[tor-commits] [tor/maint-0.3.5] Entry Nodes: Use a reasonably live consensus to select guards
asn at torproject.org
asn at torproject.org
Thu Feb 14 15:48:52 UTC 2019
commit d1ac5613fc832f4b298fbc243a35660dbd0976e3
Author: teor <teor at torproject.org>
Date: Mon Nov 5 15:27:38 2018 +1000
Entry Nodes: Use a reasonably live consensus to select guards
Fixes bug 24661; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha.
---
changes/bug24661 | 3 +++
src/feature/client/entrynodes.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++----------
2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/changes/bug24661 b/changes/bug24661
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a915a93e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changes/bug24661
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+ o Minor bugfixes (client, guard selection):
+ - When Tor's consensus has expired, but is still reasonably live, use it
+ to select guards. Fixes bug 24661; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha.
diff --git a/src/feature/client/entrynodes.c b/src/feature/client/entrynodes.c
index 20208ef61..e0fe1b9a5 100644
--- a/src/feature/client/entrynodes.c
+++ b/src/feature/client/entrynodes.c
@@ -287,7 +287,9 @@ create_initial_guard_context(void)
guard_selection_type_t type = GS_TYPE_INFER;
const char *name = choose_guard_selection(
get_options(),
- networkstatus_get_live_consensus(approx_time()),
+ networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus(
+ approx_time(),
+ usable_consensus_flavor()),
NULL,
&type);
tor_assert(name); // "name" can only be NULL if we had an old name.
@@ -726,7 +728,9 @@ update_guard_selection_choice(const or_options_t *options)
guard_selection_type_t type = GS_TYPE_INFER;
const char *new_name = choose_guard_selection(
options,
- networkstatus_get_live_consensus(approx_time()),
+ networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus(
+ approx_time(),
+ usable_consensus_flavor()),
curr_guard_context,
&type);
tor_assert(new_name);
@@ -1125,14 +1129,16 @@ select_and_add_guard_item_for_sample(guard_selection_t *gs,
* or if we don't need a consensus because we're using bridges.)
*/
static int
-live_consensus_is_missing(const guard_selection_t *gs)
+reasonably_live_consensus_is_missing(const guard_selection_t *gs)
{
tor_assert(gs);
if (gs->type == GS_TYPE_BRIDGE) {
/* We don't update bridges from the consensus; they aren't there. */
return 0;
}
- return networkstatus_get_live_consensus(approx_time()) == NULL;
+ return networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus(
+ approx_time(),
+ usable_consensus_flavor()) == NULL;
}
/**
@@ -1147,9 +1153,9 @@ entry_guards_expand_sample(guard_selection_t *gs)
tor_assert(gs);
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
- if (live_consensus_is_missing(gs)) {
+ if (reasonably_live_consensus_is_missing(gs)) {
log_info(LD_GUARD, "Not expanding the sample guard set; we have "
- "no live consensus.");
+ "no reasonably live consensus.");
return NULL;
}
@@ -1395,11 +1401,12 @@ sampled_guards_update_from_consensus(guard_selection_t *gs)
{
tor_assert(gs);
- // It's important to use only a live consensus here; we don't want to
- // make changes based on anything expired or old.
- if (live_consensus_is_missing(gs)) {
+ // It's important to use a reasonably live consensus here; we want clients
+ // to bootstrap even if their clock is skewed by more than 2-3 hours.
+ // But we don't want to make changes based on anything that's really old.
+ if (reasonably_live_consensus_is_missing(gs)) {
log_info(LD_GUARD, "Not updating the sample guard set; we have "
- "no live consensus.");
+ "no reasonably live consensus.");
return;
}
log_info(LD_GUARD, "Updating sampled guard status based on received "
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