[tor-commits] [tor/master] hs: v3 single onion services fall back to 3-hop intro for unreachable nodes
dgoulet at torproject.org
dgoulet at torproject.org
Thu Aug 29 12:59:05 UTC 2019
commit e2e1c07fd25c96a83b38f5d84d2c063b98ed8f46
Author: teor <teor at torproject.org>
Date: Fri Aug 23 16:17:47 2019 +1000
hs: v3 single onion services fall back to 3-hop intro for unreachable nodes
Previously, v3 single onion services failed when all intro nodes were
unreachable via a 1-hop path. Now, we select intros that are only available
via a 3-hop path, and use a 3-hop path to connect to them.
Fixes bug 23507; bugfix on 0.3.2.1-alpha.
---
src/feature/hs/hs_circuit.c | 25 +++++++++++++++----------
src/feature/hs/hs_circuit.h | 3 ++-
src/feature/hs/hs_service.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------
3 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_circuit.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_circuit.c
index d74b088f0..8acfcbd65 100644
--- a/src/feature/hs/hs_circuit.c
+++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_circuit.c
@@ -758,13 +758,16 @@ hs_circ_retry_service_rendezvous_point(origin_circuit_t *circ)
}
/* For a given service and a service intro point, launch a circuit to the
- * extend info ei. If the service is a single onion, a one-hop circuit will be
- * requested. Return 0 if the circuit was successfully launched and tagged
+ * extend info ei. If the service is a single onion, and direct_conn is true,
+ * a one-hop circuit will be requested.
+ *
+ * Return 0 if the circuit was successfully launched and tagged
* with the correct identifier. On error, a negative value is returned. */
int
hs_circ_launch_intro_point(hs_service_t *service,
const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip,
- extend_info_t *ei)
+ extend_info_t *ei,
+ bool direct_conn)
{
/* Standard flags for introduction circuit. */
int ret = -1, circ_flags = CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME | CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL;
@@ -775,15 +778,17 @@ hs_circ_launch_intro_point(hs_service_t *service,
tor_assert(ei);
/* Update circuit flags in case of a single onion service that requires a
- * direct connection.
- *
- * We only use a one-hop path on the first attempt. If the first attempt
+ * direct connection. */
+ tor_assert_nonfatal(ip->circuit_retries > 0);
+ /* Only single onion services can make direct conns */
+ if (BUG(!service->config.is_single_onion && direct_conn)) {
+ goto end;
+ }
+ /* We only use a one-hop path on the first attempt. If the first attempt
* fails, we use a 3-hop path for reachability / reliability.
* (Unlike v2, retries is incremented by the caller before it calls this
- * function.)
- */
- tor_assert_nonfatal(ip->circuit_retries > 0);
- if (service->config.is_single_onion && ip->circuit_retries == 1) {
+ * function.) */
+ if (direct_conn && ip->circuit_retries == 1) {
circ_flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_ONEHOP_TUNNEL;
}
diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_circuit.h b/src/feature/hs/hs_circuit.h
index b8d8b25ad..e168b301f 100644
--- a/src/feature/hs/hs_circuit.h
+++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_circuit.h
@@ -26,7 +26,8 @@ void hs_circ_service_rp_has_opened(const hs_service_t *service,
origin_circuit_t *circ);
int hs_circ_launch_intro_point(hs_service_t *service,
const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip,
- extend_info_t *ei);
+ extend_info_t *ei,
+ bool direct_conn);
int hs_circ_launch_rendezvous_point(const hs_service_t *service,
const curve25519_public_key_t *onion_key,
const uint8_t *rendezvous_cookie);
diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c
index 402929036..b05f20366 100644
--- a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c
+++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c
@@ -2105,6 +2105,7 @@ build_all_descriptors(time_t now)
static hs_service_intro_point_t *
pick_intro_point(unsigned int direct_conn, smartlist_t *exclude_nodes)
{
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
const node_t *node;
extend_info_t *info = NULL;
hs_service_intro_point_t *ip = NULL;
@@ -2113,11 +2114,19 @@ pick_intro_point(unsigned int direct_conn, smartlist_t *exclude_nodes)
/* Single onion flags. */
router_crn_flags_t direct_flags = flags | CRN_PREF_ADDR | CRN_DIRECT_CONN;
- node = router_choose_random_node(exclude_nodes, get_options()->ExcludeNodes,
+ node = router_choose_random_node(exclude_nodes, options->ExcludeNodes,
direct_conn ? direct_flags : flags);
- /* Unable to find a node. When looking for a node for a direct connection,
- * we could try a 3-hop path instead. We'll add support for this in a later
- * release. */
+
+ /* If we are in single onion mode, retry node selection for a 3-hop
+ * path */
+ if (direct_conn && !node) {
+ log_info(LD_REND,
+ "Unable to find an intro point that we can connect to "
+ "directly, falling back to a 3-hop path.");
+ node = router_choose_random_node(exclude_nodes, options->ExcludeNodes,
+ flags);
+ }
+
if (!node) {
goto err;
}
@@ -2644,7 +2653,7 @@ launch_intro_point_circuits(hs_service_t *service)
* circuits using the current map. */
FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_BEGIN(service, desc) {
/* Keep a ref on if we need a direct connection. We use this often. */
- unsigned int direct_conn = service->config.is_single_onion;
+ bool direct_conn = service->config.is_single_onion;
DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH_MODIFY(desc->intro_points.map, key,
hs_service_intro_point_t *, ip) {
@@ -2655,8 +2664,15 @@ launch_intro_point_circuits(hs_service_t *service)
if (hs_circ_service_get_intro_circ(ip)) {
continue;
}
-
ei = get_extend_info_from_intro_point(ip, direct_conn);
+
+ /* If we can't connect directly to the intro point, get an extend_info
+ * for a multi-hop path instead. */
+ if (ei == NULL && direct_conn) {
+ direct_conn = false;
+ ei = get_extend_info_from_intro_point(ip, 0);
+ }
+
if (ei == NULL) {
/* This is possible if we can get a node_t but not the extend info out
* of it. In this case, we remove the intro point and a new one will
@@ -2668,7 +2684,7 @@ launch_intro_point_circuits(hs_service_t *service)
/* Launch a circuit to the intro point. */
ip->circuit_retries++;
- if (hs_circ_launch_intro_point(service, ip, ei) < 0) {
+ if (hs_circ_launch_intro_point(service, ip, ei, direct_conn) < 0) {
log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to launch intro circuit to node %s "
"for service %s.",
safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(ei)),
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