[tor-commits] [tor/release-0.4.0] Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/937' into maint-0.3.5
teor at torproject.org
teor at torproject.org
Mon Aug 12 03:13:20 UTC 2019
commit ef345ab56d26e51f5d1f1a0b51e55a589465669b
Merge: 9be65c440 85ff6f911
Author: teor <teor at torproject.org>
Date: Mon Aug 12 09:42:15 2019 +1000
Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/937' into maint-0.3.5
changes/bug30148 | 4 ++++
src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --cc src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c
index 876f908d4,000000000..f639fc91e
mode 100644,000000..100644
--- a/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c
+++ b/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c
@@@ -1,740 -1,0 +1,740 @@@
+/* Copyright (c) 2014-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file routerkeys.c
+ *
+ * \brief Functions and structures to handle generating and maintaining the
+ * set of keypairs necessary to be an OR.
+ *
+ * The keys handled here now are the Ed25519 keys that Tor relays use to sign
+ * descriptors, authenticate themselves on links, and identify one another
+ * uniquely. Other keys are maintained in router.c and rendservice.c.
+ *
+ * (TODO: The keys in router.c should go here too.)
+ */
+
+#include "core/or/or.h"
+#include "app/config/config.h"
+#include "feature/relay/router.h"
+#include "feature/relay/routerkeys.h"
+#include "feature/relay/routermode.h"
+#include "feature/keymgt/loadkey.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/torcert.h"
+
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
+#include "lib/tls/tortls.h"
+#include "lib/tls/x509.h"
+
+#define ENC_KEY_HEADER "Boxed Ed25519 key"
+#define ENC_KEY_TAG "master"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
+#include <unistd.h>
+#endif
+
+static ed25519_keypair_t *master_identity_key = NULL;
+static ed25519_keypair_t *master_signing_key = NULL;
+static ed25519_keypair_t *current_auth_key = NULL;
+static tor_cert_t *signing_key_cert = NULL;
+static tor_cert_t *link_cert_cert = NULL;
+static tor_cert_t *auth_key_cert = NULL;
+
+static uint8_t *rsa_ed_crosscert = NULL;
+static size_t rsa_ed_crosscert_len = 0;
+static time_t rsa_ed_crosscert_expiration = 0;
+
+/**
+ * Running as a server: load, reload, or refresh our ed25519 keys and
+ * certificates, creating and saving new ones as needed.
+ *
+ * Return -1 on failure; 0 on success if the signing key was not replaced;
+ * and 1 on success if the signing key was replaced.
+ */
+int
+load_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, time_t now)
+{
+ ed25519_keypair_t *id = NULL;
+ ed25519_keypair_t *sign = NULL;
+ ed25519_keypair_t *auth = NULL;
+ const ed25519_keypair_t *sign_signing_key_with_id = NULL;
+ const ed25519_keypair_t *use_signing = NULL;
+ const tor_cert_t *check_signing_cert = NULL;
+ tor_cert_t *sign_cert = NULL;
+ tor_cert_t *auth_cert = NULL;
+ int signing_key_changed = 0;
+
+ // It is later than 1972, since otherwise there would be no C compilers.
+ // (Try to diagnose #22466.)
+ tor_assert_nonfatal(now >= 2 * 365 * 86400);
+
+#define FAIL(msg) do { \
+ log_warn(LD_OR, (msg)); \
+ goto err; \
+ } while (0)
+#define SET_KEY(key, newval) do { \
+ if ((key) != (newval)) \
+ ed25519_keypair_free(key); \
+ key = (newval); \
+ } while (0)
+#define SET_CERT(cert, newval) do { \
+ if ((cert) != (newval)) \
+ tor_cert_free(cert); \
+ cert = (newval); \
+ } while (0)
+#define HAPPENS_SOON(when, interval) \
+ ((when) < now + (interval))
+#define EXPIRES_SOON(cert, interval) \
+ (!(cert) || HAPPENS_SOON((cert)->valid_until, (interval)))
+
+ /* XXXX support encrypted identity keys fully */
+
+ /* First try to get the signing key to see how it is. */
+ {
+ char *fname =
+ options_get_keydir_fname(options, "ed25519_signing");
+ sign = ed_key_init_from_file(
+ fname,
+ INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT|
+ INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT,
+ LOG_INFO,
+ NULL, 0, 0, CERT_TYPE_ID_SIGNING, &sign_cert, options);
+ tor_free(fname);
+ check_signing_cert = sign_cert;
+ use_signing = sign;
+ }
+
+ if (use_signing) {
+ /* We loaded a signing key with its certificate. */
+ if (! master_signing_key) {
+ /* We didn't know one before! */
+ signing_key_changed = 1;
+ } else if (! ed25519_pubkey_eq(&use_signing->pubkey,
+ &master_signing_key->pubkey) ||
+ ! tor_memeq(use_signing->seckey.seckey,
+ master_signing_key->seckey.seckey,
+ ED25519_SECKEY_LEN)) {
+ /* We loaded a different signing key than the one we knew before. */
+ signing_key_changed = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!use_signing && master_signing_key) {
+ /* We couldn't load a signing key, but we already had one loaded */
+ check_signing_cert = signing_key_cert;
+ use_signing = master_signing_key;
+ }
+
+ const int offline_master =
+ options->OfflineMasterKey && options->command != CMD_KEYGEN;
+ const int need_new_signing_key =
+ NULL == use_signing ||
+ EXPIRES_SOON(check_signing_cert, 0) ||
+ (options->command == CMD_KEYGEN && ! options->change_key_passphrase);
+ const int want_new_signing_key =
+ need_new_signing_key ||
+ EXPIRES_SOON(check_signing_cert, options->TestingSigningKeySlop);
+
+ /* We can only create a master key if we haven't been told that the
+ * master key will always be offline. Also, if we have a signing key,
+ * then we shouldn't make a new master ID key. */
+ const int can_make_master_id_key = !offline_master &&
+ NULL == use_signing;
+
+ if (need_new_signing_key) {
+ log_notice(LD_OR, "It looks like I need to generate and sign a new "
+ "medium-term signing key, because %s. To do that, I "
+ "need to load%s the permanent master identity key. "
+ "If the master identity key was not moved or encrypted "
+ "with a passphrase, this will be done automatically and "
+ "no further action is required. Otherwise, provide the "
+ "necessary data using 'tor --keygen' to do it manually.",
+ (NULL == use_signing) ? "I don't have one" :
+ EXPIRES_SOON(check_signing_cert, 0) ? "the one I have is expired" :
+ "you asked me to make one with --keygen",
+ can_make_master_id_key ? " (or create)" : "");
+ } else if (want_new_signing_key && !offline_master) {
+ log_notice(LD_OR, "It looks like I should try to generate and sign a "
+ "new medium-term signing key, because the one I have is "
+ "going to expire soon. To do that, I'm going to have to "
+ "try to load the permanent master identity key. "
+ "If the master identity key was not moved or encrypted "
+ "with a passphrase, this will be done automatically and "
+ "no further action is required. Otherwise, provide the "
+ "necessary data using 'tor --keygen' to do it manually.");
+ } else if (want_new_signing_key) {
+ log_notice(LD_OR, "It looks like I should try to generate and sign a "
+ "new medium-term signing key, because the one I have is "
+ "going to expire soon. But OfflineMasterKey is set, so I "
+ "won't try to load a permanent master identity key. You "
+ "will need to use 'tor --keygen' to make a new signing "
+ "key and certificate.");
+ }
+
+ {
+ uint32_t flags =
+ (INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT|
+ INIT_ED_KEY_EXTRA_STRONG|INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR);
+ if (can_make_master_id_key)
+ flags |= INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE;
+ if (! need_new_signing_key)
+ flags |= INIT_ED_KEY_MISSING_SECRET_OK;
+ if (! want_new_signing_key || offline_master)
+ flags |= INIT_ED_KEY_OMIT_SECRET;
+ if (offline_master)
+ flags |= INIT_ED_KEY_OFFLINE_SECRET;
+ if (options->command == CMD_KEYGEN)
+ flags |= INIT_ED_KEY_TRY_ENCRYPTED;
+
+ /* Check/Create the key directory */
+ if (create_keys_directory(options) < 0)
- return -1;
++ goto err;
+
+ char *fname;
+ if (options->master_key_fname) {
+ fname = tor_strdup(options->master_key_fname);
+ flags |= INIT_ED_KEY_EXPLICIT_FNAME;
+ } else {
+ fname = options_get_keydir_fname(options, "ed25519_master_id");
+ }
+ id = ed_key_init_from_file(
+ fname,
+ flags,
+ LOG_WARN, NULL, 0, 0, 0, NULL, options);
+ tor_free(fname);
+ if (!id) {
+ if (need_new_signing_key) {
+ if (offline_master)
+ FAIL("Can't load master identity key; OfflineMasterKey is set.");
+ else
+ FAIL("Missing identity key");
+ } else {
+ log_warn(LD_OR, "Master public key was absent; inferring from "
+ "public key in signing certificate and saving to disk.");
+ tor_assert(check_signing_cert);
+ id = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*id));
+ memcpy(&id->pubkey, &check_signing_cert->signing_key,
+ sizeof(ed25519_public_key_t));
+ fname = options_get_keydir_fname(options,
+ "ed25519_master_id_public_key");
+ if (ed25519_pubkey_write_to_file(&id->pubkey, fname, "type0") < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_OR, "Error while attempting to write master public key "
+ "to disk");
+ tor_free(fname);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ tor_free(fname);
+ }
+ }
+ if (tor_mem_is_zero((char*)id->seckey.seckey, sizeof(id->seckey)))
+ sign_signing_key_with_id = NULL;
+ else
+ sign_signing_key_with_id = id;
+ }
+
+ if (master_identity_key &&
+ !ed25519_pubkey_eq(&id->pubkey, &master_identity_key->pubkey)) {
+ FAIL("Identity key on disk does not match key we loaded earlier!");
+ }
+
+ if (need_new_signing_key && NULL == sign_signing_key_with_id)
+ FAIL("Can't load master key make a new signing key.");
+
+ if (sign_cert) {
+ if (! sign_cert->signing_key_included)
+ FAIL("Loaded a signing cert with no key included!");
+ if (! ed25519_pubkey_eq(&sign_cert->signing_key, &id->pubkey))
+ FAIL("The signing cert we have was not signed with the master key "
+ "we loaded!");
+ if (tor_cert_checksig(sign_cert, &id->pubkey, 0) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_OR, "The signing cert we loaded was not signed "
+ "correctly: %s!",
+ tor_cert_describe_signature_status(sign_cert));
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (want_new_signing_key && sign_signing_key_with_id) {
+ uint32_t flags = (INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE|
+ INIT_ED_KEY_REPLACE|
+ INIT_ED_KEY_EXTRA_STRONG|
+ INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT|
+ INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT);
+ char *fname =
+ options_get_keydir_fname(options, "ed25519_signing");
+ ed25519_keypair_free(sign);
+ tor_cert_free(sign_cert);
+ sign = ed_key_init_from_file(fname,
+ flags, LOG_WARN,
+ sign_signing_key_with_id, now,
+ options->SigningKeyLifetime,
+ CERT_TYPE_ID_SIGNING, &sign_cert, options);
+ tor_free(fname);
+ if (!sign)
+ FAIL("Missing signing key");
+ use_signing = sign;
+ signing_key_changed = 1;
+
+ tor_assert(sign_cert->signing_key_included);
+ tor_assert(ed25519_pubkey_eq(&sign_cert->signing_key, &id->pubkey));
+ tor_assert(ed25519_pubkey_eq(&sign_cert->signed_key, &sign->pubkey));
+ } else if (want_new_signing_key) {
+ static ratelim_t missing_master = RATELIM_INIT(3600);
+ log_fn_ratelim(&missing_master, LOG_WARN, LD_OR,
+ "Signing key will expire soon, but I can't load the "
+ "master key to sign a new one!");
+ }
+
+ tor_assert(use_signing);
+
+ /* At this point we no longer need our secret identity key. So wipe
+ * it, if we loaded it in the first place. */
+ memwipe(id->seckey.seckey, 0, sizeof(id->seckey));
+
+ if (options->command == CMD_KEYGEN)
+ goto end;
+
+ if (server_mode(options) &&
+ (!rsa_ed_crosscert ||
+ HAPPENS_SOON(rsa_ed_crosscert_expiration, 30*86400))) {
+ uint8_t *crosscert;
+ time_t expiration = now+6*30*86400; /* 6 months in the future. */
+ ssize_t crosscert_len = tor_make_rsa_ed25519_crosscert(&id->pubkey,
+ get_server_identity_key(),
+ expiration,
+ &crosscert);
+ tor_free(rsa_ed_crosscert);
+ rsa_ed_crosscert_len = crosscert_len;
+ rsa_ed_crosscert = crosscert;
+ rsa_ed_crosscert_expiration = expiration;
+ }
+
+ if (!current_auth_key ||
+ signing_key_changed ||
+ EXPIRES_SOON(auth_key_cert, options->TestingAuthKeySlop)) {
+ auth = ed_key_new(use_signing, INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT,
+ now,
+ options->TestingAuthKeyLifetime,
+ CERT_TYPE_SIGNING_AUTH, &auth_cert);
+
+ if (!auth)
+ FAIL("Can't create auth key");
+ }
+
+ /* We've generated or loaded everything. Put them in memory. */
+
+ end:
+ if (! master_identity_key) {
+ SET_KEY(master_identity_key, id);
+ } else {
+ tor_free(id);
+ }
+ if (sign) {
+ SET_KEY(master_signing_key, sign);
+ SET_CERT(signing_key_cert, sign_cert);
+ }
+ if (auth) {
+ SET_KEY(current_auth_key, auth);
+ SET_CERT(auth_key_cert, auth_cert);
+ }
+
+ return signing_key_changed;
+ err:
+ ed25519_keypair_free(id);
+ ed25519_keypair_free(sign);
+ ed25519_keypair_free(auth);
+ tor_cert_free(sign_cert);
+ tor_cert_free(auth_cert);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Retrieve our currently-in-use Ed25519 link certificate and id certificate,
+ * and, if they would expire soon (based on the time <b>now</b>, generate new
+ * certificates (without embedding the public part of the signing key inside).
+ * If <b>force</b> is true, always generate a new certificate.
+ *
+ * The signed_key from the current id->signing certificate will be used to
+ * sign the new key within newly generated X509 certificate.
+ *
+ * Returns -1 upon error. Otherwise, returns 0 upon success (either when the
+ * current certificate is still valid, or when a new certificate was
+ * successfully generated, or no certificate was needed).
+ */
+int
+generate_ed_link_cert(const or_options_t *options, time_t now,
+ int force)
+{
+ const tor_x509_cert_t *link_ = NULL, *id = NULL;
+ tor_cert_t *link_cert = NULL;
+
+ if (tor_tls_get_my_certs(1, &link_, &id) < 0 || link_ == NULL) {
+ if (!server_mode(options)) {
+ /* No need to make an Ed25519->Link cert: we are a client */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ log_warn(LD_OR, "Can't get my x509 link cert.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ const common_digests_t *digests = tor_x509_cert_get_cert_digests(link_);
+
+ if (force == 0 &&
+ link_cert_cert &&
+ ! EXPIRES_SOON(link_cert_cert, options->TestingLinkKeySlop) &&
+ fast_memeq(digests->d[DIGEST_SHA256], link_cert_cert->signed_key.pubkey,
+ DIGEST256_LEN)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ed25519_public_key_t dummy_key;
+ memcpy(dummy_key.pubkey, digests->d[DIGEST_SHA256], DIGEST256_LEN);
+
+ link_cert = tor_cert_create(get_master_signing_keypair(),
+ CERT_TYPE_SIGNING_LINK,
+ &dummy_key,
+ now,
+ options->TestingLinkCertLifetime, 0);
+
+ if (link_cert) {
+ SET_CERT(link_cert_cert, link_cert);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#undef FAIL
+#undef SET_KEY
+#undef SET_CERT
+
+/**
+ * Return 1 if any of the following are true:
+ *
+ * - if one of our Ed25519 signing, auth, or link certificates would expire
+ * soon w.r.t. the time <b>now</b>,
+ * - if we do not currently have a link certificate, or
+ * - if our cached Ed25519 link certificate is not same as the one we're
+ * currently using.
+ *
+ * Otherwise, returns 0.
+ */
+int
+should_make_new_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, const time_t now)
+{
+ if (!master_identity_key ||
+ !master_signing_key ||
+ !current_auth_key ||
+ !link_cert_cert ||
+ EXPIRES_SOON(signing_key_cert, options->TestingSigningKeySlop) ||
+ EXPIRES_SOON(auth_key_cert, options->TestingAuthKeySlop) ||
+ EXPIRES_SOON(link_cert_cert, options->TestingLinkKeySlop))
+ return 1;
+
+ const tor_x509_cert_t *link_ = NULL, *id = NULL;
+
+ if (tor_tls_get_my_certs(1, &link_, &id) < 0 || link_ == NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ const common_digests_t *digests = tor_x509_cert_get_cert_digests(link_);
+
+ if (!fast_memeq(digests->d[DIGEST_SHA256],
+ link_cert_cert->signed_key.pubkey,
+ DIGEST256_LEN)) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#undef EXPIRES_SOON
+#undef HAPPENS_SOON
+
+#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
+/* Helper for unit tests: populate the ed25519 keys without saving or
+ * loading */
+void
+init_mock_ed_keys(const crypto_pk_t *rsa_identity_key)
+{
+ routerkeys_free_all();
+
+#define MAKEKEY(k) \
+ k = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*k)); \
+ if (ed25519_keypair_generate(k, 0) < 0) { \
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't make a keypair"); \
+ goto err; \
+ }
+ MAKEKEY(master_identity_key);
+ MAKEKEY(master_signing_key);
+ MAKEKEY(current_auth_key);
+#define MAKECERT(cert, signing, signed_, type, flags) \
+ cert = tor_cert_create(signing, \
+ type, \
+ &signed_->pubkey, \
+ time(NULL), 86400, \
+ flags); \
+ if (!cert) { \
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't make a %s certificate!", #cert); \
+ goto err; \
+ }
+
+ MAKECERT(signing_key_cert,
+ master_identity_key, master_signing_key, CERT_TYPE_ID_SIGNING,
+ CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY);
+ MAKECERT(auth_key_cert,
+ master_signing_key, current_auth_key, CERT_TYPE_SIGNING_AUTH, 0);
+
+ if (generate_ed_link_cert(get_options(), time(NULL), 0) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't make link certificate");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ rsa_ed_crosscert_len = tor_make_rsa_ed25519_crosscert(
+ &master_identity_key->pubkey,
+ rsa_identity_key,
+ time(NULL)+86400,
+ &rsa_ed_crosscert);
+
+ return;
+
+ err:
+ routerkeys_free_all();
+ tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached();
+}
+#undef MAKEKEY
+#undef MAKECERT
+#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */
+
+/**
+ * Print the ISO8601-formated <b>expiration</b> for a certificate with
+ * some <b>description</b> to stdout.
+ *
+ * For example, for a signing certificate, this might print out:
+ * signing-cert-expiry: 2017-07-25 08:30:15 UTC
+ */
+static void
+print_cert_expiration(const char *expiration,
+ const char *description)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s-cert-expiry: %s\n", description, expiration);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Log when a certificate, <b>cert</b>, with some <b>description</b> and
+ * stored in a file named <b>fname</b>, is going to expire.
+ */
+static void
+log_ed_cert_expiration(const tor_cert_t *cert,
+ const char *description,
+ const char *fname) {
+ char expiration[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
+
+ if (BUG(!cert)) { /* If the specified key hasn't been loaded */
+ log_warn(LD_OR, "No %s key loaded; can't get certificate expiration.",
+ description);
+ } else {
+ format_local_iso_time(expiration, cert->valid_until);
+ log_notice(LD_OR, "The %s certificate stored in %s is valid until %s.",
+ description, fname, expiration);
+ print_cert_expiration(expiration, description);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Log when our master signing key certificate expires. Used when tor is given
+ * the --key-expiration command-line option.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success and 1 on failure.
+ */
+static int
+log_master_signing_key_cert_expiration(const or_options_t *options)
+{
+ const tor_cert_t *signing_key;
+ char *fn = NULL;
+ int failed = 0;
+ time_t now = approx_time();
+
+ fn = options_get_keydir_fname(options, "ed25519_signing_cert");
+
+ /* Try to grab our cached copy of the key. */
+ signing_key = get_master_signing_key_cert();
+
+ tor_assert(server_identity_key_is_set());
+
+ /* Load our keys from disk, if necessary. */
+ if (!signing_key) {
+ failed = load_ed_keys(options, now) < 0;
+ signing_key = get_master_signing_key_cert();
+ }
+
+ /* If we do have a signing key, log the expiration time. */
+ if (signing_key) {
+ log_ed_cert_expiration(signing_key, "signing", fn);
+ } else {
+ log_warn(LD_OR, "Could not load signing key certificate from %s, so " \
+ "we couldn't learn anything about certificate expiration.", fn);
+ }
+
+ tor_free(fn);
+
+ return failed;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Log when a key certificate expires. Used when tor is given the
+ * --key-expiration command-line option.
+ *
+ * If an command argument is given, which should specify the type of
+ * key to get expiry information about (currently supported arguments
+ * are "sign"), get info about that type of certificate. Otherwise,
+ * print info about the supported arguments.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+log_cert_expiration(void)
+{
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ const char *arg = options->command_arg;
+
+ if (!strcmp(arg, "sign")) {
+ return log_master_signing_key_cert_expiration(options);
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr, "No valid argument to --key-expiration found!\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "Currently recognised arguments are: 'sign'\n");
+
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
+
+const ed25519_public_key_t *
+get_master_identity_key(void)
+{
+ if (!master_identity_key)
+ return NULL;
+ return &master_identity_key->pubkey;
+}
+
+/** Return true iff <b>id</b> is our Ed25519 master identity key. */
+int
+router_ed25519_id_is_me(const ed25519_public_key_t *id)
+{
+ return id && master_identity_key &&
+ ed25519_pubkey_eq(id, &master_identity_key->pubkey);
+}
+
+#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
+/* only exists for the unit tests, since otherwise the identity key
+ * should be used to sign nothing but the signing key. */
+const ed25519_keypair_t *
+get_master_identity_keypair(void)
+{
+ return master_identity_key;
+}
+#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */
+
+const ed25519_keypair_t *
+get_master_signing_keypair(void)
+{
+ return master_signing_key;
+}
+
+const struct tor_cert_st *
+get_master_signing_key_cert(void)
+{
+ return signing_key_cert;
+}
+
+const ed25519_keypair_t *
+get_current_auth_keypair(void)
+{
+ return current_auth_key;
+}
+
+const tor_cert_t *
+get_current_link_cert_cert(void)
+{
+ return link_cert_cert;
+}
+
+const tor_cert_t *
+get_current_auth_key_cert(void)
+{
+ return auth_key_cert;
+}
+
+void
+get_master_rsa_crosscert(const uint8_t **cert_out,
+ size_t *size_out)
+{
+ *cert_out = rsa_ed_crosscert;
+ *size_out = rsa_ed_crosscert_len;
+}
+
+/** Construct cross-certification for the master identity key with
+ * the ntor onion key. Store the sign of the corresponding ed25519 public key
+ * in *<b>sign_out</b>. */
+tor_cert_t *
+make_ntor_onion_key_crosscert(const curve25519_keypair_t *onion_key,
+ const ed25519_public_key_t *master_id_key, time_t now, time_t lifetime,
+ int *sign_out)
+{
+ tor_cert_t *cert = NULL;
+ ed25519_keypair_t ed_onion_key;
+
+ if (ed25519_keypair_from_curve25519_keypair(&ed_onion_key, sign_out,
+ onion_key) < 0)
+ goto end;
+
+ cert = tor_cert_create(&ed_onion_key, CERT_TYPE_ONION_ID, master_id_key,
+ now, lifetime, 0);
+
+ end:
+ memwipe(&ed_onion_key, 0, sizeof(ed_onion_key));
+ return cert;
+}
+
+/** Construct and return an RSA signature for the TAP onion key to
+ * cross-certify the RSA and Ed25519 identity keys. Set <b>len_out</b> to its
+ * length. */
+uint8_t *
+make_tap_onion_key_crosscert(const crypto_pk_t *onion_key,
+ const ed25519_public_key_t *master_id_key,
+ const crypto_pk_t *rsa_id_key,
+ int *len_out)
+{
+ uint8_t signature[PK_BYTES];
+ uint8_t signed_data[DIGEST_LEN + ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN];
+
+ *len_out = 0;
+ if (crypto_pk_get_digest(rsa_id_key, (char*)signed_data) < 0) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ memcpy(signed_data + DIGEST_LEN, master_id_key->pubkey, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+
+ int r = crypto_pk_private_sign(onion_key,
+ (char*)signature, sizeof(signature),
+ (const char*)signed_data, sizeof(signed_data));
+ if (r < 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ *len_out = r;
+
+ return tor_memdup(signature, r);
+}
+
+void
+routerkeys_free_all(void)
+{
+ ed25519_keypair_free(master_identity_key);
+ ed25519_keypair_free(master_signing_key);
+ ed25519_keypair_free(current_auth_key);
+ tor_cert_free(signing_key_cert);
+ tor_cert_free(link_cert_cert);
+ tor_cert_free(auth_key_cert);
+ tor_free(rsa_ed_crosscert);
+
+ master_identity_key = master_signing_key = NULL;
+ current_auth_key = NULL;
+ signing_key_cert = link_cert_cert = auth_key_cert = NULL;
+ rsa_ed_crosscert = NULL; // redundant
+ rsa_ed_crosscert_len = 0;
+}
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