[tor-commits] [community/staging] better strings for l10n

[emmapeel at torproject.org]

commit e076c90b924f19bec7e86b893633c285dbc884d6
Author: emma peel <emma.peel at riseup.net>
Date:   Tue Jun 4 09:45:44 2019 +0200

    better strings for l10n
---
 content/onion-services/overview/contents.lr        | 60 ++++++++++++++--------
 .../relay-operations/technical-setup/contents.lr   |  9 ++--
 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

diff --git a/content/onion-services/overview/contents.lr b/content/onion-services/overview/contents.lr
index 9daf496..9ba18c6 100644
--- a/content/onion-services/overview/contents.lr
+++ b/content/onion-services/overview/contents.lr
@@ -16,7 +16,8 @@ html: onion-services.html
 ---
 body:
 
-Onion services are services that can only be accessed over Tor. Running an onion service gives your users all the security of HTTPS with the added privacy benefits of Tor Browser.
+Onion services are services that can only be accessed over Tor.
+Running an onion service gives your users all the security of HTTPS with the added privacy benefits of Tor Browser.
 
 ## Why onion services?
 
@@ -24,11 +25,13 @@ Onion services offer various security benefits to their users, that are not usua
 
 ### Location hiding
 
-An onion service's IP is hidden. Onion services are an overlay network on top of TCP/IP/, so in some sense IP addresses are not even meaningful to onion services: they are not even used in the protocol.
+An onion service's IP is hidden.
+Onion services are an overlay network on top of TCP/IP/, so in some sense IP addresses are not even meaningful to onion services: they are not even used in the protocol.
 
 ### End-to-end authentication
 
-When a user visits a particular onion, they know that the content they are seeing can only come from that particular onion and that no impersonation is possible. This is not the case with the normal web, where reaching a website does not mean that a man-in-the-middle did not reroute to some other location (e.g. DNS attacks).
+When a user visits a particular onion, they know that the content they are seeing can only come from that particular onion and that no impersonation is possible.
+This is not the case with the normal web, where reaching a website does not mean that a man-in-the-middle did not reroute to some other location (e.g. DNS attacks).
 
 ### End-to-end encryption
 
@@ -36,24 +39,29 @@ Onion service traffic is encrypted from the client to the onion host. This is li
 
 ### NAT punching
 
-Is your network filtered and you can't open ports on your firewall? This could happen if you are in a university campus, an office, an airport or pretty much anywhere. Onion services don't need open ports because they punch through NAT, since they only establish outgoing connections.
+Is your network filtered and you can't open ports on your firewall?
+This could happen if you are in a university campus, an office, an airport or pretty much anywhere.
+Onion services don't need open ports because they punch through NAT, since they only establish outgoing connections.
 
 
 ## The Onion Service Protocol: Overview
 
-Now the question becomes **what kind of protocol do we need to achieve all these properties?** In particular, on the normal web, we connect to an IP address and we are done, but in this case how do we connect to something that does not have an IP address?
+Now the question becomes **what kind of protocol do we need to achieve all these properties?**.
+In particular, on the normal web, we connect to an IP address and we are done, but in this case how do we connect to something that does not have an IP address?
 
-In particular, an onion service's address looks like this: `vww6ybal4bd7szmgncyruucpgfkqahzddi37ktceo3ah7ngmcopnpyyd.onion`
+In particular, an onion service's address looks like this: 'vww6ybal4bd7szmgncyruucpgfkqahzddi37ktceo3ah7ngmcopnpyyd.onion'.
 
 This looks weird and random because in reality it's the _identity public key_ of the onion service and that's one of the reasons we can achieve the security properties from above.
 
-The general concept behind the onion service protocol is that we use the Tor network so that the client (Alice) can introduce itself to the service (Bob), and then sets up a rendezvous with the service. Here is a detailed breakdown of how this happens:
+The general concept behind the onion service protocol is that we use the Tor network so that the client (Alice) can introduce itself to the service (Bob), and then sets up a rendezvous with the service.
+Here is a detailed breakdown of how this happens:
 
 ### Act 1: Where the onion service sets up its introduction points
 
 ![Onion Services: Step 1](/static/images/onion-services/tor-onion-services-1.png)
 
-As the first step in the protocol, Bob (the onion service) contacts a bunch of Tor relays and asks them to act as his _introduction points_, by establishing long-term circuits to them. These circuits are anonymized circuits, so Bob does not reveal his locations to his introduction points.
+As the first step in the protocol, Bob (the onion service) contacts a bunch of Tor relays and asks them to act as his _introduction points_, by establishing long-term circuits to them.
+These circuits are anonymized circuits, so Bob does not reveal his locations to his introduction points.
 
 As part of this step, Bob gives its introduction point a special "authentication key", so that if any clients come for introductions later the introduction point can use that key to match them to Bob.
 
@@ -63,45 +71,57 @@ As part of this step, Bob gives its introduction point a special "authentication
 
 Now that the introduction points are setup, we need to create a way for clients to be able to find them.
 
-For this reason, Bob assembles an _onion service descriptor_, containing a list of his introduction points (and their "authentication keys"), and signs this descriptor with his _identity private key_. The _identity private key_ used here is the private part of the **public key that is encoded in the onion service address**.
+For this reason, Bob assembles an _onion service descriptor_, containing a list of his introduction points (and their "authentication keys"), and signs this descriptor with his _identity private key_.
+The _identity private key_ used here is the private part of the **public key that is encoded in the onion service address**.
 
-Now, Bob uploads that signed descriptor to a _distributed hash table_ which is part of the Tor network, so that clients can also get it. Bob uses an anonymized Tor circuit to do this upload, so that he does not reveal his location.
+Now, Bob uploads that signed descriptor to a _distributed hash table_ which is part of the Tor network, so that clients can also get it.
+Bob uses an anonymized Tor circuit to do this upload, so that he does not reveal his location.
 
 ### Act 3: Where a client wants to visit the onion service
 
-All the previous steps were just setup for the onion service so that it's reachable by clients. Now let's fast-forward to the point where an actual client wants to visit the service:
+All the previous steps were just setup for the onion service so that it's reachable by clients.
+Now let's fast-forward to the point where an actual client wants to visit the service:
 
 ![Onion Services: Step 3](/static/images/onion-services/tor-onion-services-3.png)
 
-In this case, Alice (the client) has the onion address of Bob and she wants to visit it, so she connects to it with her Tor Browser. Now the next thing that needs to happen is that Alice goes to the _distributed hash table_ from the step above, and ask for the signed descriptor of Bob.
+In this case, Alice (the client) has the onion address of Bob and she wants to visit it, so she connects to it with her Tor Browser.
+Now the next thing that needs to happen is that Alice goes to the _distributed hash table_ from the step above, and ask for the signed descriptor of Bob.
 
-When Alice receives the signed descriptor she verifies the signature of the descriptor using the public key that is encoded in the onion address. This provides the _end-to-end authentication_ security property, since we are now sure that this descriptor could only be produced by Bob and no one else. And inside the descriptor there are the introduction points which allow Alice to introduce herself to Bob.
+When Alice receives the signed descriptor, she verifies the signature of the descriptor using the public key that is encoded in the onion address.
+This provides the _end-to-end authentication_ security property, since we are now sure that this descriptor could only be produced by Bob and no one else.
+And inside the descriptor there are the introduction points which allow Alice to introduce herself to Bob.
 
 ### Act 4: Where the client establishes a rendezvous point
 
-Now before the introduction takes place, Alice picks a Tor relay and establishes a circuit to it. Alice asks the relay to become her _rendezvous point_ and gives it an "one-time secret" that will be used as part of the rendezvous procedure.
+Now before the introduction takes place, Alice picks a Tor relay and establishes a circuit to it.
+Alice asks the relay to become her _rendezvous point_ and gives it an "one-time secret" that will be used as part of the rendezvous procedure.
 
 ### Act 5: Where the client introduces itself to the onion service
 
 ![Onion Services: Step 4](/static/images/onion-services/tor-onion-services-4.png)
 
-Now, Alice goes ahead and connects to one of Bob's introduction points and introduces herself to Bob. Through this introduction Bob learns Alice's choice of rendezvous point and the "one-time secret".
+Now, Alice goes ahead and connects to one of Bob's introduction points and introduces herself to Bob.
+Through this introduction Bob learns Alice's choice of rendezvous point and the "one-time secret".
 
 ### Act 6: Where the onion service rendezvous with the client
 
 ![Onion Services: Step 5](/static/images/onion-services/tor-onion-services-5.png)
 
-In this last act, the onion service is now aware of Alice's rendezvous point. The onion service connects to the rendezvous point (through an anonymized circuit) and sends the "one-time secret" to it.
+In this last act, the onion service is now aware of Alice's rendezvous point.
+The onion service connects to the rendezvous point (through an anonymized circuit) and sends the "one-time secret" to it.
 
-Upon the rendezvous point receiving the "one-time secret" from Bob, it informs Alice that the connection has been **successfuly completed**, and now Alice and Bob can use this circuit to communicate with each other. The rendezvous point simply relays (end-to-end encrypted) messages from client to service and vice versa.
+Upon the rendezvous point receiving the "one-time secret" from Bob, it informs Alice that the connection has been **successfuly completed**, and now Alice and Bob can use this circuit to communicate with each other.
+The rendezvous point simply relays (end-to-end encrypted) messages from client to service and vice versa.
 
-In general, the complete connection between client and onion service consists of 6 relays: 3 of them were picked by the client with the third being the rendezvous point and the other 3 were picked by the onion service. This provides _location hiding_ to this connection:
+In general, the complete connection between client and onion service consists of 6 relays: 3 of them were picked by the client with the third being the rendezvous point and the other 3 were picked by the onion service.
+This provides _location hiding_ to this connection:
 
 ![Onion Services: Step 6](/static/images/onion-services/tor-onion-services-6.png)
 
 ## Further resources
 
-This was just a high-level overview of the Tor onion services protocol. Here are some more resources for the curious who want to learn more:
+This was just a high-level overview of the Tor onion services protocol.
+Here are some more resources for the curious who want to learn more:
 
 - The original Tor design paper describing the original design:
 https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/design-paper/tor-design.pdf
@@ -109,4 +129,4 @@ https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/design-paper/tor-design.pdf
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/rend-spec-v3.txt
 - Presentations about onion services
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VmsFxBEN3fc
-https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Di7qAVidy1Y
\ No newline at end of file
+https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Di7qAVidy1Y
diff --git a/content/relay-operations/technical-setup/contents.lr b/content/relay-operations/technical-setup/contents.lr
index fc255aa..87c290a 100644
--- a/content/relay-operations/technical-setup/contents.lr
+++ b/content/relay-operations/technical-setup/contents.lr
@@ -35,8 +35,8 @@ For more information on hosting providers and their policies on allowing Tor rel
 * Does the hoster provide IPv6 connectivity? (it is recommended, but not required)
 * What virtualization / hypervisor (if any) does the provider use? (anything but OpenVZ should be fine)
 * Does the hoster start to throttle bandwidth after a certain amount of traffic?
-* How well connected is the autonomous system of the hoster? To answer this question you can use the AS rank of the autonomous systems if you want to
-compare: http://as-rank.caida.org/ (a lower value is better)
+* How well connected is the autonomous system of the hoster?
+  To answer this question you can use the AS rank of the autonomous systems if you want to compare: http://as-rank.caida.org/ (a lower value is better)
 
 ## If you plan to run Exit Relays
 
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ These steps are intended for the latest stable version of the given OS, on Ubunt
 
 Note: For some operating systems, there are alpha version packages available (tor versions with new features not deemed to be stable yet).
 These are only recommended for people eager to test and report bugs in bleeding edge releases/features.
-If you are looking to run a relay with minimal effort we recommend you stick to stable releases.
+If you are looking to run a relay with minimal effort, we recommend you stick to stable releases.
 
 In this guide we describe how to setup a new non-exit relay.
 By reading further you can easily switch to become an exit relay.
@@ -240,7 +240,8 @@ Manually managing MyFamily for big relaygroups is error prone and can put Tor cl
 
 # Exit Relay Configuration
 
-It is recommended that you setup exit relays on servers dedicated to this purpose. It is not recommended to install Tor exit relays on servers that you need for other services as well.
+It is recommended that you setup exit relays on servers dedicated to this purpose.
+It is not recommended to install Tor exit relays on servers that you need for other services as well.
 Do not mix your own traffic with your exit relay traffic.
 
 ## Reverse DNS and WHOIS record