -1 ||
+ (ed_cert_token_pos != router_token_pos + 1 &&
+ ed_cert_token_pos != router_token_pos - 1)) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Ed25519 certificate in wrong position");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (ed_sig_tok != smartlist_get(tokens, smartlist_len(tokens)-2)) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Ed25519 signature in wrong position");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (strcmp(ed_cert_tok->object_type, "ED25519 CERT")) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Wrong object type on identity-ed25519 in decriptor");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (strcmp(cc_ntor_tok->object_type, "ED25519 CERT")) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Wrong object type on ntor-onion-key-crosscert "
+ "in decriptor");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (strcmp(cc_tap_tok->object_type, "CROSSCERT")) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Wrong object type on onion-key-crosscert "
+ "in decriptor");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (strcmp(cc_ntor_tok->args[0], "0") &&
+ strcmp(cc_ntor_tok->args[0], "1")) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Bad sign bit on ntor-onion-key-crosscert");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ int ntor_cc_sign_bit = !strcmp(cc_ntor_tok->args[0], "1");
+
+ uint8_t d256[DIGEST256_LEN];
+ const char *signed_start, *signed_end;
+ tor_cert_t *cert = tor_cert_parse(
+ (const uint8_t*)ed_cert_tok->object_body,
+ ed_cert_tok->object_size);
+ if (! cert) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Couldn't parse ed25519 cert");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* makes sure it gets freed. */
+ router->cache_info.signing_key_cert = cert;
+
+ if (cert->cert_type != CERT_TYPE_ID_SIGNING ||
+ ! cert->signing_key_included) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Invalid form for ed25519 cert");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (master_key_tok) {
+ /* This token is optional, but if it's present, it must match
+ * the signature in the signing cert, or supplant it. */
+ tor_assert(master_key_tok->n_args >= 1);
+ ed25519_public_key_t pkey;
+ if (ed25519_public_from_base64(&pkey, master_key_tok->args[0])<0) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Can't parse ed25519 master key");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (fast_memneq(&cert->signing_key.pubkey,
+ pkey.pubkey, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Ed25519 master key does not match "
+ "key in certificate");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ ntor_cc_cert = tor_cert_parse((const uint8_t*)cc_ntor_tok->object_body,
+ cc_ntor_tok->object_size);
+ if (!ntor_cc_cert) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Couldn't parse ntor-onion-key-crosscert cert");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (ntor_cc_cert->cert_type != CERT_TYPE_ONION_ID ||
+ ! ed25519_pubkey_eq(&ntor_cc_cert->signed_key, &cert->signing_key)) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Invalid contents for ntor-onion-key-crosscert cert");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ed25519_public_key_t ntor_cc_pk;
+ if (ed25519_public_key_from_curve25519_public_key(&ntor_cc_pk,
+ router->onion_curve25519_pkey,
+ ntor_cc_sign_bit)<0) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Error converting onion key to ed25519");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (router_get_hash_impl_helper(s, end-s, "router ",
+ "\nrouter-sig-ed25519",
+ ' ', LOG_WARN,
+ &signed_start, &signed_end) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Can't find ed25519-signed portion of descriptor");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ crypto_digest_t *d = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA256);
+ crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, ED_DESC_SIGNATURE_PREFIX,
+ strlen(ED_DESC_SIGNATURE_PREFIX));
+ crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, signed_start, signed_end-signed_start);
+ crypto_digest_get_digest(d, (char*)d256, sizeof(d256));
+ crypto_digest_free(d);
+
+ ed25519_checkable_t check[3];
+ int check_ok[3];
+ time_t expires = TIME_MAX;
+ if (tor_cert_get_checkable_sig(&check[0], cert, NULL, &expires) < 0) {
+ log_err(LD_BUG, "Couldn't create 'checkable' for cert.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (tor_cert_get_checkable_sig(&check[1],
+ ntor_cc_cert, &ntor_cc_pk, &expires) < 0) {
+ log_err(LD_BUG, "Couldn't create 'checkable' for ntor_cc_cert.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (ed25519_signature_from_base64(&check[2].signature,
+ ed_sig_tok->args[0])<0) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Couldn't decode ed25519 signature");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ check[2].pubkey = &cert->signed_key;
+ check[2].msg = d256;
+ check[2].len = DIGEST256_LEN;
+
+ if (ed25519_checksig_batch(check_ok, check, 3) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Incorrect ed25519 signature(s)");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ rsa_pubkey = router_get_rsa_onion_pkey(router->onion_pkey,
+ router->onion_pkey_len);
+ if (check_tap_onion_key_crosscert(
+ (const uint8_t*)cc_tap_tok->object_body,
+ (int)cc_tap_tok->object_size,
+ rsa_pubkey,
+ &cert->signing_key,
+ (const uint8_t*)router->cache_info.identity_digest)<0) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Incorrect TAP cross-verification");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* We check this before adding it to the routerlist. */
+ router->cert_expiration_time = expires;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_FINGERPRINT))) {
+ /* If there's a fingerprint line, it must match the identity digest. */
+ char d[DIGEST_LEN];
+ tor_assert(tok->n_args == 1);
+ tor_strstrip(tok->args[0], " ");
+ if (base16_decode(d, DIGEST_LEN,
+ tok->args[0], strlen(tok->args[0])) != DIGEST_LEN) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Couldn't decode router fingerprint %s",
+ escaped(tok->args[0]));
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (tor_memneq(d,router->cache_info.identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN)) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Fingerprint '%s' does not match identity digest.",
+ tok->args[0]);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ {
+ const char *version = NULL, *protocols = NULL;
+ if ((tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_PLATFORM))) {
+ router->platform = tor_strdup(tok->args[0]);
+ version = tok->args[0];
+ }
+
+ if ((tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_PROTO))) {
+ router->protocol_list = tor_strdup(tok->args[0]);
+ protocols = tok->args[0];
+ }
+
+ summarize_protover_flags(&router->pv, protocols, version);
+ }
+
+ if ((tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_CONTACT))) {
+ router->contact_info = tor_strdup(tok->args[0]);
+ }
+
+ if (find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_REJECT6) ||
+ find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_ACCEPT6)) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Rejecting router with reject6/accept6 line: they crash "
+ "older Tors.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ {
+ smartlist_t *or_addresses = find_all_by_keyword(tokens, K_OR_ADDRESS);
+ if (or_addresses) {
+ find_single_ipv6_orport(or_addresses, &router->ipv6_addr,
+ &router->ipv6_orport);
+ smartlist_free(or_addresses);
+ }
+ }
+ exit_policy_tokens = find_all_exitpolicy(tokens);
+ if (!smartlist_len(exit_policy_tokens)) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "No exit policy tokens in descriptor.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(exit_policy_tokens, directory_token_t *, t,
+ if (router_add_exit_policy(router,t)<0) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR,"Error in exit policy");
+ goto err;
+ });
+ policy_expand_private(&router->exit_policy);
+
+ if ((tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_IPV6_POLICY)) && tok->n_args) {
+ router->ipv6_exit_policy = parse_short_policy(tok->args[0]);
+ if (! router->ipv6_exit_policy) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR , "Error in ipv6-policy %s", escaped(tok->args[0]));
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (policy_is_reject_star(router->exit_policy, AF_INET, 1) &&
+ (!router->ipv6_exit_policy ||
+ short_policy_is_reject_star(router->ipv6_exit_policy)))
+ router->policy_is_reject_star = 1;
+
+ if ((tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_FAMILY)) && tok->n_args) {
+ int i;
+ router->declared_family = smartlist_new();
+ for (i=0;i<tok->n_args;++i) {
+ if (!is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(tok->args[i])) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Illegal nickname %s in family line",
+ escaped(tok->args[i]));
+ goto err;
+ }
+ smartlist_add_strdup(router->declared_family, tok->args[i]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_CACHES_EXTRA_INFO))
+ router->caches_extra_info = 1;
+
+ if (find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_ALLOW_SINGLE_HOP_EXITS))
+ router->allow_single_hop_exits = 1;
+
+ if ((tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_EXTRA_INFO_DIGEST))) {
+ tor_assert(tok->n_args >= 1);
+ if (strlen(tok->args[0]) == HEX_DIGEST_LEN) {
+ if (base16_decode(router->cache_info.extra_info_digest, DIGEST_LEN,
+ tok->args[0], HEX_DIGEST_LEN) != DIGEST_LEN) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR,"Invalid extra info digest");
+ }
+ } else {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Invalid extra info digest %s", escaped(tok->args[0]));
+ }
+
+ if (tok->n_args >= 2) {
+ if (digest256_from_base64(router->cache_info.extra_info_digest256,
+ tok->args[1]) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Invalid extra info digest256 %s",
+ escaped(tok->args[1]));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_HIDDEN_SERVICE_DIR)) {
+ router->wants_to_be_hs_dir = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* This router accepts tunnelled directory requests via begindir if it has
+ * an open dirport or it included "tunnelled-dir-server". */
+ if (find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_DIR_TUNNELLED) || router->dir_port > 0) {
+ router->supports_tunnelled_dir_requests = 1;
+ }
+
+ tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, K_ROUTER_SIGNATURE);
+
+ if (!router->or_port) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR,"or_port unreadable or 0. Failing.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* We've checked everything that's covered by the hash. */
+ can_dl_again = 1;
+ if (check_signature_token(digest, DIGEST_LEN, tok, router->identity_pkey, 0,
+ "router descriptor") < 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!router->platform) {
+ router->platform = tor_strdup("<unknown>");
+ }
+ goto done;
+
+ err:
+ dump_desc(s_dup, "router descriptor");
+ routerinfo_free(router);
+ router = NULL;
+ done:
+ crypto_pk_free(rsa_pubkey);
+ tor_cert_free(ntor_cc_cert);
+ if (tokens) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(tokens, directory_token_t *, t, token_clear(t));
+ smartlist_free(tokens);
+ }
+ smartlist_free(exit_policy_tokens);
+ if (area) {
+ DUMP_AREA(area, "routerinfo");
+ memarea_drop_all(area);
+ }
+ if (can_dl_again_out)
+ *can_dl_again_out = can_dl_again;
+ return router;
+}
+
+/** Parse a single extrainfo entry from the string <b>s</b>, ending at
+ * <b>end</b>. (If <b>end</b> is NULL, parse up to the end of <b>s</b>.) If
+ * <b>cache_copy</b> is true, make a copy of the extra-info document in the
+ * cache_info fields of the result. If <b>routermap</b> is provided, use it
+ * as a map from router identity to routerinfo_t when looking up signing keys.
+ *
+ * If <b>can_dl_again_out</b> is provided, set *<b>can_dl_again_out</b> to 1
+ * if it's okay to try to download an extrainfo with this same digest again,
+ * and 0 if it isn't. (It might not be okay to download it again if part of
+ * the part covered by the digest is invalid.)
+ */
+extrainfo_t *
+extrainfo_parse_entry_from_string(const char *s, const char *end,
+ int cache_copy, struct digest_ri_map_t *routermap,
+ int *can_dl_again_out)
+{
+ extrainfo_t *extrainfo = NULL;
+ char digest[128];
+ smartlist_t *tokens = NULL;
+ directory_token_t *tok;
+ crypto_pk_t *key = NULL;
+ routerinfo_t *router = NULL;
+ memarea_t *area = NULL;
+ const char *s_dup = s;
+ /* Do not set this to '1' until we have parsed everything that we intend to
+ * parse that's covered by the hash. */
+ int can_dl_again = 0;
+
+ if (BUG(s == NULL))
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (!end) {
+ end = s + strlen(s);
+ }
+
+ /* point 'end' to a point immediately after the final newline. */
+ while (end > s+2 && *(end-1) == '\n' && *(end-2) == '\n')
+ --end;
+
+ if (router_get_extrainfo_hash(s, end-s, digest) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Couldn't compute router hash.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ tokens = smartlist_new();
+ area = memarea_new();
+ if (tokenize_string(area,s,end,tokens,extrainfo_token_table,0)) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Error tokenizing extra-info document.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (smartlist_len(tokens) < 2) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Impossibly short extra-info document.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* XXXX Accept this in position 1 too, and ed identity in position 0. */
+ tok = smartlist_get(tokens,0);
+ if (tok->tp != K_EXTRA_INFO) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR,"Entry does not start with \"extra-info\"");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ extrainfo = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(extrainfo_t));
+ extrainfo->cache_info.is_extrainfo = 1;
+ if (cache_copy)
+ extrainfo->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body = tor_memdup_nulterm(s,end-s);
+ extrainfo->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len = end-s;
+ memcpy(extrainfo->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+ crypto_digest256((char*)extrainfo->digest256, s, end-s, DIGEST_SHA256);
+
+ tor_assert(tok->n_args >= 2);
+ if (!is_legal_nickname(tok->args[0])) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR,"Bad nickname %s on \"extra-info\"",escaped(tok->args[0]));
+ goto err;
+ }
+ strlcpy(extrainfo->nickname, tok->args[0], sizeof(extrainfo->nickname));
+ if (strlen(tok->args[1]) != HEX_DIGEST_LEN ||
+ base16_decode(extrainfo->cache_info.identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN,
+ tok->args[1], HEX_DIGEST_LEN) != DIGEST_LEN) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR,"Invalid fingerprint %s on \"extra-info\"",
+ escaped(tok->args[1]));
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, K_PUBLISHED);
+ if (parse_iso_time(tok->args[0], &extrainfo->cache_info.published_on)) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR,"Invalid published time %s on \"extra-info\"",
+ escaped(tok->args[0]));
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ {
+ directory_token_t *ed_sig_tok, *ed_cert_tok;
+ ed_sig_tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_ROUTER_SIG_ED25519);
+ ed_cert_tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_IDENTITY_ED25519);
+ int n_ed_toks = !!ed_sig_tok + !!ed_cert_tok;
+ if (n_ed_toks != 0 && n_ed_toks != 2) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Router descriptor with only partial ed25519/"
+ "cross-certification support");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (ed_sig_tok) {
+ tor_assert(ed_cert_tok);
+ const int ed_cert_token_pos = smartlist_pos(tokens, ed_cert_tok);
+ if (ed_cert_token_pos != 1) {
+ /* Accept this in position 0 XXXX */
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Ed25519 certificate in wrong position");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (ed_sig_tok != smartlist_get(tokens, smartlist_len(tokens)-2)) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Ed25519 signature in wrong position");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (strcmp(ed_cert_tok->object_type, "ED25519 CERT")) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Wrong object type on identity-ed25519 in decriptor");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ uint8_t d256[DIGEST256_LEN];
+ const char *signed_start, *signed_end;
+ tor_cert_t *cert = tor_cert_parse(
+ (const uint8_t*)ed_cert_tok->object_body,
+ ed_cert_tok->object_size);
+ if (! cert) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Couldn't parse ed25519 cert");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* makes sure it gets freed. */
+ extrainfo->cache_info.signing_key_cert = cert;
+
+ if (cert->cert_type != CERT_TYPE_ID_SIGNING ||
+ ! cert->signing_key_included) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Invalid form for ed25519 cert");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (router_get_hash_impl_helper(s, end-s, "extra-info ",
+ "\nrouter-sig-ed25519",
+ ' ', LOG_WARN,
+ &signed_start, &signed_end) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Can't find ed25519-signed portion of extrainfo");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ crypto_digest_t *d = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA256);
+ crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, ED_DESC_SIGNATURE_PREFIX,
+ strlen(ED_DESC_SIGNATURE_PREFIX));
+ crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, signed_start, signed_end-signed_start);
+ crypto_digest_get_digest(d, (char*)d256, sizeof(d256));
+ crypto_digest_free(d);
+
+ ed25519_checkable_t check[2];
+ int check_ok[2];
+ if (tor_cert_get_checkable_sig(&check[0], cert, NULL, NULL) < 0) {
+ log_err(LD_BUG, "Couldn't create 'checkable' for cert.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (ed25519_signature_from_base64(&check[1].signature,
+ ed_sig_tok->args[0])<0) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Couldn't decode ed25519 signature");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ check[1].pubkey = &cert->signed_key;
+ check[1].msg = d256;
+ check[1].len = DIGEST256_LEN;
+
+ if (ed25519_checksig_batch(check_ok, check, 2) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Incorrect ed25519 signature(s)");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* We don't check the certificate expiration time: checking that it
+ * matches the cert in the router descriptor is adequate. */
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* We've checked everything that's covered by the hash. */
+ can_dl_again = 1;
+
+ if (routermap &&
+ (router = digestmap_get((digestmap_t*)routermap,
+ extrainfo->cache_info.identity_digest))) {
+ key = router->identity_pkey;
+ }
+
+ tok = find_by_keyword(tokens, K_ROUTER_SIGNATURE);
+ if (strcmp(tok->object_type, "SIGNATURE") ||
+ tok->object_size < 128 || tok->object_size > 512) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Bad object type or length on extra-info signature");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (key) {
+ if (check_signature_token(digest, DIGEST_LEN, tok, key, 0,
+ "extra-info") < 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (router)
+ extrainfo->cache_info.send_unencrypted =
+ router->cache_info.send_unencrypted;
+ } else {
+ extrainfo->pending_sig = tor_memdup(tok->object_body,
+ tok->object_size);
+ extrainfo->pending_sig_len = tok->object_size;
+ }
+
+ goto done;
+ err:
+ dump_desc(s_dup, "extra-info descriptor");
+ extrainfo_free(extrainfo);
+ extrainfo = NULL;
+ done:
+ if (tokens) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(tokens, directory_token_t *, t, token_clear(t));
+ smartlist_free(tokens);
+ }
+ if (area) {
+ DUMP_AREA(area, "extrainfo");
+ memarea_drop_all(area);
+ }
+ if (can_dl_again_out)
+ *can_dl_again_out = can_dl_again;
+ return extrainfo;
+}
+
+/** Add an exit policy stored in the token <b>tok</b> to the router info in
+ * <b>router</b>. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. */
+static int
+router_add_exit_policy(routerinfo_t *router, directory_token_t *tok)
+{
+ addr_policy_t *newe;
+ /* Use the standard interpretation of accept/reject *, an IPv4 wildcard. */
+ newe = router_parse_addr_policy(tok, 0);
+ if (!newe)
+ return -1;
+ if (! router->exit_policy)
+ router->exit_policy = smartlist_new();
+
+ /* Ensure that in descriptors, accept/reject fields are followed by
+ * IPv4 addresses, and accept6/reject6 fields are followed by
+ * IPv6 addresses. Unlike torrcs, descriptor exit policies do not permit
+ * accept/reject followed by IPv6. */
+ if (((tok->tp == K_ACCEPT6 || tok->tp == K_REJECT6) &&
+ tor_addr_family(&newe->addr) == AF_INET)
+ ||
+ ((tok->tp == K_ACCEPT || tok->tp == K_REJECT) &&
+ tor_addr_family(&newe->addr) == AF_INET6)) {
+ /* There's nothing the user can do about other relays' descriptors,
+ * so we don't provide usage advice here. */
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Mismatch between field type and address type in exit "
+ "policy '%s'. Discarding entire router descriptor.",
+ tok->n_args == 1 ? tok->args[0] : "");
+ addr_policy_free(newe);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ smartlist_add(router->exit_policy, newe);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Return a newly allocated smartlist of all accept or reject tokens in
+ * <b>s</b>.
+ */
+static smartlist_t *
+find_all_exitpolicy(smartlist_t *s)
+{
+ smartlist_t *out = smartlist_new();
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(s, directory_token_t *, t,
+ if (t->tp == K_ACCEPT || t->tp == K_ACCEPT6 ||
+ t->tp == K_REJECT || t->tp == K_REJECT6)
+ smartlist_add(out,t));
+ return out;
+}
+
+/** Called on startup; right now we just handle scanning the unparseable
+ * descriptor dumps, but hang anything else we might need to do in the
+ * future here as well.
+ */
+void
+routerparse_init(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * Check both if the sandbox is active and whether it's configured; no
+ * point in loading all that if we won't be able to use it after the
+ * sandbox becomes active.
+ */
+ if (!(sandbox_is_active() || get_options()->Sandbox)) {
+ dump_desc_init();
+ }
+}
+
+/** Clean up all data structures used by routerparse.c at exit */
+void
+routerparse_free_all(void)
+{
+ dump_desc_fifo_cleanup();
+}
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